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Foreword
This special issue of the Hungarian Philosophical Review presents papers resulting 
from current research on Austrian philosophy. The topics are mainly historical, 
however they provide an in-depth analytical reconstruction and interpretation 
of the views discussed. Part of the papers focus on lesser known aspects of and 
connections within the diverse strands of the Austrian philosophical tradition, 
others address some important influences of Austrian philosophy (including also 
philosophical aspects of psychology, linguistics and mathematics) on Hungarian 
intellectual life and academia. 
The topics discussed are the following: Guillaume Fréchette provides an 
analysis of Brentano’s views on perception. Denis Fisette writes on the re-
ception of Mach by Brentano and his students. Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau 
investigates the influence of Meinongians on the First Vienna Cirlce’s views 
on logic. Thomas Uebel presents a new understanding, and a possible de-
fence of Carnap’s methodological solipsism he advocated in Der logische Auf-
bau der Welt. Christian Damböck investigates the “plagiarism” or “Ideendieb-
stahl” charge according to which Carnap in the Aufbau allegedly had taken 
over views of Husserl formulated in the Ideen II. Gergely Ambrus discusses 
Schlick’s Austrian psychophysical identity theory and its similarity to certain 
views of Russell and to contemporary Russellian monists, David Chalmers 
in particular. Friedrich Stadler provides a general context and background 
to these particular issues with an overview of “Austrian philosophy” at the 
University of Vienna from the 19th to the end of the 20th century. In addition, 
we also present papers about the diverse influences Austrian philosophy as 
broadly conceived exerted on Hungarian thinkers. Csaba Pléh discusses the 
influence of Karl Bühler and his school on Hungarian psychology and linguis-
tics; Miklós Rédei analyses the connections between Gödel’s and von Neu-
mann’s views on the foundations of mathematics. Péter András Varga discuss-
es the peregrinatio of the Hungarian philosopher Bernhard (Bernát) Alexander, 
a noted Kant scholar and a major figure in Hungarian intellectual life at the 
turn of the 19th century.
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In some more detail: Guillaume Fréchette’s paper Brentano on Perception 
discusses what may be taken as the “standard view” of Brentano’s theory of 
perception, according to which perceptual experiences constitute a subclass of 
intentional experiences. Fréchette argues that the standard view cannot be sup-
ported either by sense-datum theory, or adverbialist or representationalist the-
ories of perception. Further, he suggests, Brentano’s understanding of optical 
illusions presupposes the distinction between the subjectively and objectively 
given, which challenges the standard view, and fits better with an account of 
perception as openness to and awareness of the world. 
Denis Fisette in his The Reception of Ernst Mach in the School of Brentano out-
lines the most important elements of this reception. First he discusses Bren-
tano’s lectures on positivism in which he evaluates Mach’s theory of sensations. 
This is followed by a presentation of the early reception of Mach in Prague by 
Brentano’s students; then the relation between Mach’s descriptivism and his 
phenomenology is established, showing that Mach’s phenomenalism was in-
deed a source of Husserl’s phenomenology. Further, Mach’s contribution to the 
controversy on gestalt qualities is also examined as well as Mach’s debate with 
Stumpf on psychophysical relations and Husserl’s criticism of Mach’s alleged 
logical psychologism.
Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau focuses on some less familiar aspects of the his-
tory of the precursers of the later Vienna Circle. First, he puts forth the historical 
thesis that, due to the lack of archival sources, it may be questioned whether 
the so-called “First Vienna Circle” existed at all, at least as a regular discus-
sion group. Second, he uncovers hitherto unknown or neglected connections 
between the First Circle (Neurath, Frank, Hahn) and a group of philosophers 
strongly influenced by Meinong (as e.g. Alois Höfler). Limbeck-Lilienau argues 
that – besides the well-known influences of Mach and the French convention-
alists – the interaction with the Meinongians paved the way for the reception of 
the new symbolic logic and especially of Russell´s philosophy of logic and math-
ematics. Further, he claims that Neurath, and probably also Hahn, endorsed a 
logical realism similar to that of Russell and Meinong, which they renounced 
only after the reception of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.
Christian Damböck addresses a charge against Carnap that was formulated al-
ready in the 1990s by Verena Mayer and then by Guillermo Rosaddo Haddock, 
and was further radicalized in a recent article of Mayer, according to which Car-
nap in his Aufbau took over substantial parts from Husserl’s (then unpublished) 
Ideen II without acknowledging his sources. Damböck refutes these claims, dif-
ferentiating between several senses of plagiarism and „Ideendiebstahl”, and 
arguing that Carnap – though he might have been acquainted with Husserl’s 
manuscript – cannot be accused of plagiarism even in the weakest sense.
Thomas Uebel in his Overcoming Carnap’s Methodological Solipsism: Not as Easy 
as it Seems presents a novel understanding and a possible defense of Carnap’s 
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methodological solipsism advocated in Der logische Aufbau der Welt. He brackets 
Quine’s “is-at” objection against the constructional system of the Aufbau (pub-
lished in Two Dogmas in 1951), and concentrates on Neider’s objection, accord-
ing to which the intersubjectivity of the meaning of the concepts constructed by 
the Aufbau methods is not achieved. Uebel suggests that there are remarkable 
resources to resist this charge, drawing on the distinction between re-creating 
and simulating intersubjectivity, if one takes Carnap’s descriptions of the aim of 
the constructional programme literally. Uebel has extensively investigated Car-
nap’s physicalist turn in previous publications, this paper however approaches 
this development from a new angle, and provides further insights to Carnap’s 
goals in the Aufbau as well as to his reason for – finally – abandoning method-
ological solipsism that has been the epistemological fundament of the Aufbau 
programme. 
Gergely Ambrus presents Moritz Schlick’s “Austrian” psychophysical identi-
ty theory, presented in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, and compares it with the 
Russellian monist views of Russell (formulated in The Analysis of Matter and Hu-
man Knowledge, for example) and also to David Chalmers’ position, a represent-
ative of contemporary Russellian monism. A close similarity of Russell’s and 
Schlick’s views was already stated by Herbert Feigl long ago; so the goal of the 
comparision is to see in detail to what extent Russell’s and Schlick’s views are 
really akin, and further to determine the relation of some contemporary Russel-
lian monist views to these historical ancestors. As a result, Ambrus argues that all 
three accounts share some fundamental tenets, namely linguistic physicalism, 
an ontology which may be described as physicalist dualist property pluralism, 
and a sort of dual-language account of the psychophysical identity thesis, which 
is an alternative to the reductionist materialism of e.g. Smart, Armstrong and 
Lewis. Further, he claims, that Schlick, Russell and Chalmers all ground these 
tenets on a structuralist account of the meaning of physical terms, which, how-
ever, they lay out in importantly different ways.
Friedrich Stadler provides an overview of “Austrian philosophy” during the 
“long 20th century” through an institutional history of the Department of Phi-
losophy with the main figures teaching philosophy at the University of Vienna. 
After a short review of philosophy as a key discipline within the Faculty of Phi-
losophy, the development is described mainly from 1848 onwards with a focus 
on the last century. The personal and institutional breaks and continuities are 
characterized by a thematic analysis of the philosophical research and teaching 
in historical context. This is done with a focus on the typical Austrian “scientific 
philosophy” in its relation to alternative dominant currents. This specific dy-
namics becomes manifest on the one hand with the significance of philosophy 
within the Faculty of Philosophy and, on the other, with its role and function vis 
à vis the other classical faculties. The process of a gradual dissolution and diver-
sification of the Faculty of Philosophy up to the present indicates this changing 
8 FOREWORD
role of a long-term, dominant “royal discipline”. Nevertheless, the restructuring 
and renewal of philosophy as a discipline and research field since the University 
reform after 2000 appears as a successful and promising turn with an increasing 
international visibility and appreciation.
The other papers discuss diverse influences of Austrian philosophy and relat-
ed subjects on Hungarian philosophy and science. Csaba Pléh reviews the in-
fluence of Karl Bühler and his school. First he surveys the influence of Bühler’s 
works on Denkpsychologie on Valéria Dienes, Ferenc Lehnert/Lénárd, Antal 
Schütz and Imre Molnár, and then provides a detailed analysis of the influences 
of the mature Bühler of the Vienna years both on Hungarian psychology and 
linguistics. He displays the work of two Hungarian experimental psychologists, 
Paul (Pál) Schiller von Harkai, who did postdoctoral research in Vienna, and 
Ludwig (Lajos) Kardos, who was a PhD student of Bühler in Vienna. Schiller 
von Harkai developed a functionalist theoretical psychology combined with the 
Gestalt ideas of Lewin and Bühler. Kardos extended the sign-based perceptual 
theory of Bühler into a successful mathematical theory of light constancy that 
interpreted contextual influences on a general model. Besides Bühler’s recep-
tion in psychology Pléh also deals with the impact of Bühler’s theory of language 
on Hungarian linguistics: his reception by Gyula Laziczius, and his influence on 
Laziczius’ student, the linguist and psychoanalyst Iván Fónagy.
Miklós Rédei’s paper investigates the parallels and divergences of Kurt 
Gödel’s and John von Neumann’s life and career. They were both born in the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, had similar social background and education, and 
their careers had many parallels and partly overlapping research topics. Rédei 
presents these overlaps and personal encounters, beginning with the first ma-
jor intersection of their interests, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Rédei 
first reconstructs the initially different but later converging interpretations of 
the second incompleteness theorem (which von Neumann also independently 
proved), and then, widening the scope of investigations, turns to Gödel’s and 
von Neumann’s general views on the nature mathematics. Rédei convincingly 
shows that although Gödel was a Platonist while von Neumann emphasized the 
empirical element in mathematics, the relation of their views is more complex; 
Gödel also acknowledged the role of empirical scientific theories for inventing 
new mathematical ideas. Their inspiration and attitude however was still signif-
icantly different, as von Neumann’s mathematical innovations were initiated in 
most cases by empirical sciences from quantum mechanics to economics (game 
theory), while Gödel’s interest and inspiration came mainly from pure mathe-
matics and philosophy. 
Péter András Varga’s reconstructs the early influences on Bernhard (Bernát) 
Alexander at the University of Vienna in 1869–1871. Alexander was an eminent 
scholar, later to become a major figure in Hungarian intellectual life: by the turn 
century he became a respected university professor, public writer and art critic, 
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a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, serving also as the President 
of the Hungarian Philosophical Society. The paper investigates the influences 
Alexander received at the first station on his peregrination at the University of 
Vienna. This is interesting for it informs the reader both about the early forma-
tion of Alexander’ thought as well as it provides insights into the philosophical 
scene in Vienna around 1870, before Brentano’s arrival – hence presenting one 
of the rare intersections between the history of Austrian and Hungarian philoso-
phy. The paper is supplemented with a document, an excerpt from Alexander’s 
intellectual diary from the Vienna period, edited and introduced by Barnabás 
Szabados, Bettina Szekér and Péter András Varga.
Gergely Ambrus – Friedrich Stadler
 

UNITY AND TENSIONS  
IN AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY

Guillaume Fréchette
I. THE STANDARD VIEW
Thanks to his account of mental acts, Brentano is usually acknowledged as the 
philosopher of intentionality. What characterizes mental acts is their intention-
ality, that is, their directedness towards an object (Brentano 1874–1973. 68–124). 
Another important contribution of Brentano to contemporary philosophy lies in 
his conception of consciousness. In his view, mental acts are not only character-
ized by their intentionality with regard to their objects, but are also concomi-
tantly self-directed (ibid. 180/98). This self-directedness is what makes them 
conscious. 
Since intentionality and consciousness are two central marks of the mental, 
they also apply to perceptual acts as well. An act of sensory perception, insofar 
as it is mental, is intentional and conscious. It is worth noting, however, that 
while many philosophers have acknowledged in recent years the intentionality 
mark for the mental, the consciousness mark is rarely challenged.1 This perhaps 
explains in part why Brentano’s account of perception has received so little at-
tention in the secondary literature. If, following his view, perception has to be 
intentional and conscious, then it seems that the conditions for any mental state 
to be a perception are very strict, perhaps too strict: we may want to say that 
there is always an (intentional) object in every perceptual act, but we may want 
to dispute that every perceptual act is therefore also conscious. Or conversely, we 
may want to say that every perceptual act is conscious, but we may want to dis-
pute that every perceptual act therefore has an (intentional) object.
Another possible explanation for the recent lack of interest in Brentano’s phi-
losophy of perception may be found in one common interpretation of his con-
ception of intentionality, according to which the objects of intentional acts are 
1  See Textor 2017 on disputing the intentionality mark.
Brentano on Perception
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immanent objects, that is objects that have “some kind of reality in the mind”.2 
Following this interpretation, if intentionality is the mark of the mental, then 
perception is nothing but a special case of intentionality, understood as a rela-
tion between a mental act and an immanent object. In other words, following 
the common interpretation of Brentano’s conception of intentionality, what one 
perceives is merely an intentional object that is an object in the mind; it is not 
an ordinary spatiotemporal object. On this interpretation, it seems as if Bren-
tano would defend a view of perception along the lines of the argument from 
illusion.3
Following this common interpretation, it seems at first glance that Brentano’s 
account of perception would fall somewhere between phenomenalism and ide-
alism, not only concerning perception, but thought as well. It remains disputa-
ble, however, whether what Brentano calls the intentional relation really is noth-
ing more than a relation to a sense-datum (or, in the case of thought, to an idea), 
and whether perception, in his account, has to be understood as a special case of 
intentionality. Concerning the first point, we should bear in mind that in his lat-
er writings, he insisted on calling intentionality something “relation-like” (etwas 
Relativliches), abandoning the idea that it is a relation in the proper sense. Con-
cerning the second point, even in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 
he stresses many times the point that there are external objects causing our 
so-called “physical phenomena” (the seen blue, the heard sound, the seen land-
scape, etc.). Since standard phenomenalist or idealist theories would not require 
this further premise, they would not likely bring it in. If there is an external 
world producing or causing our physical phenomena, as Brentano suggests, how 
is this suggestion understandable if the external world is given to us exclusively 
in a perceptual relation, understood as an intentional relation between a mind 
and its immanent object?
One way of understanding this suggestion in the framework of a conception 
of perception as a particular case of intentionality – understood as a relation be-
2  At least following one common reading of “intentional inexistence” propounded most 
notably by Chisholm 1967 and Smith 1994.
3  Hume 1748 had a first version of the argument. Based on Smith 2002, Crane and French 
2016 propose the following reconstruction:
(i) In an illusory experience, it seems to one that something has a quality F, which the 
ordinary object supposedly being perceived does not actually have.
(ii) When it seems to one that something has a quality F, then there is something of which 
one is aware which does have this quality. 
(iii) Since the ordinary object in question is, by hypothesis, not-F, then it follows that in 
cases of illusory experience, one is not aware of the object after all.
(iv) The same account of experience must apply to both veridical and illusory experiences.
(v) Therefore, in cases of veridical experience, one is not aware of the object after all.
(vi) If one is perceptually aware of an ordinary object at all, it is in either a veridical or 
illusory experience.
(vii) Therefore, one is never perceptually aware of ordinary objects.
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tween a mind and its immanent object – is to consider it highly improbable that 
our sensory contents are not produced by anything in the physical world. Rather, 
it is highly probable that our sensory contents are produced by something phys-
ical (atoms, particles, energy fields, or forces). But probability, even very high 
or infinite probability, is not evidence. Since evident perception, that is, inner 
perception, is apparently for him the concept of perception par excellence, then 
there is no proper perception of the external world. Brentano often make this 
point or similar points.4
Understanding perception exclusively in the strong sense of evident percep-
tion, and as a particular case of intentionality (understood as a relation to an 
immanent object) seems to lead to a reading of Brentano in which the objects 
perceived are mere perceived contents or possibilities of sensations, a reading 
close to Mill’s (or even Berkeley’s) phenomenalism.5 This too may help explain 
why Brentano’s account of perception, given the common interpretation of his 
conception of intentionality, has received so little attention: if Brentano’s ac-
count of perception is understood as it has usually been interpreted, then it is 
not meaningfully different from the account already offered by phenomenalist 
and idealist theories. In this case, it would be entirely understandable why Bren-
tano’s account has been neglected. 
But even if we accept this reading of Brentano’s account of perception, there 
is an important difference between Brentano’s account of perception and Berke-
ley’s, Mill’s, or Mach’s. As we have already emphasized, while Berkeley consid-
ers physical objects in terms of sense data, the existence of which depends upon 
their being perceived, and invokes God’s perception for filling the gaps for cases 
where we are do not actually perceive anything, Brentano does acknowledge 
that the world exists independently of our perception of it. He simply raises 
serious doubts about the idea that we perceive it exactly as it is. He thus avoids 
a position such as Mill’s, where the permanent possibility of sensations accounts 
for the fact that physical objects are not always perceived. He also avoids Mach’s 
phenomenalism by stressing the ontological distinction between the mental and 
the physical, which Mach rejects.
Thus, the common interpretation of Brentano’s account of perception as a 
form of phenomenalism is not particularly plausible, even on the standard read-
ing.  His position, according to the standard reading, therefore contrasts with 
4  See for instance Brentano 1874/1973. 11/9; 128 ff.
5  Jacquette 1996. 138 and 1990. 179 ff. suggests that it was the immanent intentionality 
thesis that led Meinong, Höfler, and Twardowski to introduce the content–object distinction 
and, by it, to abandon the “self-enclosed idealism implied by Berkeley’s empiricism” (1996. 
138), which was characteristic, in Jacquette’s view, of Brentano’s conception of intentionality. 
I explain why this historical reconstruction provided by Jacquette is problematic and why 
Brentano did not defend the immanent intentionality thesis in the way suggested by Jac-
quette and many others in Fréchette 2017. 
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idealism and phenomenalism. It seems to suggest that he would defend a view 
similar to critical realism. But again, this is not the case: against Locke, Brentano 
doesn’t distinguish between primary and secondary qualities concerning their 
relation to the observer: for him, extension and colour are given on the same 
basis in perception. If Brentano sides neither with Locke nor Berkeley, neither 
with Mach nor Mill, how should we understand his position? Here, defenders of 
the standard reading have divergent opinions, but since perception seems to be 
the enfant pauvre of Brentano’s theory of intentionality in the standard reading, 
scholarly discussion has been relatively sparse.6
However, the standard reading of Brentano – according to which he believes 
that intentionality is a relation to an immanent object, and perception is a special 
case of intentionality – has a grain of truth, at least insofar as there are many pas-
sages from the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint that seem to support this 
reading. But as mentioned above, there are obvious problems with this reading 
when it comes to Brentano’s supposition of an external world directly responsi-
ble for what we see, hear, etc. Furthermore, Brentano’s criticism of phenome-
nalism7 makes it difficult to champion a reading on which he appears to defend 
a variety of this same phenomenalism. 
In short, the common reading of Brentano’s thesis on intentionality attributes 
to him a suboptimal account of perception which does not fit with his critique of 
phenomenalism. Furthermore, it suggests that Brentano should be seen as a de-
fender of the argument from illusion. But if causality is a relation that, according 
to him, operates between the external world and physical phenomena, and if the 
external world is not a simple theoretical posit but something of which perceiv-
ing agents are parts, then there must be a way in which, as perceiving agents, we 
are after all related with the external world.  
II. TENETS OF THE STANDARD VIEW
In order to address this issue, let us summarize in a few general theses the gist 
of Brentano’s conception of perception according to the standard interpretation.
T1: Perception is a special case of intentionality
T1 is simply a repetition of the common interpretation of Brentano’s theory of 
intentionality, according to which intentionality is a relation to an immanent ob-
6  Brentano’s account of perception has been directly or indirectly discussed recently in 
Mulligan 2004, Textor 2007, Fisette 2011, Seron 2017, 2017a and Massin 2017.
7  See for example Brentano against Mach (Brentano 1988), but also Brentano’s lectures 
on positivism from 1894–95 (Brentano 1894–95), where he defends the view of a correlation 
between the seeing and the seen (against the identification proposed by Mach), advocating at 
the same time for the irreducibility of causality.
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ject. Since all mental phenomena are intentional in Brentano’s view, and since 
perceptual experiences (hearing a sound, seeing a colour, etc.) are mental phe-
nomena, it follows that all perceptual experiences are intentional.
T2: Perception is of something that truly exists 
T2 is a foundationalist thesis insofar as it restricts the use of “perception” to the 
perception of things that truly exist. If only mental phenomena truly exist (this 
thesis is expressed in the basic idea that physical phenomena exist only inten-
tionally (or better: inexist) in the mind, while mental phenomena truly exist), 
and if perception (Wahr-nehmung) is, by definition, perception of something that 
truly exists, then only inner perception (that is perception of mental phenomena) 
is perception in the relevant sense of the term.
T2 imposes obvious epistemological restrictions on the application of the 
term “perception”: if there is a strong sense of perception in which what we 
perceive is what truly exists, then only inner perception is perception in the 
true sense (Brentano 1874/1973. 119–170). Following the standard account, this 
thesis may explain Brentano’s rejection of Berkeleyan idealism, Machian phe-
nomenalism, and Lockean realism, since it acknowledges that there is a domain 
of what it innerly perceived, which is perceived as it is. 
T3: What we truly perceive is a mental-phenomenon-containing-something
T3 addresses in part the issue that was left undetermined in T2, namely the 
actual contents of so-called sensory perception. Brentano comes to T3 from 
the following premises: (a) only mental phenomena truly exist (i.e. only men-
tal phenomena are objects of inner perception); and (b) objects of mental phe-
nomena are inexisting objects (colours, chairs, landscapes, etc. as “intentionally 
contained” in the mental phenomenon). Therefore, what we “truly” (or innerly) 
perceive is what one could call a mental-phenomenon-containing-something. 
The hyphens here are meant to stress, first, the fact that what is innerly or “tru-
ly” perceived is not simply the seeing, the hearing, etc., but the hearing as the 
hearing of some specific tone, the seeing as the seeing of a specific colour, etc.; 
and second, that sensory contents are perceived only to the extent that they are 
intentionally contained in a mental phenomenon, which is the actual object of 
perception. Sensory contents are only indirectly perceived, so to speak, that is, 
as part of a mental phenomenon.
III. THE NAÏVE UNDERSTANDING OF PERCEPTION
On the face of it, these three theses leave no room for anything but a restricted 
concept of perception, namely, that of inner perception. It is easy, on the basis 
of T1–T3, to understand why most readers of Brentano take him literally when 
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he writes at numerous places that only inner perception is perception (Wahr- 
nehmung) in the proper sense.8 Characterizing inner perception as the only kind 
of perception (and characterizing outer perception as the mere reception of 
physical phenomena) seems to lead Brentano to reject the naïve understanding 
of perception (or perceptual experience) in terms of “openness to the world” 
(McDowell 1994: 112), according to which we are presented, in perceptual ex-
periences, with ordinary mind-independent objects, and that in such experienc-
es we are aware of such objects.9 This would support an understanding of Bren-
tano’s position as defending the argument from illusion. Following the account 
at the basis of the three theses, it seems that no mind-independent objects are 
directly involved in perceptual acts. Moreover, T3 in particular makes it clear 
that Brentano would reject the transparency intuition that is often shared by 
philosophers who believe that our experience gives us features of mind-inde-
pendent objects. In short, it seems that Brentano’s account of perception, fol-
lowing the standard view, cannot account for the basic intuition that perception 
is primarily of something other than itself.
Is this a plausible reading? I doubt it. Taken literally, it would mean that 
what I truly perceive when I am seeing a barn is not the barn but the seeing. 
While this view may capture in some way the intuition that we are aware of 
something in perceptual experiences, it leaves out too much from our naïve un-
derstanding of perception in order to count as a plausible account of perception. 
After all, when I see the barn and when I see a church, there are some obvious 
differences in my perceptions. Cashing out these differences simply in terms of 
modulations in the seeing implausibly downplays the naïve intuition that these 
perceptions give me some information (erroneous or not) about the world, not 
merely indirectly as what is contained in a mental act, but perhaps even directly 
about the location and various features of certain objects. If Brentano does reject 
the positions of Berkeley, Locke, Mill, and Mach on perception, then he should 
have more to say about this naïve intuition than simply dismissing it. He ought 
to acknowledge some kind of perceptual process through which my sensory 
organs gather information (both correct and incorrect) about my environment. 
The existence of such process could hardly be denied if the hypothesis of an 
external world is to be justified at all.
Although T1–T3 plausibly explain the lack of interest in Brentano’s account 
of perception, they are neither a plausible rendering of Brentano’s view of per-
ception, nor are they compatible with some important insights by Brentano on 
8  Ibid. This was already the case with Husserl in the Logical Investigations (Husserl 
1901/2001), who set the tone for the interpretation of Brentano in the phenomenological tra-
dition, in Heidegger 1992[1925]. 46. for instance, and later on in Føllesdal 1969. 680–681 and 
Jacquette 2006. 107, among others. See Hickerson 2007. 42 ff. for a discussion of the problems 
raised by this reading.
9  On awareness, see Crane and French 2016.
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the nature of perception that are rarely discussed in the secondary literature. 
Although it is true that for Brentano, inner perception has a priority over outer 
perception in the order of investigation, this priority does not imply that there 
is no outer perception properly speaking, or that “perceiving your sensing” is 
the only case of perceiving. In the rest of this paper, I will argue that T1–T3 
are meant to provide an account only of inner perception: that they are meant to 
provide instances of “good” perception, not of perception in general.
IV. TWO OPTIONS FOR THE STANDARD VIEW
For a defender of the standard view, there are two main options in interpreting 
Brentano’s theory of perception, both of which would account for the idea that 
truly perceiving the barn is actually perceiving the seeing (which contains, in 
some special way, the barn as its intentional object). The first option is a rela-
tional account, which can be spelled out in two different ways. (1) First, one 
could argue that we directly perceive mental images (or physical phenomena, 
in the Brentanian sense) which are dependent on the mind, and that these have 
the properties that perceptually appear to us. Such a view basically amounts to 
a sense-data theory. We have already seen that Brentano would not endorse 
such a view in the framework of phenomenalism.10 The problem with such an 
account is that it introduces a veil of perception which makes our relation to the 
world highly problematic. Here again, it would make Brentano a defender of the 
argument from illusion, which does not fit with his critique of similar positions. 
(2) Second, one could also try to argue for the relational account in terms of 
some variety of representationalism or intentionalism, conceiving of perception 
as a special kind of relation between one’s mind and the intentional object, 
mediated by the representational content. Crane (2009, 2009a, 2013) defends 
a similar view, though he maintains that his view is not relational as such: I can 
represent a golden mountain although there is no such thing; However, he 
seems neutral as to whether it actually fits with Brentano’s. Following this view, 
in perception a given object seems to me in a particular way: the “seeming to me 
in a particular way” can be explained in different ways. It might be explained in 
terms of representational content alone; for example, I see the barn as an old and 
unoccupied brownish building in the middle of the field. It may also be cashed 
out, at least partly, in terms of the mode or attitude of a specific experience: 
10  Of course, there is another option that is at least technically open: one could also accept 
the sense-data theory without accepting phenomenalism, as in causal theories of perception 
for instance (e.g., Price 1932). But such theories are usually designed as a justification of our 
belief in the external world. Brentano’s account, however, both in the standard view and in 
the view argued for here, takes our belief in the external world to be primitive and unjusti-
fiable.
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seeing the barn is in this respect a different experience from merely imagining 
or remembering it. Independently of the question whether or not the mode or 
attitude plays a role in determining the phenomenal character of an experience, 
a representationalist account of Brentano’s position should lead one to consider 
perception as (at least partly) determined by the representational content, that 
is, by the physical phenomenon. There might be an object which is represented 
– there might actually be such a barn in the field – but the experience repre-
sents a barn not in virtue of the existence of such a barn, but rather in virtue of 
being more or less accurate: for instance, an experience such as seeing the barn 
as floating above the field is likely to be less accurate than an experience such as 
seeing the barn as standing on the field.
Whether Brentano would agree that representations (or rather, presentations, 
Vorstellungen) represent in virtue of being more or less accurate can remain an 
open question for now, but if intentionalism is an option for the standard view, 
then it seems that only judgements of inner perception (of the form “Seeing 
exists”, for instance), and not presentations per se, have correctness conditions 
and can be assessed for accuracy. Intentionalism therefore seems (at least on the 
face of it) not to be a real option for the standard view.
Even if we put this concern aside, it is also questionable whether Brentano 
would agree that representations represent in virtue of being the bearer of some 
semantic information, which is an essential component of a representationalist 
or intentionalist account. In the best case, intentionalism would fit only loosely 
with the standard view: Brentanian physical phenomena, in the standard view, 
are not really bearers of semantic information: they are not representational, and 
they are not, properly speaking, about the world in the sense that my seeing 
is about the “green as perceived.” Certainly, Brentano sometimes calls them 
“signs of something real” (Brentano 1874/1973. 24/14) in a way which evokes 
Helmholtz’s theory of perception, but unlike Helmholtz he rejects the idea that 
these signs carry information about the actual localization of the external stim-
ulus, information which according to Helmholtz is processed by unconscious 
inferences.11 In short, Brentano’s physical phenomena are signs of an outside re-
ality, simply on the (highly probable) assumption of the existence of an external 
reality; however, if one sticks with the standard view, they do not seem as such 
assessable for accuracy, nor do they represent something else.
Finally, and most obviously, intentionalism cannot account for the non-dis-
tinction view between content and object which is presupposed by the standard 
view.12 In the intentionalist account, intentional objects are not identical with 
the contents of mental acts, as presupposed by the standard view.
11  See Brentano 1979. 69 for a critique of Helmholtz’s position. More on this below.
12  I discuss the non-distinction view and proposes an alternative based on Brentano’s view 
in his lectures on descriptive psychology in Fréchette 2017.
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For these reasons, a relational (in this case representationalist) reading of 
Brentano’s views on perception seems not to be very helpful for the standard 
view. Against such a reading, one can favour a non-relational reading of percep-
tion along the lines of adverbialism. According to this account, intentionality is 
quasi-relational, that is, the intentional content of one’s mental act should be 
understood as a property of the perceptual experience itself rather than as some 
kind of object with a particular kind of existence. According to adverbialism, I 
do not see coloured objects, since colours are strictly phenomenal properties 
(and such a view fits well with Brentano’s own view of colours). On this view, 
there is a common core between my seeing a yellow truck and my hallucinating 
a pink elephant, for in both cases phenomenal properties appear in the same 
way. The main problem with the application of this account to Brentano’s views 
on perception is that while it fits well with his reism, in which irrealia are banned 
from the ontology (and therefore we present things in this or that way), it cannot 
account for the idea that what is presented are intentional objects (and not merely 
modes of presenting), and that these are in some relation with the outer world 
(not as representations, but as signs). If we consider Brentano’s reism as his final 
word, not only in ontology, but in perception as well, then adverbialism may 
have some potential, but it entails the rejection of T3; adverbialism therefore 
seems not to be a real option for the standard view.
Thus, it seems that the only way to make sense of the standard reading 
of Brentano’s view of perception is the relational account. It involves either 
ways however serious reconstruction under theoretical presuppositions that 
are not always plausible; this suggests that the alleged three tenets on percep-
tion (T1–T3) are perhaps giving a wrong picture of Brentano’s actual views on 
perception.
V. THE BACKGROUND TO BRENTANO’S VIEWS  
ON PERCEPTION
To give a plausible reconstruction of Brentano’s view, it might help to take a 
quick look at the background to his views on perception and his take on per-
ceptual illusion. Let us start with the background. There are a few central ideas 
from the history of the philosophy of perception that played an important role 
for Brentano’s views. First, the Augustinian view distinguishing between higher 
and lower (sensory) perception already plays a role in the account developed in 
Die Psychologie des Aristoteles (Brentano 1867). In this context, sensory perception 
has a limited role: it is possible only through the active act of the soul, and not 
through bodily sensation alone (neque enim corpus sentit, sed anima per corpus). 
There are representations (similitudines) on the basis of the information (informa-
tio) sent by the organs to the soul. Intentio, based on information, is our identifi-
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cation of the object perceived.13 Like Augustine, Brentano believes that sensory 
perception as such is possible only on the basis of an active act of the soul, or in 
Brentano’s conception, on the basis of inner perception. We find a similar idea 
in Descartes (c’est l’âme qui sent, et non le corps),14 with whom Brentano agrees 
(even against Aristotle!) at many places.15 In these cases, ideas (representations) 
are isomorphic figures, pictures, or (as Brentano calls them) signs produced by 
external stimulation.
In all these cases – the distinction between lower and higher perception (Au-
gustine) or the distinction between the stimulation on the retina and the pro-
duced images in the soul (Descartes) – one finds the idea that visual sensations, 
for instance, which are produced by the stimulation on the retina, are not by 
themselves responsible for our seeing; in order to really perceive the blue patch 
of colour in front of me, an active act of the mind is necessary. In Brentano, this 
act is called a presenting (Vorstellen). Against Reid, Brentano would refuse to 
say that the presenting and the presented are only “grammatically” distinct.16 
A presenting really exists, while a presented is strictly phenomenal and merely 
“inexists” intentionally in the presenting. On this account, Brentano obviously 
advocates for the ontological priority of acts (like presentings) over their ob-
jects (the presented); in other words, it seems that he argues that the being of 
acts of presentation is a condition for the inexistence of physical phenomena. If 
“sensory perception” designates the reception of the nerve signal produced by 
the stimulation of the sense organ, which is experienced as “having a physical 
phenomenon”, then it seems that for something to count as sensory percep-
tion, there must be a conscious mental act which is intentionally directed at the 
physical phenomenon. This would also explain Brentano’s rejection of external 
perception (sensory perception taken in isolation from the acts in which we are 
conscious of it) as Falschnehmung.
This reading of the relation between mental and physical phenomena in terms 
of the ontological priority of the former over the latter has the consequence that 
one would have to admit that there could still be sensory perception in a rele-
vant sense even without any external stimulation of the sensory organs. This 
does not challenge the intentionality thesis, since Brentano accepts cases where 
we have physical phenomena that are not produced by external stimulation, 
as we will see below.17 But even if one accepts the ontological priority of the 
13  On Augustine, see Caston 2001. 33 ff.
14  Descartes, Dioptrique, Discours IV, A.T. VI, p. 109 (Descartes 1902. 109).
15  For instance Brentano 1975[1916]. 13 where he agrees with Descartes on this point 
against Aristotle, and praises Reid for doing the same.
16  Reid 1895 [1764]. 182 ff. Compare Brentano 1975. 4.
17  The other consequence of the ontological priority reading is that organisms with no 
mental phenomena (if there are such things) would be deprived of perception. Brentano how-
ever accepts this consequence. In his view, animals have no general concepts, and hence 
no higher intellectual activities: they only have sensations, affects, memory, and associative 
GUILLAUME FRéCHETTE: BRENTANO ON PERCEPTION 23
mental over the physical, Brentano’s point seems rather to be that perception 
in the strong sense of T2 cannot be accounted for strictly in terms of physical 
phenomena produced by external stimulation of the sense organ, since we have 
no evidence that these phenomena accurately depict external reality.
This line of thought about sensory perception may seem anti-realist to a sig-
nificant extent, and when we put it in the context of its times, it obviously fol-
lows some important insights on sensory perception developed by Helmholtz 
under the influence of Johannes Müller, who can be labelled as anti-realist as 
regards the nature of perception. Müller (1837) thought that his law of specific 
nerve energies, according to which every sensory nerve reacts specifically and 
differently (as a light nerve, a sound nerve, a smell nerve, etc.) to a stimulation 
s, had the consequence that sensory perception is not perception of a quality of 
an external body, but of a quality of our nerves. This suggests that sensations 
cannot be seen as copies of external objects, but rather that they have a rep-
resentational nature. This idea was also followed by Helmholtz, who argued that 
contents or sensations are rather signs that “completely depend on our organi-
zation” (Helmholtz 1878. 225 f.). Consequently, Helmholtz argued, perception 
should be seen as the result of this interpretation, this result being sometimes 
obtained through unconscious inferences.
Brentano accepted Müller’s conclusion in his account of perception: it is not 
the quality of the external stimulation that determines sensation, but the spec-
ificity of the stimulated sensory organ. But does Brentano accept this simply on 
the basis of T2? In order to answer this question, it might be helpful to recall 
the views of Helmholtz and Hering, which both influenced Brentano to differ-
ent extents. According to Helmholtz, Müller’s law also confirms that there is a 
distinction between sensation and perception. Sensations are produced by the 
stimulation of the nerves and are fully specified, following Müller’s law, by the 
specific characteristics or modalities of the sensory organs; nevertheless, we do 
interpret our sensations as giving us information about the position and form of 
objects in space (1867. 427). This interpretation is what Helmholtz calls “per-
ception”. Perceptions, and only perceptions, are mental acts: sensations merely 
provide the material upon which perception operates.
Hering, on the other hand, rejects the distinction between sensation and per-
ception. For him, the spatiality of our sensations is not something superimposed 
by the “perceptions” of Helmholtz; rather, spatiality (or a sense for spatiality) 
is built into sensings themselves. Hence, sensations are not unorganized raw 
material, but sensing itself, as an activity, has access to spatiality as a primitive 
processes. Sensations being mental phenomena, even animals have perception in the strong 
sense of T2, although to a very limited extent in comparison with humans. In the manuscript 
“On the Soul of Animals” (Von der Tierseele, Ps 18), dated 1903, he even goes so far as to leave 
open the possibility of substances having mental activities (Brentano 1903. 50185–6).
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quality of what is given in sensations. Hering has no need for a further concept 
of perception as does Helmholtz, and can accommodate Müller’s law by simply 
adding that objectual space, the space of objects, is something that we think on 
the basis of our experience and of our inferences. We see the trees in a row of 
trees as being bigger from a short distance, and getting smaller at a greater dis-
tance, but we think them as being of relatively equal heights. Characterizing this 
“thinking” as a perception, as does Helmholtz, suggests that in vision itself, for 
instance, purely hypothetical thought-like processes are involved (e.g., Helm-
holtz’s unconscious inferences), a consequence rejected by Hering.
Where does Brentano stand? Like Hering, Brentano seems to draw the con-
clusion that Müller’s law shows that a distinction between perception (of external 
objects) and sensation is superfluous. Sensations are specifically and spatially de-
termined, and so is outer perception. According to him and similarly to Hering, I 
see the Müller–Lyer lines as being of equal lengths, but I think (or judge) them 
as being of unequal lengths. As far as outer perception is concerned, Brentano 
follows Hering’s reading of Müller and rejects the distinction between perception 
and sensation. But in contrast to Hering, Brentano still wants to argue for percep-
tion as a mental process different from sensation (sensory stimulations). This view 
is expressed in T2, in which perception (i.e. inner perception) is only of something 
that truly exists. This explains the restriction made that the only veridical percep-
tion is inner perception (i.e. the perception of one’s own mental acts).
In other words, Brentano wants to stress the two following points. First, per-
ception in the strong sense of T2 is not to be confused with the reception of 
sensory stimulation which we experience as physical phenomena. Second, the 
distinction between perception and sensation does not take place at the level 
of sensory stimulation and its processing (as Helmholtz would have it). Rather, 
sensings themselves already provide information about quality and localization; 
this information is not processed in a further step, called “perception” by Helm-
holtz. Therefore, in order to avoid misunderstanding, the term “perception” 
should be reserved for “inner perception”.
At bottom, this second point seems more terminological than philosophical. 
Brentano made this exact point in 1889:
The term “perception” has degenerated in an almost similar way [to the term “pleas-
ure”]. Only really appropriate in respect of knowledge, it came to be applied in the 
case of the so-called external perception – i.e. in cases of a belief, blind, and in its 
essential relations, erroneous – and consequently would require, in order to have sci-
entific application as a terminus technicus, an important reform of the usual terminology, 
one which would essentially narrow the range of the term (Brentano 1902. 83).18
18  The English translation here (and in many other places) uses “impression” instead of 
“perception” as a translation of Wahrnehmung. I have corrected the translation here.
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What this terminological remark suggests is that “perception” as a technical 
term simply covers too much. While Brentano prefers the traditional, Cartesian 
use of “perception” to designate cases of self-evident knowledge, and only such 
cases (the German Wahr-nehmung suggests it more clearly than its French or 
English equivalents), he does not deny that we have some kind of access to the 
external world. He simply points out a terminological confusion arising from the 
use of a single term to designate two different processes. This point should not 
be taken as denying any kind of access to the external world. What I have called 
above “sensory perception”, in the broader or naïve sense of openness to and/or 
awareness of the world is not challenged in any sense by this remark.
But even if taken strictly in the terminological sense, Brentano’s remark is not 
without problems. First, the use of the term “perception” in late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth century philosophy and psychology goes almost unanimously 
against Brentano’s suggestion. Even Brentano’s own students rejected the sug-
gestion and used “perception” or “external perception” in the broader or naïve 
sense in which we used it above.19 Assertions like “strictly speaking, so-called 
external perception is not perception” (Brentano 1874/1973. 70), which soon 
became emblematic of Brentano’s conception of perception, should therefore 
be taken with a pinch of salt.20 In fact, the terminological remark on the use of 
the term “perception” seems not to be principled; rather, Brentano seems to 
stress in his later published works the terminological point against the use of 
“perception” by Helmholtz, Helmholtz’s student Wundt, and those who were 
influenced by them.21
In fact, in many texts Brentano does account for “outer perception” in terms 
which are quite comparable to those used to qualify perception as we are consid-
ering it here, as openness to and/or awareness of the world.22 He argues that by 
association we use the term “perception” both for cases of intuition (Anschauung) 
and for states which are characteristic of the occurrence of such intuitions.23 At 
19  See for instance Stumpf 1939. 207 ff.; Bergmann 1908. 9 ff.; Marty 1908. 121; Twar-
dowski 2016 [1895]. 201 ff.
20  One of the reasons why it received an emblematic character is certainly Husserl’s point 
in the Logical Investigations, in which he says, quoting this exact same phrase, that Brentano 
never should “have said of inner perception […] that it is really the only sort of perception in 
the true sense of the word” (Husserl 1901a/2001a. 239/345).
21  See for instance Brentano 2009 [1896]. 131, 148; [1897]. 51.
22  See for instance Brentano 1956 [ca.1884]. 144: “In outer perception, we are directed 
towards physical things, colours, sounds, smells, tactile qualities, etc. In short, towards some-
thing qualitative and sensory. Since it is something physical, it should be located (if it exists 
at all) in the external world. For this reason, we locate for instance a green colour, that we see, 
on a particular object of the external world, and we say that the tree is green” (my translation).
23  See Brentano (forthcoming: 53046): “By habitude, the name [perception] is closely asso-
ciated with both the intuition under which it should properly be conceived and the different 
states which are typical for the occurrence of this intuition (since these states come always or 
most of the time along with this intuition)” (my translation).
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bottom, taking the background of his views in consideration, we can summarize 
Brentano’s views on perception with these three general ideas: (i) there is a gen-
eral meaning of “perception” according to which it characterizes our openness 
and/or awareness of the world; (ii) inner perception is the only case of percep-
tion in which all cases of perception are cases of self-evident knowledge (and 
all these cases are exclusively cases of awareness); and (iii) outer perception is 
typically a case of perceptual experience in which physical things of the external 
world appear to us. All these cases are exclusively cases of openness. I will argue 
for the third idea in more detail in the next section.
VI. PERCEPTION AND ILLUSION
If we restrict the application of T2 to point (ii) mentioned above, it leaves open 
the possibility of accounting for perception in the naïve sense of openness and 
awareness of the world in Brentano’s conception. One obvious way of doing so 
would be to look at is conception of the physiology of perception. As I suggested 
above, Brentano’s position on psychology, physiology, and perception in general 
in the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is determined to a great extent 
by the natural sciences of his times. In Brentano’s case, it was the positivism of 
Comte that played the most important role. Scientific philosophy, in its “pos-
itive explanations – even if they were the most perfect ones – never claims to 
expose the producing forces of phenomena […] [it] simply seeks to analyse with 
exactness the conditions of their emergence and to connect these conditions 
through law-like relations of succession and similarity” (Brentano 1869. 23). 
Comte’s positivism was for him the reference model for the natural sciences, 
but it was not in principle incompatible with the Kantian idea of a scientific ex-
planation in the form expounded by Helmholtz (1847), as Brentano himself con-
cedes.24 In other words, what Brentano rejects in Kantian philosophy of science 
is its constructivism, especially as applied in Helmholtz’s concept of perception. 
Space is not a form of our intuition; it is a quality given in sensory perception. 
He would definitely reject the idea that “we can never perceive matter in itself, 
but only through its forces” (Helmholtz 1847. 4).
In 1874, this attitude seemed to mean for Brentano that psychology as a sci-
ence of the mental should restrict the talk of intentionality (the relation between 
the mind and the objects perceived) to the domain of inexisting objects; that it 
should restrict the talk of consciousness to the domain of mental phenomena; 
and that it should restrict the talk of perception (in the sense of evident knowl-
edge) to the domain of mental phenomena. Restricting the talk of intentionality, 
consciousness, and perception (in the sense of T2) to the realm of the mental 
24  See Brentano’s concession to Kant in Brentano 1874–1973. 128, fn2/76.
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seems, however, to be more a terminological restriction guiding the application 
of the right concepts to the right processes than the radical thesis often attribut-
ed to him that psychological knowledge does not apply to any other processes. 
It should therefore not be confused with the Kantian restriction of knowledge 
to phenomena. The former is motivated by the limits of our evident knowledge, 
while the latter is motivated by the alleged limits of knowledge tout court.
That psychological knowledge applies to processes other than intentional 
acts, conscious acts, and perceptual acts in the sense of T2, is clear when Bren-
tano talks about the “conditions of emergence” of mental and physical phenom-
ena, which are also part of psychological investigation. In the 1880s, Brentano 
gave to the investigation of the conditions of emergence the label “genetic psy-
chology”. That these investigations are not undertaken in the published version 
of the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint has mainly to do with Brentano’s 
abandonment of the initial plan to publish a series of six books, which started 
with the Psychology as we know it, not with any principled concern about the 
object of psychology.
The nature of mental and physical phenomena and their “conditions of emer-
gence” are two different standpoints on objects that, eventually, could turn out 
to be identical.25 Sensations (or sensings, presentings, etc.) as mental phenome-
na are not necessarily objects that are distinct from those studied by physiology. 
They may even be the same objects studied from different perspectives. Nor 
does it necessarily follow, because sensory objects do not “truly exist” that they 
have no substantial role to play in understanding perception. As we pointed out 
earlier, it would also be wrong to think that Brentano would reject the distinc-
tion between subjective sensations (e.g., hallucinations) and objective sensa-
tions (externally stimulated sensations) simply because this distinction is not 
systematically accessible in inner perception (more on this below).26 Although 
descriptive classification has priority over genetic investigations in psychological 
research, it is not meant to override any genetic classification. In fact, when it 
comes to investigating the nature of perception, Brentano’s descriptive classi-
fication takes a surprising but revealing turn. Think of the explanation of the 
Müller–Lyer illusion that Brentano championed: on the face of it, his expla-
nation follows the thesis defended by Helmholtz (1867. 566) of the perceptual 
overestimation of wide angles and the underestimation of narrow angles. But 
25  Brentano was a dualist, but took great pains in developing a theory of the mind that 
could still be true if, by any chance, materialism turned out to be true. In his lectures on the 
immortality of the soul from 1875/76, he stresses the following point (Brentano 1875. 29586): 
“Therefore, one should always and in every case consider as a factual unity (sachliche Einheit) 
the totality of the mental activities that we innerly perceive. Thus the soul is not a collective, 
not a group of atoms of which we could apprehend the disintegration. Rather, from the stand-
point of the hypothesis which we formulated, if the soul is material, then it is a unitary atom 
and thus, like all atoms, it is incorruptible” (my translation).
26  On this distinction, see Brentano 2009. 155 ff.
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this similarity is only superficial. Helmholtz’s model of explanation belongs ba-
sically to the category of physiological theories of illusions. Such models provide 
an explanation of the illusion on the basis of a disturbance in the information 
channels: it is merely the result of a physiological disturbance, which we de-
scribe as the overestimation of wide angles and the underestimation of narrow 
angles.27
While Helmholtz’s model is based on the supposition of physiological distur-
bances, Brentano’s model seems to be based on the supposition of an inappro-
priate application of the signalled information. Indeed, Brentano considers the 
Müller–Lyer illusion a case of “illusion of judgement” (Urteilstäuschung). In his 
view, this illusion of judgement is not to be confused with illusions “in which 
our phenomena do not correspond to the objectively given” (2009. 25). The 
broken stick illusion is such an illusion in the latter sense, and it is not an illusion 
of judgement, while the Müller–Lyer illusion is based on “a false evaluation of 
relations given phenomenally” (ibid.).28 The optical paradox emerges because 
the judgement that the lines are unequal conflicts with the initial phenomenon 
in which the lines are of equal lengths.
It is quite remarkable here that both sorts of illusion presuppose a distinction 
between the objectively and the subjectively (or phenomenally) given. Müller–
Lyer cases are such that the subjectively given actually matches the objectively 
given (two lines of equal lengths), but the paradox comes from the wrong judge-
mental evaluation of the subjectively given. In other words, the paradox comes 
from our rejection of (asubj. given= aobj. given), where a stands for the lines of equal 
lengths. Broken stick cases are such that the subjectively given simply does not 
match the objectively given; the paradox here comes from the acceptance of (bsubj. 
given ≠ bobj. given), where b stands for the unbroken stick. In the first case, the para-
dox arises only at the level of the judgement, while in the second case, it seems 
to come from a conflict which is intrinsic to the given itself.
It is also quite remarkable that Brentano here uses the term “the given” (das 
Gegebene), which is quite unusual in his vocabulary. What he means by “objec-
27  On these theories, see Gregory 1970. 142, who labels them “physiological confusion 
theories”.
28  In the phenomenology lectures of 1888/89, Brentano is a little more explicit on this dis-
tinction: “[Optical illusions] are of two sorts: (1) of the sort like when a stick in water appears 
broken, or an object appears misplaced in a mirror. Here, we have a real modification of the 
phenomenon; but this modification is caused by light waves which make their way to me in 
an unusual manner from the body from which they are sent and make me conclude to the ex-
istence of the object. [In this case], habitude leads me to deceptive hypotheses on its position 
and form. If I contented myself in designating the phenomenon as a different one, I would 
make no mistake. (2) The cases are different when I deceive myself about the subjective 
phenomenon itself; when it appears to me for example modified in a certain way, while the 
phenomenon is unmodified. […] [This is the case with] the Zöllner figures. The appearance 
is so powerful that the modification of the phenomenon could barely be said to be more pow-
erful. Even knowledge doesn’t suspend the appearance.” (Brentano-forthcoming-2. 59032.)
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tively given” and “subjectively given” is sometimes also described in terms 
of objective and subjective sensations. In his phenomenology lectures from 
1888/89, he lists under subjective sensations the presentations of fantasy, but 
also the sensory feelings, the muscular sensations, reflex sensations, sensations 
of darkness, after-images, simultaneous contrast, and concomitant sensations. 
These sensations have a common and complex cause: they are the result of the 
conjunction, according to his student Marty, between innate and acquired dis-
positions.29 And most importantly, they are not caused by external stimulation. 
Only objective sensations are caused by external stimulation.
Given this distinction, the Müller–Lyer case would be a case in which (a) I 
have an objective sensation of the lines as of equal lengths; (b) the subjectively 
given is identical with the objectively given; (c) I incorrectly reject the identi-
ty in (b). The broken stick case would be a case where (a) I have an objective 
sensation of the stick as unbroken, which (b) is not identical with the subjective 
sensation of the stick as broken and (c) I correctly accept that (a) and (b) are not 
identical.
There are two obvious questions here. First, how do we know that objective 
sensations are always accurate (i.e. that the nerve signal which we experience as 
a physical phenomenon is produced by the appropriate external stimulation)? If 
objective sensations are always correct or appropriate signs of external reality, 
then we must admit that it is at least possible to directly perceive (in a relevant 
sense of “perception”) external reality (ordinary mind-independent objects), 
otherwise the distinction between objective and subjective sensations would be 
purely arbitrary.
The second question is the following: is the distinction between objective 
and subjective sensation accessible in inner perception? If it is accessible, then I 
do have access in inner perception to the source of the stimulation. This would 
make T1, T2 and T3 false. T1 would be false because the external stimulation 
cannot be the target object of the intentional relation, and T2 and T3 would 
be false because if the distinction is accessible in inner perception, then inner 
perception would not be only perception of what truly exists (mental phenome-
na), and not only the perception of a mental phenomenon containing something 
(the physical phenomenon), but it would also give the correctness conditions of 
outer perception: an outer perception is correct when the external stimulation 
corresponds to the physical phenomenon, and it is incorrect when it does not 
correspond.
If the distinction is not accessible to inner perception, then T1, T2, and T3 
would be quite implausible or in need of serious improvements. T1 would be 
implausible if the possibility of perceiving external stimulation is granted. T2 
29  See Marty 1889. Stumpf 1886 also uses the same distinction in his lectures on psy-
chology.
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and T3 would not make much sense if one argues that there are correctness 
or accuracy conditions for outer perception which are not accessible to inner 
perception (correctness is, after all, something which one experiences in inner 
perception). If, in outer perception, we are able to discriminate between subjec-
tive and objective sensations, it would be implausible to hold that this ability to 
discriminate disappears in inner perception.
What Brentano’s interpretation of the Müller–Lyer illusion suggests is that 
there are illusions, some of which (like the Müller–Lyer one) are illusions of 
judgement, but others emerge from a conflict between the subjectively and the 
objectively given. This distinction is incompatible with the central premise of 
the argument from illusion, which Robinson calls the phenomenal principle:
Phenomenal principle: “If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which 
possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is 
aware which does possess that sensible quality” (Robinson 1994. 32).
In order for him to agree with the principle, he would have to abandon the thesis 
that in perceiving the stick in the water, the unbroken stick is objectively given 
to me. If his take on perceptual illusions gives us an important insight on his 
conception of the nature of perception, then T1–T3 are simply not a correct 
rendering of this conception and should be given up.
VII. THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE STANDARD VIEW
I believe that the grain of truth in the standard view of Brentano’s conception of 
perception consists in the two following claims:
(1) Understanding perceptual processes in the right way presupposes know-
ing what is the nature of perception. Hence, descriptive psychology is 
prior to genetic psychology in the order of investigation.
(2) In order to investigate the nature of perception, the best place to start is 
with inner perception, since all cases of inner perception are “good” cas-
es: they show us things (i.e. mental phenomena) as they really are.
However, we have seen here that these claims must be supplemented in order 
to conform with what Brentano actually says on perception:
(3) Cases of inner perception should not be taken as paradigmatic cases of 
perception, as T2 suggests; they are simply instances of “good” cases.
(4) There might well be cases of outer perception which could be included 
under the “good” cases30 – and there definitely need to be a few of them if 
30  Nothing rules out that outer perception could be of something as it truly is: but if there 
are such cases, then these will not be cases of evident knowledge.
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the distinction between subjectively and objectively given is supposed to 
serve its purpose – but understanding cases of outer perception correctly 
is a far more complex task, since it requires an empirical investigation of 
their conditions of emergence.
(5) Perception in the naïve sense of awareness, that is, in the sense that it 
sometimes gives us perceptual awareness of ordinary mind-independent 
objects, is not challenged by Brentano’s views. When I veridically see 
a blue patch, I have an objective sensation which is identical with the 
subjective sensation; when I see the broken stick in the water, I have an 
objective sensation of the unbroken stick. Having such a sensation pre-
supposes, by definition, a regularity of the relation between the external 
object and the sign (the content of the objective sensation), which can be 
explained only if the possibility of having perceptual awareness of exter-
nal objects is granted.
(6) Perception in the naïve sense of openness, that is, the idea that in per-
ceptual experiences we are presented with ordinary mind-independent 
objects, is not challenged either. The most basic form of perception is 
presentation (Vorstellung), and its presenting mind-independent objects is 
granted on the same basis as perception in the sense of awareness (5).
If this alternative is correct, it seems that Brentano could agree with the inten-
tionalist tenet that representations (or rather presentations, Vorstellungen in his 
terminology) present or represent at least partly in virtue of being more or less 
accurate. Such an interpretation, even if it means abandoning the standard view, 
would be welcome at least for a proper understanding of the motivations and 
details of Brentano’s descriptive psychology, of his realist ontology of his middle 
period, of his conception of time perception, and of his conception of mental 
dispositions.31
31  This is an expanded version of “Brentano on Perception and Illusion”, to be published 
in the proceedings of the 40th Kirchberg Symposium (C. Limbeck and F. Stadler eds.), which 
was given in Kirchberg, then in Munich and Guarapuava in 2017. The idea of this paper came 
from discussions with Marcello Fiocco in Salzburg in 2015/16 (see Fiocco 2017). I thank the 
Kirchberg audience for its input, especially those who took part in the workshop on Brentano 
and the Myth of the Given: Marcello Fiocco, Uriah Kriegel, Michelle Montague, and Hamid 
Taieb for stimulating interactions on the first version, Johannes Brandl for the discussions in 
Kirchberg and Munich, and Mark Textor for his input in Munich. Thanks also to Evandro 
Brito, Ernesto Giusti, André Leclerc, Mario Gonzáles Porta, Gleisson Schmidt, Jean Siqueira, 
Wojciech Starzyński, and the other participants at Universidade Estadual do Centro-Oeste do 
Paraná (Guarapuava) for stimulating discussions during the Brentano conference there. This 
paper was written as part of the research project “Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology” funded 
by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF, P-27215).
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Denis Fisette
The Reception of Ernst Mach 
in the School of Brentano
Franz Brentano is one of the most inﬂ uential fi gures in the philosophy of the late 
nineteenth century. Brentano and his successors have established a philosophical 
program which had a decisive impact on the history of philosophy in Austria. This 
program stands out clearly in several lectures delivered by Brentano during his 
stay in Vienna, particularly in his inaugural address at the University of Vienna 
(Brentano 1929) in which Brentano outlines the program that he systematically 
develops in his Psychology from an empirical Standpoint (2009). This program was 
the result of Brentano’s research in Würzburg (1866–1873) which has been partly 
inspired by Auguste Comte’s positive philosophy and John Stuart Mill’s empiricism 
(Münch 1989; Fisette 2018). During his stay in Vienna, Brentano’s interest in pos-
itivism remained intact as evidenced by his 1893–1894 lectures “Contemporary 
philosophical questions” in which he examines several versions of positivism, in-
cluding Mach’s version.
This paper is about the reception of Mach by Brentano and his students in 
Austria1. I shall outline the main elements of this reception, starting with Bren-
tano’s evaluation, in his lectures on positivism, of Mach’s theory of sensations. 
Secondly, I shall comment the early reception of Mach by Brentano’s pupils in 
Prague. The third part bears on the close relationship that Husserl established 
between his phenomenology and Mach’s descriptivism. I will then briefly ex-
amine Mach’s contribution to the controversy on gestalt qualities. The fifth part 
bears on Stumpf’s debate with Mach on psychophysical relations and I shall 
conclude this study with some remarks on Husserl’s criticism of Mach’s alleged 
logical psychologism in his Logical Investigations.
1  In a series of papers, I addressed Brentano’s relationship with several versions of pos-
itivism, namely J. St. Mill (Fisette, forthcoming), Auguste Comte (Fisette 2018) and Ernst 
Mach (Fisette 2012). In this paper, I shall summarize Brentano’s stance vis à vis Mach and 
emphasize the reception of Mach by Brentano’s students. 
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I. BRENTANO’S LECTURES ON POSITIVISM (1893–1894)
In his lectures “Contemporary philosophical questions” which he held in Vi-
enna one year before he left Austria, Brentano extensively discusses Mach’s 
positivism (LS 20. 29366–29475). He compares four versions of positivism, that 
of Auguste Comte, which he compares to Kirchhoff’s descriptivism, and Mach’s 
phenomenalism, which he compares to John Stuart Mill’s empiricism. Brentano 
claims that the two last versions of positivism mark a progress over the other two 
versions namely because they are more up-to-date with respect to the develop-
ment of natural sciences at the time, and because, unlike Comte, for example, 
they recognize the philosophical value of the field of mental phenomena, i.e. 
psychology.
Brentano’s correspondence with Husserl and Mach in 1895 testifies that, de-
spite his reservations regarding the metaphysical positions advocated by these 
different versions of positivism, there remains, however, a “consensus on the 
method of research”, namely with Brentano’s methodological phenomenalism 
(Brentano 1988. 203). Indeed, Brentano is an empiricist and he is also very much 
concerned with positivity. Brentano agrees with positivism that the given con-
sists in phenomena which are also the objects of sciences (physical and psy-
chological alike). The inquiry is limited to phenomena and relations between 
phenomena that one seeks to subsume under general laws. Brentano is also in 
agreement with this aspect of descriptivism which favours the “how” question 
over the why question in the sense that the description of phenomena is prior 
to, and a necessary condition to their explanation. However, Brentano does not 
endorse Mach’s thesis according to which the task of science is merely to de-
scribe and not to explain phenomena. In his lectures on positivism, Brentano 
also claims that “it is unfair to claim that advanced sciences renounces the search 
for causes” (LS 20. 29403).
But Brentano’s overall criticism of Mach rests on Mach’s phenomenalism 
with regard to a spatial external world which, according to Brentano, is grounded 
on the identity of the mental and the physical. In Brentano’s own words: Mach’s 
proof of the “absurdity of the assumption of a spatial outside world on the basis 
of the identity of the mental and the physical in sensations is a complete failure” 
(LS 20. 29443). Brentano’s criticism of positivism targets not only Mach’s theory 
of elements, but also Comte and especially Mill’s doctrine of the permanent 
possibilities of sensation, to which Brentano grants much importance in these 
lectures. Brentano maintains that most versions of phenomenalism that he con-
siders in these lectures claim that they “do not allow anything real then their 
own mental phenomena” (LS 20. 29411), and the limitation to the description 
of phenomena presupposes that the objects of experience are reducible to our 
own mental phenomena, and to percepts in the case of sensory perception. For 
if phenomena are somehow related to experience, and then they are necessarily 
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related to mental states (sensory perception). In other words: esse est percipii. 
Moreover, Mach’s doctrine of elements amounts to identifying two irreducible 
classes of phenomena and it therefore does not account satisfactorily for the 
duality in the percept or in one’s state of mind such as an emotion between the 
feeling and what is felt, or between perceiving and what is perceived. According 
to Brentano, this duality correspond two classes of phenomena which are bearers 
of heterogeneous and irreducible proprieties.
Brentano advocates instead a form of critical realism according to which the 
only access one has to the external world is by means of phenomena through 
which they are given to experience, but these objects exist independently of be-
ing perceived. However, Brentano claims that with some modifications, it might 
be possible to preserve the core of Mach’s doctrine of elements, provided that 
one replaces the identity relation between the two classes of phenomena by that 
of intentional correlativity (Correlativität), which Brentano has worked out in his 
lectures on descriptive psychology delivered in Vienna in the late 1880s and 
which I shall later examine2.
II. THE EARLY RECEPTION OF MACH IN PRAGUE
Mach witnessed the very first moments in the establishment of a school of Bren-
tano in Prague where he held a chair of physics from 1867 to 1895. It is also in 
Prague that the first contacts between Mach and Brentano’s students took place. 
Several of Brentano’s students held chairs in Prague at that time, the first being 
Carl Stumpf who began his teaching in Prague in the fall of 1879 and held that 
position until 1884. Thanks to Brentano’s and Stumpf’s efforts, Marty obtained 
a position in Prague and began his teaching in 1880. A few years later, Masaryk 
obtained a position in the newly created Czech University in 1882 and he will 
be joined later by Ehrenfels in 1896.
Beside Mach, the main leading scientist in Prague was Ewald Hering, with 
whom Stumpf maintained a close relationship (Stumpf 1930. 399).3 With Her-
ing and Mach, Stumpf and Marty were both members of a circle of scientific 
researchers in Prague whose official organ was the well-known journal Lotos. 
2  Let us recall Brentano’s marked interest in Mach’s positivism and his doctrine of ele-
ments, as evidenced by his numerous notes dictated in Florence during the winter of 1905–
1906, when he was practically blind (Brentano, 1988). Brentano’s interest in Mach (1914) is 
clear in the article “Von der psychologischen Analyze der Tonqualitäten in ihre eigentlich er-
sten Elemente” (Brentano 1979) which he had prepared for the Fifth International Congress 
of Psychology in Rome in 1905, and in which he discusses Stumpf’s and Mach’s doctrines.
3  Notice that Stumpf was already acquainted with Hering’s work in physiology, which he 
extensively discussed in his Rambuch in connection with the nativism-empiricism controversy 
on space perception (Stumpf 1873).
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Hering and Mach were very much involved in the activities of this circle4. Due 
in part to the reputation of the researchers associated with the research group 
Lotos, Prague was considered at that time a leading research center in Europe 
and has attracted many researchers from abroad and many students. It was also 
during that period that began the formation of Brentano’s students of the second 
generation such as Emil Arleth, who attended Stumpf’s lectures as early as 1879 
and received from Hering a solid training in the field of physiological psycholo-
gy (see Marty 1916). Franz Hillebrand, a close friend of Stumpf, who, under the 
recommendation of Brentano, went to Prague in 1886 to study philosophy with 
Marty, has worked both with Mach and Hering and contributed significantly to 
Hering’s research in physiology. He later published many works in this field, 
and in his intellectual biography on Hering, he acknowledged his debt to him 
(Hillebrand 1918; see Stumpf & Rupp 1927). 
The scientific reputation of Prague partly explains why the American philos-
opher William James went to Prague, during his trip to Europe in 1882, in order 
to meet Hering, Mach, and Stumpf. The empiricism advocated by James at that 
time and which he later developed systematically in his book The Principles of 
Psychology (see Marty 1892) is in many respects akin with the positions advocat-
ed by Hering, Mach, and Stumpf on sense experience. Although Stumpf is very 
critical of James’ sensualism as shown by Stumpf’s works on emotions (Stumpf 
1928b), and moreover of James’ later conversion to pragmatism, he maintained a 
lasting correspondence with James that shows a close relationship between the 
two philosophers (Stumpf 1928a)5.
III. HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY AND MACH
Brentano refers to his lectures on positivism in a letter to Mach dated May 1895 
in which he responds to a letter from Mach (14-05-1895) in which he informs 
him of his appointment in Vienna to the chair of history and theory of inductive 
sciences, left vacant since the resignation of Brentano in 1880, and he thanks 
Brentano for supporting him despite the circumstances that precipitated his de-
parture from Vienna in 1895. We know that most students from Brentano in 
Vienna enthusiastically supported Mach’s appointment. Indeed, in September 
1894, Mach was invited to the Congress of the Association of German physicists 
and naturalists held in Vienna and gave a talk entitled “The principle of com-
4  The lists of lectures which are relevant for this period are published in the journal Lotos 
V. 1884. VI–VIII and VI. 1885. VIII–IX. Hering held many lectures during Stumpf’s stay in 
Prague, mainly on the subject of colors, and on the law of specific nerve energies. Mach main-
ly lectured on the fundamental concepts of electrostatics. 
5  In a recent book, E. C. Banks (2014) compared Mach’s and James’ empiricism to that of 
B. Russell.
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parison in Physics” (Mach 1997). Mach’s talk has generated so much interest 
from Brentano’s students, that Alois Höfler, a student of Brentano and Meinong, 
invited Mach to discuss his talk at a meeting of the Philosophical Society of the 
University of Vienna. This discussion aroused in turn so much interest that two 
further discussion sessions were organized by Josef C. Kreibig, another student 
of Brentano. These discussions have convinced several members of the Philo-
sophical Society, including Brentano’s students who were very much involved 
in this organisation (see Fisette, 2014), of the interest of Mach’s candidature to 
occupy Brentano’s chair in Vienna. Mach began his teaching at the University 
of Vienna in 1895 and we know the major influence he has had on the course of 
the history of philosophy in Austria.6
Worth mentioning in this regard is Husserl’s positive review of Mach’s talk 
three years before the publication of his Logical Investigations (Husserl 1897). 
We know that Mach (1897. 200) uses the term “phenomenology” (a “general 
physical phenomenology extending to all domains”) in his talk to name his own 
methodological stance based on the description and analysis of sensations as the 
main task he assigns to science. This phenomenology is in many respects sim-
ilar to Husserl’s phenomenology in the Logical Investigations, which he defines 
as a descriptive psychology, but also to that of Stumpf understood as a neutral 
science whose task consists in the description and analysis of sense phenomena 
(Stumpf 1906a). Brentano himself explicitly establishes the connection between 
his descriptive psychology and Mach’s doctrine of elements in his lectures on 
descriptive psychology which he taught in Vienna between 1887 and 1891. 
Brentano also uses the term phenomenology to refer to this part of his psychol-
ogy which deals with the description and analysis of conscious experiences and 
the subtitle of the second version of these lectures: “Psychognosie: the doctrine 
of the elements of human consciousness” unequivocally refers to Mach’s doc-
trine of elements7 and thus confirms that there is some kinship between these 
different versions of phenomenology.
Let us now return to Husserl. In his Amsterdam lectures (1928), Husserl 
even characterizes his phenomenology as a radicalization of a phenomenologi-
cal method previously used “by some scientific researchers and some psycholo-
gists” (Husserl 1997. 213) and he mentions the names of Mach, Hering, and 
Brentano. The first two names are the natural scientists who, according to Hus-
serl, have extensively used this phenomenological method, while the psycholo-
gists he refers to in this passage are, of course, Franz Brentano and his pupils. 
This is confirmed in an appendix to § 1 of the 1925 lectures on phenomeno-
6  See Haller & Stadler 1988. On several other aspects of the relationship between Mach 
and Höfler, see Blackmore 2001; on A. Meinong’s relationship with Mach, see Lindenfeld 
1980.
7  In the manuscript of Brentano’s lectures Deskriptive Psychologie oder Beschreibende Phänom-
enologie. Vorlesungen 1888–1889 (59115–59116), he refers explicitly to The Analysis of Sensations.
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logical psychology in which Husserl claims that one of the main sources of his 
phenomenology lies in Mach’s work in the domain of sensations (Husserl 1962. 
350) namely because his approach to psychology differs from that of traditional 
natural sciences thanks to its descriptive character. Referring this time to the 
famous empiricism-nativism debate between Helmholtz and Hering, Husserl 
writes about the meaning of the method in Mach and Hering:
The sense of this method in men like Mach and Hering lay in a reaction against the 
threatening groundlessness of theorizing in the exact natural sciences. It was a reac-
tion against a mode of theorizing in mathematical speculations and concept-forming 
which is distant from intuition, a theorizing which accomplished neither clarity with 
insight, in any legitimate sense, nor the production of theories. (Husserl 1997. 211.)
This amounts to saying that in Mach and Hering, this phenomenological meth-
od imposes several constraints on one’s descriptions, namely that which consists 
in admitting as descriptum only what is immediately and intuitively given in ex-
perience, which Husserl conceives of in Logical Investigations as sensory data and 
immanent contents of perception and experience as a whole.
Another quote, taken from his 1910 lectures “The Fundamental problems of 
phenomenology”, corroborates what Husserl says in the Amsterdam lectures. 
He once again maintains that the origin of the phenomenological method lies 
in J. S. Mill and “in the sensation-monism of Mach, who likewise substitutes 
connecting groups of sensation for the thing” (Husserl 2006. 76).8 Prima facie, 
these two remarks make it possible to establish a close link between Husserl’s 
phenomenology and Mach’s descriptivism which, as Husserl points out in this 
passage, beyond its strict methodological meaning of describing phenomena in 
the simplest and more economical possible way, is coupled with a metaphysi-
cal postulate which, as we have stressed several times, amounts to the reduc-
tion of physical objects and psychical functions to aggregates or complexes of 
sensations. Yet just like Brentano and most of his pupils, Husserl has always 
criticized this form of phenomenalism. The question is therefore how to recon-
cile the repeated criticisms of Mach’s phenomenalism throughout his work with 
the leading role that Husserl clearly assigned to him in the genesis of his own 
phenomenology. Part of the response lies in Husserl’s criticism of Mach in the 
Logical Investigations where he raises the objection of logical psychologism which 
I shall later discuss (see Lübbe 1960; Sommer 1985).
8  In the winter semester of 1903–1904, Husserl gave a lecture on the new publications 
in the domain of natural sciences, and Mach’s book, The Analysis of Sensations, was on the 
program (see Schuhmann 1977. 76). Mach’s book was also an important topic in Husserl’s 
lectures entitled „Philosophische Übungen mit einigem Anschluß an E. Machs Analyse der 
Empfindungen” in the summer semester of 1911 (see Husserl’s letter to Vaihinger dated May 
24, 1911, in Husserl 1994/V. 211–212). 
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IV. MACH AND THE CONTROVERSY ON GESTALT QUALITIES
The name Mach is also associated with what has been called the controversy 
on Gestalt qualities to which gave rise the publication in 1890 of Ehrenfels’ 
study “On Gestalt qualities” to which participated most of Brentano’s students.9 
Ehrenfels’ starting point is the first edition of Mach’s book Contributions to the 
Analysis of Sensations in 1886, in which Mach points out that we have the ability 
to immediately “feel” spatial forms and even “sound forms”, or melodies. The 
question that arises in connection with descriptive psychology pertains to the 
nature of these peculiar contents of presentation which are called spatial forms 
and melodies, for example. Ehrenfels wonders then if these phenomena are 
mere syntheses or sums of sensations or something entirely new and irreducible 
to such syntheses. Ehrenfels finally opts for Mach’s position on that issue and 
claims that this species of phenomena constitutes something entirely new and 
autonomous with respect to mere bundles and aggregates or to mental chemistry 
and he relies on three short passages in Mach’s book including the following:
If two series of tones be begun at two different points on the scale, but be made 
to maintain throughout the same ratios of vibration, we recognize in both the same 
melody, by a mere act of sensation, just as readily and immediately as we recognize in 
two geometrically similar figures, similarly situated, the same form (Mach 1914. 285).
Ehrenfels argues that Mach’s analysis of sensations paved the way for his own 
solution to the problem of Gestalt qualities.
After reading Ehrenfels’ paper, Mach wrote to him that he himself had devel-
oped, twenty years earlier, the ideas that are found in this study, and we can as-
sume, with Mulligan and Smith (1988), that Mach (1865) here refers to his study 
“Bemerkungen zur Lehre vom räumlichen Sehen”. In this original study, Mach 
wonders how it is possible to recognize two spatial configurations (Gestalten) as 
being one and the same figure, for example, how can we identify one and the 
same melody played in two different keys and by different instruments. This 
recognition and similarity cannot depend, Mach argues, on perceptual presenta-
tional qualities since they are different in both cases. Mach’s remarks can be un-
derstood in the sense of a recourse, necessary in this case, to additional elemen-
tary sensations outside the sphere of presentations, namely to sensations that 
he calls muscular or kinesthetic sensations: “When we hear the same melody in 
two different keys, our apprehension of this ‘sameness’ rests on the fact that, for 
all the differences in tone-sensations, the same feeling-sensations are involved 
in both cases” (Mulligan & Smith 1988. 126). It is known that Husserl studied 
9  On the Gestalt controversy, see M. Ash (1995); on the relationship between Mach and 
von Ehrenfels, see Mulligan & Smith 1988.
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similar phenomena that he calls “figurative moments” already in his Philosophy 
of Arithmetic in a quite different context, namely that of the explanation of in-
direct apprehensions of multiplicities10. In a footnote to chapter XI, Husserl in 
fact mentions Ehrenfels’ article, that he had not studied at that time, but he ex-
plicitly acknowledges his debt to Mach’s The Analysis of Sensations: “Since I read 
this work by the gifted physicist right after its appearance, it is quite possible 
that I too was partly influenced in the progress of my thought by reminiscences 
from that reading” (Husserl 1970. 211). That said, in Husserl’s later works, he 
preferably uses the notion of moments of unity in order to designate that kind 
of phenomena, and it is no longer to Mach’s name that he refers in this context, 
but to Ehrenfels and Meinong.
V. MACH AND STUMPF ON LAWS OF PHYSICS  
AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL RELATIONS
In 1896, a year after his arrival in Vienna, Mach was invited to attend the 3rd In-
ternational Congress of Psychology held in Munich, of which Stumpf and The-
odor Lipps were co-presidents. But Mach declined this invitation because of 
his precarious health, and Brentano replaced him (see Brentano 1897). Stumpf 
delivered the inaugural address published under the title “Body and Soul” 
(Stumpf 1910) in which Stumpf summarizes his main objections against this 
form of neutral monism in several of his writings, and in particular in the two 
Academy treatises (Stumpf 1906b. 1; 1906a. 10–14)11. Stumpf’s first criticism is 
directed against the phenomenalist conception of physics and the empiricist 
interpretation of its objects in terms of “permanent possibilities of sensation”. 
The objects of physics, like those of psychology, are not reducible to complexes 
of elements since sense phenomena, although they represent indeed the start-
ing point and the term of the research in the natural sciences, are finally “the 
object of none of them” (Stumpf 1906a. 16). The second criticism is directed 
against his conception of the laws of physics: in spite of Mach’s profound under-
standing of the history of the development of thought in the natural sciences as 
evidenced notably by his work on the economic nature of the research in phys-
10  Notice, however, that even before von Ehrenfels, Husserl already used the notion of 
Gestalt (rather than that of figural moment) in his 1889–1890 lectures on the concept of num-
ber (Husserl 2004. 298).
11  Stumpf knew Mach’s work and discusses it many times in his lectures and publications. 
He reviewed the first and second edition of Analysis of Sensations (Stumpf 1886. 1900). In 
the first, he is critical of Mach’s phenomenalism, but relatively laudatory about the work as 
a whole. In his review of the second edition of the book published in 1900, Stumpf is clearly 
more critical and denounces the unacceptable consequences of Mach’s positivism, and in 
particular the reduction of mental functions to sense impressions, the conception of the world 
as a sum of sensations, the dissolution of the subject, etc. See also Stumpf 1890. 55 ff.
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ics, the thesis according to which laws of nature are nothing more than abridged 
reports on facts is logically unjustifiable. Stumpf does not dispute the value of 
the principle of economy of thought so important in classical positivism, but 
he considers that it leads to bankruptcy because, by confusing laws and simple 
facts, it has as a direct consequence logical psychologism as defined in Husserl’s 
Prolegomena (Stumpf 1906a. 53n.), which I will discuss in the next section. 
The third objection against Mach (cf. Stumpf 1910. 86) bears on psychophys-
ical relations to which Stumpf attaches much importance in his writings. Unlike 
most of his contemporaries, including Brentano and Husserl, Stumpf unequivo-
cally rejects the doctrine of parallelism according to which the physical and the 
psychological are aspects of one and the same reality and he advocates, following 
Lotze, a form of interactionism that rejects monism in favor of dualism. The 
position that Stumpf advocates in “Leib und Seele” is nicely summed up in the 
following quote taken from his posthumous book Erkenntnislehre:
The discredited dualism however, according to which everything in the world, in-
cluding the mental and physical, stands in thoroughgoing interaction (directly or in-
directly), now appears as the true monism. According to interactionism, the world is, 
despite the diversity of its parts, a unified organic whole. Thus the parallelistic view 
proves to be impractical and contradictory, and therefore the theory of interaction 
remains, for the time being, the best guide through the maze of this great problem. 
(Stumpf 1939–1940. 822.)
One of Stumpf’s arguments in favor of interactionism and against parallelism is 
Darwin’s theory of evolution (Stumpf 1910. 78–79) to which he attaches great 
importance since the Prague period, and notably in his studies on the origins of 
music and the psychology of sounds.
Mach awaited the publication of the second edition of Stumpf’s talk in 1910 to 
respond to these objections12. In a short notice entitled “Sensory Elements and 
Scientific Concepts”, Mach (1992. 121) summarizes Stumpf’s objection in say-
ing “that relations by means of scientific laws ‘absolutely never’ exist between 
immediately given sensory appearances; what scientists mean by lawfulness is 
always completely different” (Mach 1992. 121). In response to Stumpf’s objec-
tions, Mach argues that the purely mathematical world to which Stumpf (1910. 
84–85) refers is a metaphysical postulate foreign to a physicist who adheres to 
the descriptivist point of view and who refrains from crossing the threshold of 
appearances. Mach indeed argues that everything beyond the immediate data 
of experience is metaphysical, and any science that does not conform to pure 
12  The discussion with Mach was in fact introduced in the 1909 version of “Body and Soul” 
and repeated, with significant additions, in his 1910 collection of essays Philosophische und 
Reden Vorträge, in which he makes more explicit his criticism of Mach (Stumpf 1910. 83–87).
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description has to deal with Scheinprobleme. Hence the monism of sensations 
according to which the world is made neither of matter nor of mind, but of a neu-
tral material that can be treated according to the context, interest, and direction 
of research, as psychical or physical13.
VI. THE OBJECTION OF PSYCHOLOGISM  
IN HUSSERL’S PROLEGOMENA14
Let us finally examine Husserl’s objection of logical psychologism that he im-
putes to Mach in chapter IX of his Prolegomena to Pure Logic entitled “The prin-
ciple of economy of thought and logic”, in which he denounces any attempt to 
base logic and the theory of knowledge on the principle of economy of thought. 
But let us bear in mind that Husserl’s objection in the Prolegomena does not 
directly relate to the theories based on that principle as Husserl confirms in his 
correspondence with Mach. On the contrary, he recognizes the “extraordinarily 
successful” nature of Mach’s research on the biological and psycho-cognitive 
aspect of science and the merits of a “genetico-psychological und biological” ap-
proach to science (Husserl 1994/VI. 255). These theories are perfectly legitimate 
and fruitful, Husserl says, “in their due limits” (Husserl 1982a. 123). The dis-
tinction in the Prolegomena between logic as a theoretical science (as a theory of 
science) and as a practical science (as Kunstlehre) is important to understand the 
meaning of this limitation. Indeed, in ignoring the difference between the actu-
al content of logical propositions and their practical application, logical psycholo-
gism systematically confuses the use of a proposition for normative purposes 
with its theoretical content, and its main mistake consists precisely in claiming 
to provide logic as a whole with a foundation. Only then can an empiricist like 
Mach be called a psychologist. For whoever recognizes the merits of the division 
within logic between its theoretical and its practical aspect is quite justified to 
resort to physiological psychology, for example, to explain the mechanical use 
of methodological rules. In other words, the use of psychology in the theory of 
knowledge can only be considered psychologist insofar as these two aspects of 
logic are confused and the theory of knowledge be reduced to a Kunstlehre of 
knowledge. 
13  One of Stumpf’s famous students who contributed significantly to the reception of 
Mach is the author of the novel Man ohne Eigenschaften, Robert Musil. Musil traveled to Ber-
lin in 1903 to study philosophy, physics and mathematics, and in 1908, under the direction 
of Stumpf, he defended a doctoral thesis on Mach (Musil 1908). See R. Haller (2003) who 
summarizes some general aspects of the complex relationship between Mach, Stumpf and 
Musil’s dissertation.
14  On Husserl’s criticism of Mach based on the objection of psychologism, see Fisette 
(2012).
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This is confirmed by Husserl’s analyzes in § 55 of the Prolegomena, which 
deals more specifically with this form of empiricist foundation of logic that uses 
the principle of economy of thought. In its most general sense, this principle is 
formulated as follows: “This tendency of obtaining a survey of a given province 
with the least expenditure of thought, and of representing all its facts by some 
one single mental process, may be justly termed an economical one” (Mach 
1903b. 211). This principle can be understood either as a psychological princi-
ple, as Cornelius does, or as a biological principle. What Husserl calls the Ave-
narius–Mach principle is considered in this section a biological principle that 
is associated with the principles of evolution of species, their adaptation to the 
natural conditions of their environment, and their conservation. In addition to its 
recognized applications in the field of biology, the field in which this principle is 
the most fruitful is precisely that of the methods in mathematical logic that serve 
practical needs such as the system of decimal numbers and in general all the 
standard mechanical and algorithmic processes that are used in mathematics. 
For all these technical and mechanical processes, continues Husserl, are meth-
odological artifices which serve essentially to the economy of thought, i.e., they 
are used in order to compensate for “the defects of our mental constitution” or 
the severe limitations of “men’s intellectual powers” (Husserl 1982a. 126). In 
fact, all these methodological artifices are due to the very nature of our mental 
constitution and they are the result of a natural evolution or “certain natural 
processes of thought-economy” (Husserl 1982a. 126). 
One can see that Husserl’s interest in the Prolegomena for the theory of the 
economy of thought in explaining the methodology of scientific research is not 
incidental. However, Husserl considers that this interest depends on the role of 
this theory in the larger and much more ambitious program of a theory of sci-
ence. Therefore, this is not the place where psychologism lies. For logical psy-
chologism is only imputable to Mach in so far as it takes into account only one 
aspect of logic (practical and technological). Mach’s main mistake, therefore, 
boils down to the limitation of knowledge to “the empirical aspect of science”, 
especially to science as a biological phenomenon, and to the fact that he does 
not take into account the true “epistemological problem of science as ideal-
ly unified, objective truth” (Husserl 1982a. 133). For the theory of knowledge 
that Husserl advocates in the Logical Investigations “wishes to grasp perspicuous-
ly, from an objectively ideal standpoint, in what the possibility of perspicuous 
knowledge of the real consists, the possibility of science and of knowledge in 
general” (Husserl 1982a. 131). This task is an essential philosophical comple-
ment to the mathesis and the overall theory of science. In that respect, as a theory 
of knowledge,15 phenomenology has nothing to expect philosophically from a 
15  In the introduction to the second Investigation, Husserl clearly indicates that his theory of 
knowledge differs from that of classical empiricism in that “it recognizes the ‘ideal’ as a con-
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genetic explanation as Husserl points out in his discussion of the work of Külpe 
and Elsenhans regarding the meaning of his criticism of logical psychologism 
(Husserl 1982a. 319).
Mach responded to Husserl’s criticism in the fourth edition of his book The 
Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development in which 
he admits that his scientific approach is indeed “a psycho-cognitive sketch” 
(Mach 1919. 582), while denying of having confused “natural or blind thought 
and logical thinking’’ and much less logical and psychological issues (Mach 
1919. 582). He conceives of his dispute with Husserl as a difference of meth-
od: Mach’s method is inductive and proceeds from particular phenomena to 
the general laws (bottom-up) whereas, with his general theory of science, Hus-
serl proceeds deductively from main principles and laws, which he defines 
as ideal entities, to particular cases. But Mach does not take into account in 
his response Husserl’s phenomenological investigations in the second volume 
of his Logical Investigations and ignores, it seems, Husserl’s phenomenology 
and the use of a descriptive approach in his analysis of conscious experiences. 
Mach further argues that even a theory of all possible theories in Husserl’s 
program cannot do without research in the field of biology: “Even if the logi-
cal analysis of all the sciences were complete, the biologico-psychological in-
vestigation of their development would continue to remain a necessity to me 
(Mach 1919. 582).
In a letter dated June 18, 1901, Husserl (1994/VI. 255–256) acknowledges 
receipt of the new edition of Mach’s work and reminds him that his criticism of 
psychologism in no way challenges the right of a “genetic-psychological and bi-
ological” approach to science, but he opposes, as we saw, “the subordination of 
the epistemological explanation of the purely logical in science under the points 
of view of psychological genesis and biological adaptation” (Husserl 1994/VI. 
255). Husserl recalls, moreover, that the chapter on the economy of thought 
does not primarily target Mach’s use of the principle of economy of thought, but 
rather Cornelius’ use of this principle in a psychological sense (Husserl 1982b. 
303; see Cornelius 1897). What Husserl more specifically criticizes in Mach is 
the one-sidedness of his empirical descriptions, and the fact that he does not 
take into account the ideal and purely logical content of science, as if the ge-
netical point of view were enough for epistemological needs (Husserl 1994/V. 
256). Now, we saw that Husserl’s argument in the Prolegomena against logical 
psychologism was based precisely on the ideality of the laws of logic. That said, 
Husserl claims that there is no contradiction between these two approaches that 
are mutually compatible and complementary (Husserl 1994/VI. 257). Husserl’s 
dition for the possibility of objective knowledge in general, and does not ‘interpret it away’ in 
psychologistic fashion” (Husserl 1982b. 238).
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clarification seems to have dispelled Mach’s concerns as evidenced by Mach’s 
short letter of 23 June 1901 in which he says that he has nothing further to add 
to Husserl’s clarification and he hopes that this dispute is past history.16
VII. FINAL REMARKS
We know that Mach renounced his chair in Vienna in 1901 and that one of 
the candidates to fill this chair was none other than Husserl who even visited 
Mach thereupon during the Easter holidays of 1901.17 Alois Riehl, a colleague of 
Husserl at Halle, seems to have been one of the serious candidates for the suc-
cession of Mach in Vienna. But since Riehl was not interested in that position, 
he strongly recommended Husserl’s candidacy to Mach. According to Husserl, 
Mach would have positively received Riehl’s recommendation and would have 
shown a preference for Husserl’s candidacy for this position18. However, after 
numerous negotiations within the Faculty, the Commission took the opportu-
nity to repatriate the physicist Ludwig Boltzmann to Vienna by offering him 
Mach’s chair (see Blackmore 1995). Husserl’s disappointment is manifest in a 
nostalgic letter to his compatriot T. Masaryk, in which he admits of having aban-
doned the long-cherished hope of obtaining a position in Austria:
Von der alten Heimat bleibe ich nun wohl dauernd getrennt, die in früheren Jahren 
gehegte Hoffnung, einmal nach Österreich berufen zu werden, habe ich längst auf-
gegeben – obschon ich mit Freude erst im letzten Jahre hörte, daß E. Mach, als er sich 
zurückzog neben Riehl auch mich als ihm erwünschten Nachfolger für Wien nannte 
(Husserl 1994/I. 107).
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christoph limbeck-lilienau
The First Vienna Circle: Myth or Reality?
I. INTRODUCTION1
Many philosophical traditions have been mentioned as predecessors of logical 
empiricism, from Mach’s empiricism and Russell’s new logic to neo-kantianism 
and Austrian philosophy in the tradition of Bolzano and Brentano. One group 
has been specifically singled out as a kind of predecessor of the Vienna Circle 
around Schlick, the so-called “First Vienna Circle” (Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn 
and Philipp Frank). Several views have been associated with the “First Vienna 
Circle”: first, that it formed a kind of nucleus of the later Vienna Circle in which 
we can already find some ideas of the later logical empiricism; secondly, that the 
main influence on this group was the philosophy of science of Mach, Boltzmann 
and the French conventionalists (Poincaré, Duhem, Rey). I will claim in this 
paper, that for historical reasons there are severe doubts about the importance 
and even about the existence of the group called the “First Vienna Circle”. 
I will also claim that due to the focus on the “First Vienna Circle”, some other 
important philosophical influences on Neurath, Hahn and Frank in Vienna be-
fore 1914 have been ignored and have not been taken sufficiently into account 
in the genesis of logical empiricism. I will emphasize especially the influence 
of a Viennese group of Meinongians, who were in close contact with Neurath, 
Hahn and Frank and shaped some of their early views on the foundation of 
science. Naturally I do not contest the influence of Mach, Boltzmann and the 
French conventionalists, through whatever forum that may have happened, on 
the young Neurath, Hahn and Frank. But I will claim that the Meinongians are 
especially important for the philosophy in Vienna around 1910. They are an 
essential factor in the rise of analytic philosophy in Austria. And through their 
interaction with Russell, the Meinongians were critical for the reception of the 
analytic philosophy of Russell and Frege in Austria. Through their contact with 
1  The present paper is an extended version of a section on the First Vienna Circle in my 
paper The First Vienna Circle and the Erlangen Conference (2019). I thank Thomas Uebel, Elis-
abeth Nemeth, Denis Fisette and Bastian Stoppelkamp for discussions on earlier versions of 
the present paper. 
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the Meinongians, Neurath, Hahn and Frank were in contact with the early rise 
of analytic philosophy as strongly as they were influenced by the philosophy of 
science of Mach, Boltzmann and Poincaré.
I will first discuss the literature on the “First Vienna Circle” and evaluate 
the accuracy of the data about that group (1). Secondly, I will describe the phil-
osophical scene in Vienna with a special focus on the Meinongians (2). Then, 
I will reconstruct the philosophical discussions into which Neurath, Hahn and 
Frank were involved in Vienna before 1914 from the available historical data we 
have (3). I will then show how the discussions among the Meinongians influ-
enced especially the philosophy of logic and mathematics of Neurath and Hahn 
(4). As conclusion, I will evaluate the impact of the philosophical discussions 
before 1914 on the later Vienna Circle (5).
II. RE-DISCOVERING THE “FIRST VIENNA CIRCLE”
The first Vienna Circle was absent from the standard histories of logical empiri-
cism until the 1980s. Rudolf Haller (1982a, 1982b) and Friedrich Stadler (1982. 
111–117) were the first to put an emphasis on an almost unnoticed group formed 
by Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank before WWI, and mentioned 
by Frank (1941 and 1949). Haller named that group the “First Vienna Circle” 
and suggested that it should receive special attention, particularly if one wanted 
to avoid the then dominant “received view” of logical empiricism. Against the 
view of a foundationalist empiricism and an ahistorical philosophy of science, 
Haller claimed that a focus on the forgotten “First Vienna Circle” would allow 
us to see a fallibilist, holistic, conventionalist and historically informed stream 
in the Vienna Circle which was overlooked, despite the fact that this stream re-
emerged in the Vienna Circle in the 1930s around Carnap and former members 
of this “First Vienna Circle”. Subsequent historical reconstructions of the phi-
losophy of the Vienna Circle followed Haller’s suggestion of a revisionary view 
of logical empiricism and emphasized the role of the forgotten First Vienna Cir-
cle and its decisive influence on later logical empiricism, especially on the left 
wing of the Vienna Circle (Uebel 1991 and 2000, Stadler 2015).
The only primary source about the “First Vienna Circle” comes from Frank 
(1941), who, in an English re-edition of his papers added an introduction called 
“Historical Background”. There, he intended to “clear up certain misunder-
standings” about logical empiricism and its history (Frank 1941. 6). Frank em-
phasized the origin of logical empiricism in the thoughts of Ernst Mach, despite 
certain shortcomings of the latter’s philosophy of science, namely: Mach’s un-
derestimation of the importance of logic and mathematics, his rejection of atom-
ism and his belief that physics was actually about perceptual experiences. In this 
context, Frank mentions “a group of young men”, Hahn, Neurath and himself, 
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who tried to solve these shortcoming with on the one hand conventionalism 
(Poincaré, Duhem and Abel Rey) and on the other hand new developments in 
logic and the philosophy of mathematics (Couturat, Schröder and Hilbert are 
mentioned by Frank). In a much expanded version of his historical introduction 
(Frank 1949), Frank is more explicit. The group, so Frank, was actually a weekly 
discussion group which tried to rebuild a “new positivism”, based on the ideas 
of Mach and the French conventionalists. 
According to Frank, the discussions of the group focused mainly on the way 
to overcome the mentioned shortcomings in Mach’s philosophy. Contrary to 
Mach, the group thought that the principles of science were “clear-cut mathe-
matical relations among a small number of concepts” and not Mach’s abbreviat-
ed and economical descriptions of observations, which involved a great number 
of vague concepts. In order to allow for an independence of a mathematized 
theory from observation, one had to appeal to conventions. As was suggested 
by Poincaré, definitions and basic principles of science were chosen freely and 
this conventional part of a theory was then coordinated with empirical state-
ments: „According to Mach the general principles of science are abbreviated 
economical descriptions of observed facts; according to Poincaré they are free 
creations of the human mind which do not tell anything about observed facts. 
The attempt to integrate the two concepts into one coherent system was the 
origin of what was later called logical empiricism.” (Frank 1949. 11–12.) Frank 
suggests that his early paper on conventions and laws of nature (Frank 1907) is 
an example of such an integration of Mach with conventionalism.
Unfortunately, Frank’s report is the only source on the discussion group.2 
Despite the lack of additional independent evidence for Frank’s narrative of 
a regular discussion group, it cannot be doubted that Hahn, Frank and Neur-
ath knew each other at the time and did discuss, in some context or other, the 
problems mentioned by Frank. Although Neurath never speaks about a regular 
discussion group, he refers to his early intellectual friendship with Hahn and 
Frank. In a letter from 1934, Neurath writes: “I was acquainted with him [Hahn] 
for about 35 years, we discussed together Poincaré, Philipp Frank reported to us 
about Einstein’s very first publications.”3 And he writes about Hahn: “35 years 
of similar endeavors in different domains. The joint youth with Poincaré, Du-
hem etc.”4 And also: „Hahn and I have been friends for many years – since the 
Gymnasium time. (…). He, the older, taught me a lot of things. We, Frank and 
other[s] read Spinoza in the ’Rahnhof’ [a Viennese café].”5
2  There is no source whatsoever from the time of the meetings (no programs, notes or in-
cidental remarks in correspondence). Not even a document which may confirm that a group 
with Hahn, Neurath and Frank actually met for discussions.
3  Letter of Neurath to Gerrit Mannoury, Sept. 22, 1934.
4  Letter of Neurath to Hempel, August 16, 1934.
5  Letter of Neurath to Carnap, 1945, quoted in Uebel 2000. 69. 
CHRISTOPH LIMBECK-LILIENAU: THE FIRST VIENNA CIRCLE: MYTH OR REALITY? 53
Given the lack of sources on the meetings mentioned by Frank, Fisette (2011) 
suggested that the group was just part of the discussions at or after the meet-
ings of the “Philosophical Society” in Vienna, of which Neurath, Hahn and Frank 
were members at this time.6 For this reason, Fisette calls the First Vienna Circle a 
“pseudo-Circle”. Fisette’s doubts are certainly very helpful. They raise the ques-
tion what entity the term “First Vienna Circle” is actually supposed to designate. 
I will focus here on the philosophical discussions in which Neurath, Hahn and 
Frank were involved before Hahn’s departure from Vienna (1910), when Hahn 
was appointed at the University of Czernowitz (now in Ukraine).7 These dis-
cussions at multiple institutional levels shaped the philosophical views of Neur-
ath, Hahn and Frank. I will limit my reconstruction to actually documented 
discussions. Frank’s report on the First Vienna Circle can be seen as a synthetic 
and potentially misleading integration of diverse discussions into a more or less 
mythical regular discussion group. 
III. DISCUSSIONS BEFORE 1914
Neurath, Hahn and Frank were involved in several discussions on the philoso-
phy of science between 1907 and 1910. These discussions took place in three 
different settings: informal meetings of Neurath, Hahn and Frank (perhaps with 
others), a reading group around Hahn and Höfler on the philosophy of mathe-
matics and the discussions in the “Philosophical Society”. 
Hahn had studied mathematics in Vienna. After research in Göttingen, he 
got his “Habilitation” in Vienna in 1905 and started to teach there. Neurath had 
studied economics in Berlin since 1903 and returned to Vienna in 1906 after 
getting his doctorate in Berlin. At the time, the scientific interests of Neurath 
and Hahn strongly converged as Neurath expressed his intention to focus more 
on mathematics, the natural sciences and the history of science.8 In 1907, Neur-
ath and Hahn met regularly in order to prepare a course on the foundations of 
mathematics and physics with a special focus on Poincaré, Mach and Russell. 
Neurath writes:
I am doing a lot of things. I am especially more and more interested in exact logic, 
but also general considerations on the foundations of the sciences, particularly the 
exact sciences are on my daily schedule. I try to revise and improve my knowledge in 
6  The evenings of the Philosophical Society were mostly followed by more informal dis-
cussions in a Viennese coffeehouse. 
7  Frank’s suggestion, in Frank 1949. 3, that his discussion group met till 1912 is quite im-
probable, given that regular meetings would be reduced to Frank and Neurath after 1909. In 
1912 Frank was appointed to the University of Prague.
8  See Neurath to Tönnies, November or December 1906.
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mathematics and physics etc. A local lecturer of mathematics plans to offer a course 
in the next winter term on the foundations of mathematics and mechanics (following 
the work of Poincaré). He asked me to teach the course together with him. […] We 
meet twice a week and read Russell’s Principles of Mathematics. Also Mach’s History of 
Mechanics is sometimes our topic. (Letter of Neurath to Tönnies, Spring 1907.) 
Apparently that course was never given,9 but it may have triggered further dis-
cussions on the philosophy of science between Neurath and Hahn, and then 
also Frank.10 
In the same year (1907), the philosopher Alois Höfler (1853–1922) was ap-
pointed at the University of Vienna as professor of philosophy, with a special 
focus on pedagogy. Höfler had studied physics with Boltzmann before turning 
to philosophy under the influence of Brentano and Meinong. He was one of the 
closest allies of Meinong11 and after his appointment to Vienna gave a contro-
versial inaugural lecture on Meinong’s theory of objects.12 For several reasons, 
Hahn, Neurath and Frank got into close contact and intellectual exchange with 
Höfler. First, the other professors of philosophy in Vienna did not seem very 
attractive to them.13 Secondly, Höfler had a strong interest in the philosophy of 
physics and mathematics. Thirdly, Höfler was institutionally important, because 
of his role in the “Philosophical Society” in Vienna, an essential philosophical 
forum for Hahn, Neurath and Frank. Probably through that “Society”, the three 
young scientists came into contact with Höfler. 
Through Meinong’s debate with Russell,14 Höfler gained a strongly interest 
in the new symbolic logic. In 1908–1909, Höfler, Hahn and another Meinongi-
an, Hans Pichler, met regularly in a reading group on logic and the foundations 
of mathematics.15 Together, they read literature on the philosophy of mathe-
matics, especially the German translation (1908) of Couturat’s Les Principes des 
Mathématiques, which introduced Russell’s logic and logicism to the German 
9  In 1907–1908, Hahn actually gave courses on the theory of functions and on the 
foundations of geometry.
10  Though none of these meetings can actually be documented, see footnote 2. 
11  Meinong was Höfler’s dissertation supervisor and co-author, see Höfler and Meinong 
1890. Höfler’s correspondence with Meinong includes more then 3000 letters.
12  Höfler to Meinong, Oct. 3. and Dec. 31, 1907.
13  Besides Höfler, two other professors taught philosophy in Vienna: Friedrich Jodl (1849–
1914), a classical positivist strongly influenced by Feuerbach, and Laurenz Müllner (1848–
1911), a priest and specialist in Christian philosophy. The successor of Mach and Boltzmann, 
the philosopher and psychologist Adolf Stöhr (1855–1921) becomes professor in Vienna only 
in 1910.
14  Smith 1985 and Höfler’s letter to Meinong from Feb. 21, 1908. Höfler’s interest in Rus-
sell was also triggered by Cassirer’s reaction to Russell and Couturat in Cassirer 1907.
15  Höfler mentions this reading group in a report and Hahn mentions it in a letter to Höfler, 
reprinted in Limbeck-Lilienau 2015. 45.
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public.16 Couturat’s book concluded with a long and ferocious attack on Kant’s 
philosophy of mathematics. Neurath wrote a brief review of Couturat’s book 
(Neurath 1909a). But it is not clear whether Neurath participated in Höfler’s 
reading group, although some details may suggest so.17 Pichler also mentioned 
discussions with Hahn on the foundations of arithmetics, especially on the prob-
lem of the completeness of arithmetics and the means to prove it (Pichler 1909. 
75–76). At the same time Höfler gave two courses on Mach’s and Boltzmann’s 
philosophy of the natural sciences and organized discussions on the same topic 
in the “Philosophical Society”, once together with Neurath.18
The “Philosophical Society at the University of Vienna” was an essential in-
tellectual forum for Viennese philosophers and philosophically interested sci-
entists like Neurath, Hahn and Frank, but also for other later members of the 
Vienna Circle (e.g. Viktor Kraft and Edgar Zilsel). In that forum, Hahn, Frank 
and Neurath gave their first philosophical talks at the University of Vienna.19 
Höfler, together with Twardowski and other students of Brentano had founded 
the “Society” in 1888/89. Leading scientists like Boltzmann, Wilhelm Ostwald, 
Felix Klein or the co-founder of psychoanalysis, Josef Breuer, had given talks 
there.20 A central and innovative feature of the “Society” were discussion eve-
nings. After his return to Vienna (1907), Höfler began to organize these discus-
sions, though with an increasing resistance from the president of that society, 
Friedrich Jodl, who tried to suppress them. In 1909, this led to a major clash. 
Höfler, together with Meinong, protested against the suppression of these dis-
cussions and he met regularly with Hahn in order to re-establish them.21 It is 
quite probable that Neurath and Frank were also in support of such discussions, 
as they were strongly involved in their relaunch at the end of 1909.22 Due to 
the mentioned lack of data, we cannot reconstruct how often or regularly Hahn, 
Neurath and Frank met for discussions separately from the “Philosophical So-
ciety” and Höfler.
16  On Russell’s reception in Germany and Austria, see Pulkkinen 2005.
17  At the time of the reading group, Neurath wrote Höfler about Schroeder’s logic (letter 
from 1909). Pichler also mentions his discussions with Neurath on logic, Pichler 1909. 22. 
But these conversations with Pichler and Höfler may have taken place in the “Philosophical 
Society”. 
18  Höfler’s courses in the winter of 1908–1809 and 1909–1910 had the title “Lesung und 
Besprechung naturwissenschaftlich-philosophischer Schriften von Mach und Boltzmann”. 
The discussion led by Neurath in connection to that course was called “Concept and Scope 
of the Apriori” (January 1910).
19  Fisette 2011 describes the essential role of that Society for the formation of the Vienna 
Circle.
20  For an overview of the talks and discussions at the “Philosophical Society”, see Black-
more 1995 and Meister 1938.
21  Letters from Höfler to Meinong from Spring 1909. Höfler and Meinong wrote a report, 
supported by Hahn, expressing their protest (Höfler Archive, Graz). 
22  With the discussions on “Does Absolute Motion Exist?” led by Frank (Nov. 1909) and 
the discussions on the Apriori led by Neurath (January and February 1910).
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Let us focus now on the positions of the Meinongians around Höfler and let 
us show how some of these positions became attractive for some of the men-
tioned later members of the Vienna Circle.
IV. THE MEINONGIANS IN VIENNA
When Neurath, Hahn and Frank began to be actively involved into philosoph-
ical discussions, Mach had already retired and Boltzmann was dead. At the 
University of Vienna, it was Höfler who now centrally focused his interests on 
logic, the foundations of mathematics and the natural sciences. Despite Hö-
fler’s strong interest in the philosophy of science of Mach and Boltzmann, his 
philosophical positions were clearly Meinongian. He repeatedly emphasized, 
that he had, together with Meinong, introduced the central distinction between 
the content and the object of a mental act (Höfler/Meinong 1890), a distinction 
which was at the basis of Meinong’s theory of objects (see Meinong 1899. § 2). 
In Vienna, Höfler continued to defend his Meinongian approach based on the 
new theory of objects.
Meinong had introduced his theory of objects of higher order as an extension 
of Brentano’s conception of intentionality (Meinong 1899). Contrary to Bren-
tano’s “immanent object” of the intentional act, he distinguished between the 
psychological content of the act and the object, which may be any kind of object, 
psychological, physical or other. Meinong also distinguished between objects of 
lower order (psychological or physical objects) and objects of higher order, like 
relations or complexes, which do not exist in the same sense as psychological 
or physical objects. Based on this conception, Meinong had announced in 1904 
a new philosophical discipline, the theory of objects (Gegenstandstheorie). The 
subject matter of the theory of objects is concerned with all objects, whether 
they exist or not, whether they are real, possible or impossible. As such, its topic 
goes beyond psychology (psychological objects), physics or metaphysics (real 
objects). Meinong claimed therefore that the subject matter of the theory of ob-
ject is not covered by any of the existing scientific or philosophical disciplines.
Meinong tried also to explain the relation of the theory of objects to logic and 
mathematics. As mathematics dealt also with any kind of objects, Meinong took 
it to be a special sub-discipline of the theory of objects. It was one of the spe-
cial sciences which forms part of the general discipline of the theory of objects 
(Meinong 1904. 508–509 and 511). Meinong was less clear about the status of 
logic in relation to the theory of objects, but he suggested that such foundational 
disciplines as “set theory”, “metamathematics” or “mathematical logic” may be 
at the border of a special science of objects (like mathematics) and the general 
science of objects (Meinong 1904. 513). A further advantage of Meinong’s the-
ory of objects for mathematics and logic was the fact that it attempted to give a 
CHRISTOPH LIMBECK-LILIENAU: THE FIRST VIENNA CIRCLE: MYTH OR REALITY? 57
foundation to these formal disciplines which was definitely not psychological or 
psychologistic. The objects of Meinong’s theory are neither per se psychologi-
cal, nor are they mind-dependent. 
After Meinong’s programmatic announcement of his new theory of objects, 
the position was immediately endorsed by Höfler (1905).23 There, he defended 
the view that mathematics was part of the theory of objects in Meinong’s sense, 
as well as logic, insofar as logic was concerned with the Apriori. Against the 
psychologists, he emphasized that logic and mathematics was not concerned 
with the psychological. He insisted that his own distinction between the con-
tent and the object of mental acts showed that contents are, but objects are not 
psychological. And as mathematics was also concerned with objects, it neither 
was based on psychology. He illustrated this with Hilbert’s geometry, which had 
divorced the basic concepts of geometry from any rest of intuition (“Anschau-
ung”). For Höfler, geometry dealt with objects of higher order in Meinong’s 
sense, namely with relations, not with spatial intuitions. Against the Neo-Kan-
tians, Höfler remarked that the categories and intuitions of transcentental phi-
losophy were still psychological notions and that therefore the Neo-Kantians, 
contrary to Meinong, could not get rid of psychologism.24 At the same time, 
Höfler also announced “Logical Studies” based on the theory of objects, as well 
as a paper on “Spatial and Spaceless Geometry”.25
In Vienna, after his appointment in 1907, Höfler continued to promote the 
theory of objects and to work on the relation of logic and mathematics to the 
theory of objects. In 1908, Höfler became increasingly interested in Russell and 
his new logical foundations of mathematics. Since 1904, Russell had regularly 
reviewed and commented the newest publications of Meinong. In his corre-
spondence with Meinong in 1908, Höfler repeatedly asked Meinong about Rus-
sell and the relation of Meinong’s philosophy to Russell. Höfler was particularly 
interested in Russell’s theory of relations and its possible connection to Mei-
nong’s theory of relations.26 
Besides Höfler, a small group of philosophers strongly influenced by Mei-
nong worked also on the theory of objects in Vienna. They were all part of the 
“Philosophical Society” and included Anton Oelzelt-Newin (1854–1925), a for-
mer student of Brentano and Meinong who had worked with Meinong in Graz; 
Josef Klemens Kreibig (1863–1917), also a student of Brentano who did get his 
23  Höfler’s defense had some international impact as it was given as a talk at the “5th Inter-
national Congress of Psychology” in Rome.
24  The correspondence between Meinong and Höfler shows an increasing clash between 
the Meinongians and the Neo-Kantians, with regular complaints by the correspondents that 
their papers are rejected by the Kant-Studien.
25  None of these were published, although the “Nachlass” of Höfler contains a long manu-
script on geometry with that title. Höfler’s new ideas about logic were certainly incorporated 
in the huge second edition of his Logik, 1922.
26  See letter of Höfler to Meinong, March 2, 1908 (Meinong Archive, Graz).
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habilitation in Graz, before returning to Vienna in 1907 and Hans Pichler (1882–
1958), who had originally studied with Windelband in Strassburg, but lived in 
Vienna from 1906 to 1912, before going to Graz in order to get his habilitation 
with Meinong.27 All these philosophers published on the intricate question of 
the relation of the theory of objects to epistemology, psychology, ontology and 
logic.28 The question of the status of logic was central to their writings. 
Through their correspondence with Höfler, the interaction of Hahn, Neurath 
and Frank with Höfler is well established, but we can also reconstruct frequent 
meetings of Hahn with Oelzelt-Newin and Pichler, as well as discussions of 
Neurath with Pichler. An exact reconstruction of these philosophical contacts 
of Neurath, Hahn and Frank with the Meinongians would need further space. 
Through the close ties of the philosophies of Meinong and Russell, the philo-
sophical scene around Höfler and the Viennese Meinongians was particularly 
favourable to a reception of the new theories in logic and the foundation of 
mathematics such as those of Russell, Couturat and Frege. 
V. LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS
Frank claimed that the main focus of discussion between Neurath, Hahn and 
himself was an empiricist or conventionalist view of scientific theories and “the 
primary role of mathematics and logic in the structure of science” (Frank 1949. 
7). But he also claimed, that they wanted to connect Mach and the convention-
alists “with the investigations in logic of authors such as Couturat, Schröder, 
Hilbert etc.” (Frank 1949. 7). For Frank, it was important to show how a com-
plex axiomatized mathematical theory could be correlated with the empirical 
part of a scientific theory. But he did not say much about logic or the foundations 
of mathematics. This was different for Hahn and Neurath. Both showed a strong 
interest in logic and the foundations of mathematics. 
The beginning of the century saw major shifts with the emergence of symbol-
ic logic and the development of a non-psychologistic understanding of logic. At 
the same time the logicist program in the foundations of mathematics emerged. 
Already in the first decade of the century, Neurath and Hahn were well aware 
of these developments. Neurath clearly shared an anti-psychologist conception 
of logic and supported a logical realism similar to that of Russell and Meinong. 
Hahn not only was strongly interested in Russell, but probably was already 
then sympathetic to his logicist program. This positive reception of Russell and 
the sympathies for anti-psychologism and logical realism can be explained by 
27  On Oelzelt-Newin, see Dölling 1999. 81–82; on Kreibig, see Binder 2001; on Pichler, 
see Sauer 2001.
28  See especially Oelzelt-Newin 1907, Kreibig 1909 and Pichler 1909 and 1912.
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Hahn’s and Neurath’s close contacts to a group of Viennese Meinongians, with 
Höfler at its center, and the reception of modern logic among them.
Anti-psychologism in logic claims that logic is not about judgements, beliefs 
or thoughts (in a psychological sense). The objects of logic are not psychological 
objects. Logical realism is in strong support of such an anti-psychologistic view. 
Russell (1904) gave a clear characterisation of logical realism, a view he shared 
with Meinong: For Russell, every belief has an object other then itself and these 
objects of belief are extra-mental (with the exception of beliefs about mental 
states). Truth and falsehood applies not to beliefs but to these extra-mental 
objects of belief (Russell 1904. 204).29 Also Meinong posited such objects. He 
called the objects of a belief or a judgments an `objective’ (in German: “Objek-
tiv”), a term Russell translated by “proposition”.30 Both for Russell at that time 
and for the Meinongians, logic was about propositions, conceived as the primary 
bearers of truth. There are several reasons to believe that Neurath and Hahn 
were attracted to this view, when they read Russell (1903) and Couturat (1908) 
between 1907 and 1909. 
Neurath gained a strong interest in mathematical logic, already before his 
return to Vienna in 1906, probably through the philosopher Gregorius Itelson 
(1852–1926), a strong influence on the young Neurath.31 In 1904, Itelson had 
given two talks: “The Reform of Logic” and “Logic and Mathematics”. Though 
never published, the talks became quite well known through a summary by 
Couturat, the only source on Itelson’s conception of logic (Couturat 1904). For 
Itelson, logic is not about the laws of thought and “psychologistic logic” is “ab-
solutely sterile”. For him, logic is not about thoughts, but about the objects of 
thought: “Logic is the science of objects in general” and “Logic is the science of 
all objects, real or not, possible or impossible, in abstraction of their existence” 
(Couturat 1904. 1038–1039). Besides his anti-psychologism and logical realism, 
Itelson emphasized a strong connection between logic and mathematics: “math-
ematics is a purely logical science” (Couturat 1904. 1037). As for mathematics, 
it is also a science of objects, namely of ordered objects (sets, groups). Itelson’s 
conception is very close to the logical realism defended by Russell.32 Meinong 
himself noticed the similarity of Itelson’s position with his own theory of objects 
(Meinong 1907. 211–212).
29  Schlick 1910 also quoted that passage where Russell defines logical realism, but rejected 
the position.
30  Meinongians like Höfler also sometimes identified “objectives” with states of affairs.
31  In a letter to Tönnies (Dec. 30, 1904), Neurath says that he is “captivated by mathe-
matical logic”. In another letter (June 25, 1906), he calls Itelson the “sharpest mind I know” 
and a “second Socrates”. On Itelson, see Buck 1926 and Freudenthal and Karachentsev 2011.
32  Russell says in a letter to Meinong: “I myself have been accustomed to use the name 
ʽLogic’ for that which you call ʽ Theory of Objects’”, and in the same letter: “I am in complete 
agreement with the view that mathematics is theory of objects. That is in fact one of the main 
theses of my Principles of Mathematics.” Letter from Dec. 15, 1904, see Smith 1985. 
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Back in Vienna, Neurath read Russell’s Principles of Mathematics together with 
Hahn and continued to promote Itelson’s conception of logic. He mentioned it 
in a paper on Schröder’s logic (Neurath 1909b. 5) and defended it in a discussion 
on the Apriori he led at the “Philosophical Society”.33 Also Pichler (1909. 22), 
in a discussion of Itelson’s theory, thanked especially Neurath for explaining 
Itelson’s conception of logic to him.34 Whether Hahn shared such a conception 
of logic is not known, although Hahn’s sympathies for Russell inclined him per-
haps to a similar view. At least, Hahn expressed his interest in Meinong’s theory 
of objects in a letter to the latter.35 And in his correspondence with Meinong, 
Hahn emphasizes frequently his high esteem for the philosophical judgment of 
Meinong.
In the 1929 and after the intense discussions of Wittgenstein’s conception of 
logic based on tautologies, Hahn rejected Itelson’s logical realism: „If logic were 
to be conceived – as it has actually been conceived – as a theory of the most gen-
eral properties of objects, as a theory of objects as such, then empiricism would 
in fact be confronted with an insuperable difficulty. But in reality logic does not 
say anything at all about objects; logic is not something to be found in the world; 
rather, logic first comes into being when – using a symbolism – people talk about 
the world.”36 It is implausible that Hahn had already such a view in the 1910s. 
The view that logic does not express anything about the world and that the rules 
of logic are actually conventionally fixed grammatical rules of a language is the 
result of the discussion of the Tractatus in the Vienna Circle.37  
Hahn’s early philosophy of logic and mathematics can only be reconstructed 
in a fragmentary way, as it is expressed only in some book reviews. Hahn reject-
ed any kind of intuition (or Kantian “Anschauung”) as a justification for mathe-
matical axioms. In geometry, this led him to accept the kind of conventionalism 
defended by Poincaré (Hahn 1908). Hahn also supported the movement for the 
arithmetization of analysis and the attempt to give a rigorous and axiomatic basis 
to arithmetics, free from any intuitions or empiricist justification. For Hahn, any 
empirical justification of mathematics would endanger the certainty and rigor 
of mathematics (Hahn 1909a). Hahn also supported Peano’s rigorous axiomatic 
foundation of arithmetics. Later, Hahn said explicitly that a logical foundation of 
arithmetics was highly desirable (Hahn 1919). Given his interest in the logicist 
33  Höfler took notes of Neurath’s remarks, see Höfler Archive, Nr. V. 32. 104.
34  Other Viennese Meinongians also discussed Itelson’s conception, Kreibig 1909. 309 and 
Höfler 1922.
35  In a letter to Meinong (April 4, 1910), Hahn mentions Meinong’s and Mally’s theory of 
objects (Meinong 1904), Meinong Archive, Graz.
36  Hahn 1929.
37  See also Carnap 1928. §107 for an early formulation of such a conventionalist conception 
of logic, also in Carnap 1937.
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programs of Russell (1903) and Coururat (1908), he was probably attracted to 
such a view much earlier. 
Despite Hahn’s support for Poincaré’s conventionalist conception of geom-
etry, nothing indicates that he was sympathetic to an extension of convention-
alism to other areas of mathematics or even to logic. In a review of a book by 
the Dutch mathematician and philosopher Gerrit Mannoury (Hahn 1912), Hahn 
mentions Mannoury’s extension of Poincaré’s conventionalism to arithmetics 
and logic. He mentions also that Mannoury conceives logic as “only an analy-
sis of the forms of language”. Although Hahn’s review of Mannoury is neutral, 
Hahn does not express any sympathies for such an extended conventionalism. 
The extension of conventionalism to laws of nature and to causality is also ex-
plicitly rejected by Hahn in a review of Hugo Dingler (Hahn 1909b). 
Let us summarize Hahn’s early views on logic and the foundation of math-
ematics: Hahn supported the elimination of intuition from mathematics and 
the arithmetisation of analysis. An attractive way to eliminate intuitions from 
arithmetics was the logicist program, therefore Hahn’s interest in Russell and 
Couturat. Concerning the foundations of logic, it is quite probable that Hahn 
shared the logical realism adopted by Russell, Neurath and the Meinongians. 
Hahn’s remark about logical realism from 1929 represents possibly Hahn’s own 
evolution, from an early Russellian conception of logic through Wittgenstein’s 
conception of logic based on tautologies to a view close to Carnap’s logical con-
ventionalism.
VI. IMPACT ON THE VIENNA CIRCLE
The logical empiricists of the 1920s and 1930s did not share the logical realism 
of Russell and Meinong, nor did they accept Meinong’s theory of objects. But 
the philosophy of the Meinongians was imbued with an analytic spirit which 
was very close to the analytic philosophy of Russell and Moore. This favoured 
an early reception of the new symbolic logic and the philosophy of Russell and 
Couturat. The same year Schlick was appointed at the University of Vienna, 
Höfler published a strongly revised edition of his Logik (1922), a book he had 
originally published with Meinong in 1890. The new edition, co-authored with 
Ernst Mally, contained an extensive exposition of the logic from Russell’s Prin-
cipia Mathematica.38 
When Carnap, Neurath and Hahn published the manifesto of the Vienna 
Circle (1929/2012), the importance of the Viennese students of Brentano for 
a renewed understanding of logic and the foundations of science was explic-
itly emphasized there. In a passage on the pre-history of the “scientific world 
38  The parts on Principia Mathematica in Höfler’s Logik have been written by Mally.
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conception”, most probably written by Neurath, the manifesto acknowledged 
that the students of Brentano “were working toward a rigorous new founda-
tion of logic” (1929/2012. 79). In that passage, Neurath mentions the endeavors 
of Höfler for a re-discovery of the work of Bolzano, but he mentions also the 
work of Meinong, Hans Pichler and Ernst Mally. Meinong’s “theory of objects 
(…) shows some affinity to modern theories of concepts”, so Neurath, and “the 
early writings of Hans Pichler (1909) also stem from this intellectual milieu” 
(1929/2012. 79).
It would be certainly a mistake to underestimate the central importance of 
Mach, Boltzmann and of the French conventionalists in the early formation of 
Hahn, Neurath and Frank, although this was not the object of the present pa-
per.39 The intention here was to analyse the importance of the early analytic 
philosophy and its logic in the formation of Hahn, Neurath and Frank and the 
intellectual contacts which were particularly favorable for such a reception. This 
philosophical context has hitherto not been sufficiently appreciated or evalu-
ated in the research on the genesis of logical empiricism.40 The more or less 
mythical “First Vienna Circle”, as described in Frank’s narrative prevented an 
adequate historical analysis of the philosophical milieu in which Hahn, Neurath 
and Frank received their first philosophical formation. 
Whether the “First Vienna Circle” was more than some occasional meetings 
in Viennese coffeehouses between three young scientists remains an open ques-
tion. No historical sources indicate that it was more, and no sources prevent us 
to think that it was even less. And even if the “First Vienna Circle” actually 
existed, we cannot say anything about it, due to the lack of historical sources 
about it. We can just repeat Frank’s statements, without the ability to evaluate 
their historical accuracy. The importance the “First Vienna Circle” has acquired 
in the genealogy of logical empiricism is certainly an exaggeration, which is in 
no way justified by the historical evidence we have. Furthermore, the mythical 
presence of that circle has prevented us to see the actual historical data about 
Neurath, Hahn and Frank and their relevance for an explanation of their early 
philosophical positions.
39  I analyse the influence of Mach and the French conventionalists on Hahn, Neurath and 
Frank before 1918 in Limbeck-Lilienau 2019.
40  Uebel 2000 is an exception, as he was the first to emphasize the central role of Höfler 
for our young trio.
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christian Damböck
Carnap’s Aufbau: A Case of Plagiarism?
This paper addresses the topic of Austrian Philosophy as a potential influence 
on Carnap by means of a case study, namely, the alleged influence of Husserl on 
Carnap’s first major book, The Logical Structure of the world (hereafter: Aufbau).1 
In a recent article, Verena Mayer formulates a very radical claim, specifically 
that in the Aufbau, Carnap somewhat plagiarized Husserl, stealing ideas from 
the then-unpublished manuscript of Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenome-
nological Philosophy II (hereafter: Ideen II). The aim of this article is to refute this 
claim. Though Carnap might have been acquainted with Husserl’s manuscript, 
there is no indication that he took a significant amount of ideas from the latter. 
In section I, I provide a survey of the various accounts of Husserlian influenc-
es on Carnap as developed over the years by Verena Mayer and Guillermo E. 
Rosado Haddock. None of these accounts involves plagiarism, literally speak-
ing, but some involve varieties of ideendiebstahl (theft of ideas). These accounts 
of Husserlian influences on Carnap include: (1) a more neutral initial account, 
which does not involve any accusation of ideendiebstahl yet; (2) a weak account, 
which only involves the more general claim of Carnap’s being influenced by 
Husserl but failing to acknowledge this influence; and (3) a strong account, which 
adds the more specific hypothesis that the Aufbau is basically a convoluted pres-
entation of ideas that were stolen from Ideen II. In section II, the weak account is 
rejected for empirical reasons; there is no evidence at all that supports the weak 
account, whereas at the same time there is plenty of evidence that refutes it. 
1  Work on this paper was supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF research grant 
P31716). For helpful comments, I am grateful to Verena Mayer. The present paper is intend-
ed as an appendix to Damböck 2019, which provides an extensive account of the develop-
ment of the Aufbau. I do not repeat here every detail that is already found in Damböck 2019. 
For matters of space, references to primary sources are generally not provided in the present 
paper as they are already to be found in Damböck 2019. Therefore, if the reader is interested 
in the details of the empirical evidence that supports my account, the present paper is not an 
independent source at all, but must be read against the background of a previous reading of 
Damböck 2019. The general argument, however, is easily grasped even for readers that are 
not familiar with Damböck 2019. 
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In section III, the strong account is identified to be: (a) empirically ill-founded 
because it directly hinges on the validity of the weak account; and (b) method-
ologically ill-founded for being based on similarities alone, many of which can 
be identified in the Aufbau and in several other books that belong to a certain 
philosophical genre. 
I.  MAYER’S AND ROSADO HADDOCK’S ACCOUNT  
OF HUSSERL’S INFLUENCES ON CARNAP
In this paper, I focus exclusively on the Husserlian influences that are relevant 
for the Aufbau. Therefore, I discuss here the influences that Husserl had on Car-
nap’s dissertation Der Raum only insofar as they are also relevant for the Aufbau.2 
Moreover, I exclusively aim to review various theses on Husserlian influences 
on the Aufbau that were formulated by Mayer and Rosado Haddock, ignoring 
other important aspects of this relationship. In particular, I hardly discuss any of 
the systematic aspects of the relationship between Carnap and Husserl.3 This 
is somewhat unfair, to be sure, because it implies that all these points where 
Mayer and Rosado Haddock correctly point out certain affinities and overlap 
between Carnap and Husserl are ignored. For the present purpose, though, it 
must suffice to say that I widely agree with the neutral aspects of the discussion 
in the respective texts by Mayer and Rosado Haddock. These neutral aspects – 
viz., what I call the initial account – are also in wide agreement with the recent 
state-of-the-art interpretations of the relationship between Carnap and Husserl 
by Carnap scholars, such as Thomas Ryckman and A.W. Carus. However, the 
present paper exclusively aims to evaluate those aspects of the writings of May-
er and Rosado Haddock that accuse Carnap of stealing Husserlian ideas and, 
therefore, I henceforth take the neutral aspects for granted here without any 
further discussion.
The accounts of the Husserlian influence on Carnap by Mayer and Rosado 
Haddock were formulated in three different contexts: (1) (Mayer 1991, 1992), 
two papers that mainly consist of what I will call here the initial account; (2) 
(Rosado Haddock 2008), a book that consists of key features of the weak account; 
and (3) (Mayer 2016), an article that consist of the strong account. Before I go on 
to discuss these accounts, I start with some general observations on the notion 
of plagiarism and ideendiebstahl involved here.
2  For discussion of these influences, see Carus 2007. 127-135; Sarkar 2003; Stone 2009 as 
well as Rosado Haddock 2008. Chapter 1.
3  For reviews of the philosophical similarities and differences between Carnap and Hus-
serl, see Ryckman 2007; Carus 2016; Damböck 2017. 176–181; as well as the writings of May-
er and Rosado Haddock that are discussed here, together with Richardson 2010.
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1.  Some observations on plagiarism and ideendiebstahl
To set the stage for the present discussion, it is first necessary to identify what 
exactly “plagiarism” might mean here. This is particularly important because 
Mayer’s strong account is based on a notion of plagiarism that is by no means 
uncontroversial. Firstly, Mayer sets aside the now-common notion of plagiarism 
that involves the literal reproduction of passages of a text. Mayer, in turn, does 
not claim at all that Carnap might have plagiarized Husserl in this sense; rather, 
she restricts her understanding of plagiarism to cases where “not inconsiderable 
thought content stem from the work of another author, without this authorship 
being acknowledged” (Mayer 2016. 176). For Mayer, this also includes cases 
where the non-acknowledged source was not published yet. “This would even 
constitute a particularly perfidious case of ideendiebstahl (theft of ideas)” (ibid.). 
This notion makes sense, insofar as it is certainly true that in most cases 
where certain big figures accuse each other of plagiarism, the reproached injus-
tice is ideendiebstahl, rather than copying portions of a text. Note also that there 
already exists a very prominent example of accusation of ideendiebstahl with 
regard to Carnap, namely, Wittgenstein’s (in)famous reproach that Carnap had 
stolen his account of physicalism (see Stadler 2015. 224–228); however, this and 
other famous examples also show how extremely problematic all kinds of “pla-
giarism” accusations immediately become as soon as we no longer consider the 
copying of a text but mere ideendiebstahl. First, it is often not clear at all what 
exactly the respective idea in question is. Second, the idea in question is quite 
often something that simply was hanging in the air and then became formulated 
in various varieties by different authors almost simultaneously. Third, the idea 
in question is usually formulated somewhat differently by different authors and 
has subtly different functions in the respective contexts. Therefore, it seems 
groundless to talk about ideendiebstahl at all as long as it does not become con-
siderably clear that (1) the idea in question is sufficiently clear and precisely 
expressible, (2) there is good evidence that a person first came across the idea 
only in the presumably-plagiarized text, and (3) both the original author and the 
plagiarizer use the idea in the same way. As soon as any one of these conditions 
does not hold, the entire matter becomes all too muddy. 
Consider the following example. An author, B, might take certain ideas from 
a book or author A but essentially receives these ideas in a non-affirmative way, 
i.e., developing her own alternatives that might show similarities but diverge 
in such a significant way that it won’t be accurate at all to straightforwardly say 
“this idea was taken from A.” Rather, B would have to start here to distance 
herself, such as by saying things like “there is a somewhat similar idea to be 
found in A, but A does not get it right, my own version differs, I do not buy A 
for this and that reason, etc.” In a case like this, it may happen that B simply 
decides to leave the diverging account of A as it is, i.e., not mentioning it at all. 
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The reason might be simply a question of space and legitimate selection of fo-
cus. B is no longer all that interested in A. She wants to develop an alternative 
account, at a different level of argumentation, with different targets in mind. 
Getting involved in a lengthy discussion of A would simply make no sense in 
the present context. Do we have any good reason to accuse A of plagiarism, even 
though she was initially inspired by B but in the end does not acknowledge this 
source of inspiration in her writing? Probably not. It is certainly true, however, 
that plagiarism accusations often take exactly that form. Therefore, it seems to 
be a good idea to be suspicious of plagiarism accusations of that kind and to treat 
them very carefully. In the present example, it would be a massive exaggeration, 
if not a malicious imputation, to call A a plagiarist because she had scientifically 
valid reasons not to mention B. 
To conclude, it tends to be rather silly to talk about plagiarism in cases like 
the one mentioned above; also, the alternative notion of ideendiebstahl is very 
problematic in all its varieties. However, for the present purpose, I will keep 
the notion on the table, having noted all necessary restrictions. I will not use the 
term “plagiarism” here any longer, keeping the latter for the straightforward 
case of copying portions of a text without acknowledgement. Rather, I distin-
guish three different cases of alleged and/or actual “ideendiebstahl”: 
(1) Ideendiebstahl is not to be attributed in the following case. An idea, X, that is 
found in A is used in B without acknowledging A (although B read A) and it addi-
tionally holds (a) that B’s approach to X is significantly different from A’s and that 
(b) B also read and got inspired by several other sources where X or related ideas 
can be found. I will call this a case of pseudo-ideendiebstahl. Pseudo-ideendiebstahl, 
in turn, though being neither plagiarism nor ideendiebstahl at all, is typically found 
in cases of polemical sources that somewhat try to devalue B and to demonstrate B’s 
moral inferiority, in comparison with A. Such moral accusations are, at the end, more a 
matter of taste or non-cognitive emotional stance. In that sense, such accusations are 
legitimate, to be sure; however, it is not legitimate to use a twisted reality in support 
of emotional readings like that. The interpreter is legitimately uttering her feelings if 
she only points out that, in her view, B is morally inferior in comparison with A; how-
ever, she illegitimately uses the notion of ideendiebstahl (or even plagiarism) if only 
pseudo-ideendiebstahl is involved. 
(2) Ideendiebstahl is to be attributed in cases where sufficient evidence shows that 
B directly took an idea X from A without acknowledgement as soon as X: (a) is suffi-
ciently clear and precisely expressible, (b) was initially found by B in A and only in A, 
and (c) is used in B in the same way than in A. I will call this a concrete ideendiebstahl. 
A concrete ideendiebstahl is not necessary a fraud, but it is bad scientific practice at 
least, which can be justifiably criticized (even, and in particular, in emotional readings 
that argue for B’s moral inferiority in comparison with A).
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(3) Ideendiebstahl is also to be attributed in cases where sufficient evidence shows 
that a person B studied with a person A, had discussions with A, read texts by A, took 
classes by A, and (a) was obviously significantly influenced by all these interactions 
and (b) is perfectly aware of this fact but still (c) fails to acknowledge or even denies 
these interactions, for example, in an autobiography or interview. I will call this a 
general ideendiebstahl. General ideendiebstahl is not so much a matter of scientific prac-
tice, at least in cases where it is not accompanied by concrete ideendiebstahl, because 
there is no typical way to acknowledge such general influences in scientific publica-
tions. The mistake involved here, rather than being a matter of bad scientific practice, 
is more a question of morality and personal character (and therefore, of course, also 
legitimately can be invoked in the context of emotional readings of B).
None of the accusations of Mayer or Rosado Haddock involve plagiarism, lit-
erally speaking, i.e., the copying of passages of a text; however, some involve 
varieties of ideendiebstahl. The initial account of Mayer does not involve any 
accusation of ideendiebstahl or plagiarism at all, whereas the weak account 
of Rosado Haddock involves an accusation of general ideendiebstahl and the 
strong account of Mayer involves an accusation of concrete ideendiebstahl. Let 
us now review these three different accounts. 
2. The initial account (mainly Mayer 1991–1992)
In (Mayer 1991, 1992), a neutral account of the parallels between the Aufbau 
and several writings by Husserl is formulated, which was later elaborated in 
several respects in (Rosado Haddock 2008) and is still present in (Mayer 2016). 
I describe this neutral account here by means of some idealizations because 
the relevant writings already contain traces of the weak and strong accounts 
(this holds, in particular, for Rosado Haddock’s book). However, the neutral ac-
count is important because it contains several qualifications with whom not only 
Husserl scholars, such as Rosado Haddock and Mayer, would agree, but also all 
appear to be acceptable for recent Carnap scholars, such as Ryckman and Carus. 
The neutral account consists of the following points: 
(1) Carnap’s Aufbau is influenced by his reading of Husserl, which includes 
the main published writings, such as the Logical Investigations and Ideen I, 
but possibly also the manuscript of Ideen II;
(2) This influence involves significant parallels between the Aufbau and Ideen 
II and other writings by Husserl;
(3) In particular, Carnap possibly took the term “constitution” directly from 
Husserl and tried to somewhat reimplement an approach similar to the 
“constitutional theory” of Ideen II at the level of formal logic;
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(4) On the other hand, there are also significant differences between Husserl 
and Carnap, including the absence of any “transcendental ego” in the 
Aufbau;
(5) Carnap studied with Husserl in the winter term of 1923/24 and tried to 
receive support from Husserl for his plan to habilitate at the University 
of Freiburg; however, Husserl did not support Carnap’s plan, and Carnap 
finally submitted his habilitation thesis in December 1925 in Vienna (the 
thesis was the initial manuscript of the Aufbau, which was published in 
1928);
(6) The influences of Husserl on Carnap have been widely overlooked by 
Carnap scholars for a long time; we should appreciate them in order to de-
velop more accurate accounts of the relationship between Logical Empir-
icism and continental and 20th century continental European philosophy 
in the last decade.
This account does not involve any accusation of ideendiebstahl or bad scientific 
practice because Carnap very well did refer to Husserl in the Aufbau. Because 
the extent to which Carnap was influenced by Ideen II, specifically, remains 
unclear, one may not necessarily expect any reference to this then-unpublished 
manuscript. Also, there is no conclusive evidence at all that Carnap ever read 
Ideen II or even heard of the manuscript. Still, it is not impossible that Carnap read 
the manuscript because during the winter term of 1923–1924, Carnap interact-
ed with Husserl’s assistant, Ludwig Landgrebe, who prepared the manuscript. 
Why shouldn’t Landgrebe hand over the manuscript to Carnap for some time or 
at least report to him about certain aspects of the latter? There is no evidence, 
to be sure, that supports this, but it is fair to say that there is also no counter-ev-
idence that refutes it. 
3.  The weak account of ideendiebstahl (Rosado Haddock 2008)
The weak account of ideendiebstahl is basically a product of Rosado Haddock’s 
book and certain speculations to be found there, which (Mayer 2016) picked up 
again and somewhat radicalized even further. Unlike the strong account, the 
weak account is not based on any strong claims about the influences of Ideen II 
on the Aufbau. Rather, the weak account claims that (1) Carnap interacted with 
Husserl much more than the initial account claims and, as a consequence of this, 
he was (2) influenced much more strongly than the initial account may suggest; 
in spite of this, Carnap (3) systematically (and intentionally) ignored these in-
fluences in his autobiographical writings. More specifically, the weak account is 
based on the following claims: 
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(1) Carnap not only studied with Husserl in the winter term of 1923–1924, 
but he firstly went to Freiburg after WWI in order to study with Husserl; 
Carnap presumably took classes with Husserl already before 1923 and he 
definitely attended several of Husserl’s seminars and lectures during the 
three semesters that followed winter term of 1923–1924, i.e., during the 
entire period where he worked on the manuscript of the Aufbau.
(2) Thus, between the fall of 1923 and winter of 1925–1926, Carnap was in 
close contact with Husserl and some of his students, including Ludwig 
Landgrebe; he frequently interacted with all of them and wrote the Auf-
bau against the background of these intense interactions that, therefore, 
became the main matter of inspiration for the Aufbau manuscript.
(3) However, because Carnap finally submitted his habilitation thesis in Vi-
enna, supported by Moritz Schlick, who was a strong critique of Hus-
serl, he decided not to hang a lantern on the interactions with Husserl 
any longer; later on, he simply ignored them and almost entirely ignored 
Husserl in his autobiography, although he knew perfectly well that Hus-
serl was a major influence, at least during the years 1924 and 1925 when 
Carnap wrote the Aufbau.
The weak account, therefore, is based on a perfectly empirical claim, i.e., that 
Carnap had much more interactions with Husserl than initially expected – and, 
of course, it stands and falls with this empirical claim. If those interactions oc-
curred and deeply influenced and framed the period when Carnap wrote the 
Aufbau, we have a clear case of general ideendiebstahl here, because neither 
in the Aufbau nor in Carnap’s autobiography did Carnap sufficiently appreciate 
these deep influences. Therefore, if the weak account holds, we are justified in 
accusing Carnap of somewhat immoral social behavior. 
4. The strong account of ideendiebstahl (Mayer 2016)
The strong account assumes both the initial and the weak account, but also 
adds another very strong and ingenious element that explicitly can be found 
only in (Mayer 2016), i.e., the claim that Carnap basically used Ideen II as the 
primary source of the Aufbau. He took almost everything from Husserl, both 
the elements of constitution theory and the way in which they are connected. 
The reason for this theft of ideas was that Carnap, in 1925, got under serious 
time pressure – he only began writing the manuscript of the Aufbau in spring 
and Schlick was continuously insisting on getting the manuscript submitted in 
the summer. Carnap took the option of stealing material from Husserl’s unpub-
lished work as an easy way to deal with this dilemma. He exploited Husserl’s 
manuscript intentionally and with explicit fraudulent intent. Therefore, he tried 
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to somewhat change certain aspects of Husserl’s initial account in order to mask 
his actual source. The Aufbau is nothing but a somewhat twisted and degenerat-
ed copy of Ideen II, and Carnap, during his entire lifetime, successfully managed 
to keep this fraud unrecognized, intentionally never mentioning Husserl as the 
real (and only) source of the Aufbau. The strong account is thus clearly accusing 
Carnap of concrete ideendiebstahl. 
2. THE WEAK ACCOUNT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EMPIRICAL  
EVIDENCE AT ALL
The crucial claim of the weak account, namely (1), is entirely empirical. If Car-
nap did not just interact with Husserl during the winter term of 1923–1924, 
but also during the following three semesters, this would entirely change our 
picture of the development of the Aufbau because the received view is rather 
that Carnap distanced himself from Husserl in 1924 and started to work on the 
manuscript of the Aufbau in the fall of 1924 only against the background of this, 
say, de-Husserlization of his philosophy. This view, which is defended exten-
sively in (Carus 2016) as well as (Damböck 2019), would become, at the least, 
very problematic if it turned out that Carnap studied with Husserl and interact-
ed with him and his students during the entire period where he actually wrote 
the Aufbau. It would be untenable, then, to claim that Carnap moved away from 
Husserl in 1924, no longer taking him as an important source when writing the 
Aufbau in 1925. The weak account, in turn, stands and falls with the empirical 
soundness of (I), because the speculations in (2) and (3) become plausible only 
if (I) appears to be true. Therefore, first and foremost, we need to get clear about 
the empirical facts here. What did happen in 1924–1925? 
First, it must be noted that Rosado Haddock, Mayer, Carus, and Damböck all 
assume that Carnap did start to write the manuscript of what later became the 
Aufbau only in fall 1924 and that the manuscript was finished in December 1925. 
This general picture is well-supported by evidence from Carnap’s diaries and 
his correspondence.4 Therefore, we can take this part of the story to be uncon-
troversial. Disagreement, in turn, only concerns the question of how long Carnap 
interacted with Husserl. Let us review the respective arguments and sources. 
I focus here on the most recent formulation in (Mayer 2016. 186–189, 193–194), 
although at least parts of what is said there can already be found in (Rosado Had-
dock 2008. 47–48). Both Mayer and Rosado Haddock also suggest that Carnap 
might have already taken courses with Husserl before 1923. Because they do not 
4  For a very detailed examination, see Damböck 2019. The following description of the 
intellectual development of Carnap in the early 1920s is developed in this paper in much 
more detail. For the respective empirical sources, see this paper. 
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have any evidence that supports their claim and, more importantly, this side of the 
empirical picture is only of minor relevance for the weak account, we henceforth 
ignore this here. More relevant is the general question of why Carnap moved to 
Freiburg in 1919. Mayer suggests that he moved to Freiburg in order to study with 
Husserl (Mayer 2016. 186); however, this is certainly not the case. Carnap moved 
to Freiburg because the family of his wife owed an estate there, called Wiesneck 
(in Buchenbach, near Freiburg). Carnap and his family moved to Wiesneck be-
cause they found optimal living conditions there and for no other reason. Firstly, 
in 1919, Carnap did not intend to study philosophy any further, but rather finished 
his studies with a Staatsexamen and intended to become a high school teacher. It 
was only in the fall of 1920 that Carnap decided to strive for a career as a philos-
opher and only then did Carnap start to read Husserl in the first place.5 Then, 
Husserl played an important role as a source of Carnap’s dissertation, which was 
finished in January 1921. However, as far as the diaries indicate, there were no 
personal interactions between Carnap and Husserl until the fall of 1923.6
Until 1923, though considering himself a philosopher of science, Carnap 
made no significant effort towards the establishment of an academic career. He 
was financially independent then – because his stepfather was a rich farmer – 
and therefore did not feel the need to go to academia as long as he could easily 
survive as a private scholar. However, in 1923, Carnap and his family visited 
Mexico for some months, where Carnap’s stepfather owed an estate. Because 
of this somewhat conflictual visit, together with huge financial losses during 
the hyperinflation that took place in Germany in the very same year, Carnap 
realized that he no longer could manage working solely as a private scholar. 
Therefore, the natural move for him in 1923 was to try to find a place to habil-
itate in order to finally start building a career as an academic philosopher. He 
firstly contacted Bruno Bauch in Jena and Heinrich Scholz in Kiel. After getting 
back to Freiburg from his Mexico trip in fall 1923, he also immediately got in 
touch with Husserl. The reason for the latter was certainly that Carnap preferred 
not to leave Freiburg, mainly for private reasons, and not necessarily because of 
any particular affinities with the philosophy of Husserl. The Husserl episode of 
the winter term of 23/24 is well-documented in Carnap’s diaries;7 however, the 
diaries also indicate that the Husserl episode of the winter term of 1923/24 was 
the first time that Carnap actually met Husserl in person;8 and they also indi-
5  See Carnap forthcoming. The first Husserl text that Carnap read was Ideen I, at some 
point in September or October of 1920.
6  However, see also footnote 8, below. 
7  I do not repeat the respective quotations here, because this episode is extensively cov-
ered by both Carus 2016. 138–145 and Mayer 2016. 186–189. 
8  This is not to be conclusively drawn from the diaries because there are a couple of months 
between 1919 and 1923 where Carnap apparently wrote no diary at all. At any rate, Husserl 
is not mentioned in the diaries until October 1923. Also, there is hardly any mentioning of 
Husserl in Carnap’s correspondence before that time.
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cate that the Husserl episode ended in February 1924. After having extensively 
reported on his interactions with Husserl in the diary between October 1923 
and February 1924, in the remaining parts of the diaries that Carnap wrote until 
his emigration to the US in December 1935 (that cover more than 500 pages in 
print), Husserl is mentioned only eight times, and no personal interaction is ever 
mentioned.9 The picture we receive from the correspondence is similar. There 
is some mentioning of Husserl, but no indication of any personal interaction, 
such as attending courses and the like. However, Mayer, following Rosado Had-
dock and somewhat counteracting the evidence, claims that Carnap attended 
Husserl’s “Oberseminar”, and presumably also his lectures, during the three 
semesters that follow the winter term of 23/24. Why does Mayer commit herself 
to this far-reaching claim? 
Mayer mentions, as evidence, Karl Schumann’s Husserl chronicle (Schumann 
1977. 281), indeed indicating that Carnap participated in Husserl’s Oberseminar 
between the summer term of 1924 and the summer term of 1925. However, 
Schumann’s claim is based on a letter that Ludwig Landgrebe wrote to the au-
thor in 1976,10 namely, more than five decades after the period in question. Giv-
en that there is no indication at all that Landgrebe’s reminiscence might have 
been based on any reliable source, such as diaries or signature lists, it must be 
assumed that Landgrebe simply was wrong here and did not recollect correctly 
the period when Carnap went to Husserl’s Oberseminar and also met Land-
grebe, namely, the winter term of 1923/24. This becomes even more likely as 
Landgrebe, in turn, fails to mention Carnap’s presence at the Husserl semi-
nar in the winter term of 23/24; therefore, Landgrebe most likely simply mixed 
up his reminiscences a bit more than 50 years later. It seems very likely that 
Landgrebe, in his letters, simply wanted to say that he met Carnap in Husserl’s 
Oberseminar at some stage in the 1920s, possibly around 1924–1925. This is almost 
true, to be sure. Also, we may note here that certainly neither Landgrebe nor 
Schumann might have been aware of the huge importance we now put on the 
question of when exactly Carnap went to Husserl’s seminar. At any rate, I con-
clude that Landgrebe most likely incorrectly remembered exactly when he met 
Carnap in Husserl’s seminar. Evidence from the diary tells us that this took 
place not between the summer term of 1924 and the summer term of 1925, but 
already in the winter term of 1923–1924. 
9  Until 1930, Husserl is mentioned five times, but only in cases where Carnap discusses 
Husserl’s writings and philosophy with Schlick, Kraft, and other members of the Vienna Circle. 
Then, on June 19, 1933, Carnap mentions a meeting with Landgrebe that is also reported by 
Mayer and Rosado Haddock. Finally, in 1935, Carnap mentions Husserl’s lectures in Prague 
(which he did not attend). 
10  Unfortunately, the letter by Landgrebe seems to be lost; it is not available, at least in 
the Schumann Nachlass at Leuwen. I got this information from Verena Mayer via personal 
communication (e-mail from November 23, 2018).
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Mayer is perfectly aware of the fact that the only real evidence we have here, 
namely, Carnap’s diaries, by no means suggests that Carnap attended Husserl’s 
courses after February 1924. However, Mayer qualifies the diaries in a very neg-
ative way here, claiming: 
Carnap’s diaries for its most parts contain notes on private events (shopping, walks, 
feelings, visits of friends etc.), who possibly were intended to serve as memory aids. 
Beside of this, there are sometimes also some notes on important professional events 
being by no means reliable though. For example, there is no hint to be found on the work 
on the habilitation thesis and its submission. The diaries, therefore, are not such doc-
uments that may allow us to conclude the existence or non-existence of events being 
not noted. (Mayer 2016. 186, my emphasis.)
This suggests that Carnap only somewhat occasionally wrote certain superficial 
things in the diaries, hardly covering professional events and, in particular, not 
covering the work on his habilitation thesis at all. However, this is anything but 
true. Firstly, note Carnap’s habilitation thesis. Work on the latter is not just 
mentioned by Carnap in the diary, but reported extensively and meticulously. 
The term “Konstitutionstheorie” shows up 30 times, only during the year 1925, 
always indicating work on the habilitation thesis. In an additional document 
complementing the diary, Carnap even protocolized each single paragraph he 
wrote on graph paper. Additionally, work on the habilitation thesis is extensively 
documented in the correspondence. It is also not true that Carnap’s notes are 
not reliable. There is no indication that Carnap did not take the task of writing 
the diary seriously. On the contrary, from 1923–1924 onward, Carnap obvious-
ly got the impression that he had become part of an important philosophical 
movement and therefore tried to document all kinds of professional events as 
precisely as possible. Though it is true, on the other hand, that Carnap hardly 
ever reports personal feelings – he almost never adds emotional statements to 
his diary – he always tries to be as accurate as possible concerning mere matters 
of fact. This does not imply, to be sure, that everything we do not find in the diary 
necessarily never happened. However, it does imply at least for the period in 
question here – viz., the years from 1924 onwards – that Carnap obviously tried 
to write down everything that happened during the day if it had at least minimal 
relevance. The diaries of 1924 and 1925 cover about 90 pages in print, although 
Carnap always tries to be as brief as possible. During a 726-day period, between 
January 6, 1924 and December 31, 1925, there are only 108 days that are not 
covered by an entry and there are never more than 4 consecutive days without 
an entry. If at a certain day there is no or only a very brief entry to be found in 
the diary, this occurred due to vacation, illness, or a very intense period of work. 
The entries, on the other hand, cover all kinds of external events, such as travel-
ling, meeting people, or having a party. The entries almost never cover internal 
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events, such as personal feelings or thoughts. Therefore, the period in question 
is covered extensively and with every desirable detail, in particular, concerning 
all kinds of professional interactions, for example, with Schlick and the Vienna 
Circle, with Franz Roh and Sigfried Giedion, and with Wilhelm Flitner and 
people in Leipzig, including Hans Freyer and Hans Driesch. Note also that 
travelling to Freiburg was not particularly easy for Carnap. He firstly had to walk 
two kilometers to the train station at Himmelreich, then go to Freiburg by train, 
and walk to the University again. Such a trip took at least half of a day and some-
times Carnap even stayed overnight with friends at Freiburg in order to avoid 
all-too-frequent commutes. Carnap usually reports on his visits to Freiburg in 
the diary, also indicating where he went and which people he met. Therefore, 
if there would have been any meeting with Husserl between March 1924 and 
December 1925, we definitely would find a report in the diary. Though it might 
be true that Carnap was no longer a big fan of Husserl in 1924–1925, he still was 
certainly aware of the fact of Husserl being the world’s most famous philosopher 
at that time. Why should he refuse to note visiting such a celebrity in the diary?11
To conclude, there is no evidence whatsoever that Carnap met Husserl (or 
Landgrebe) during the period in question (viz., March 1924 until January 1926). 
Rather, evidence from the diary makes it almost evident that there were no in-
teractions with Husserl or Landgrebe at all. Therefore, the weak account clearly 
must be considered empirically falsified. 
11  There is one option to be mentioned here that is at least implicitly suggested by Mayer, 
namely, that Carnap somewhat intentionally did not add his meetings with Husserl in 1924 
and 1925 to the diary because he intended to plagiarize Husserl from the start. However, 
apart from the fact that this version is dangerously close to becoming a conspiracy theory of 
some kind, it is by no means plausible or even consistent. If the strong account holds, this 
would imply that Carnap, only somewhere in 1925, decided to plagiarize Husserl, after get-
ting pressed by Schlick to finish his habilitation thesis as soon as possible. So, why did Carnap 
fail to mention his meetings with Husserl during the entire year before that alleged event? 
Note also that, for philological reasons, it almost certainly can be ruled out that Carnap might 
have removed the Husserl-related portions from his diary only later. The diary is a huge cor-
pus of material, indeed, covering six decades at several thousand pages of shorthand material. 
Almost all these sources appear to be the original sources, rather than copies or transcripts. 
This is true, in particular, for the entire period in question. In order to fake these original 
sources, Carnap would have had to work for weeks. More importantly, one would certainly be 
able to figure out that the version of the diary that covers the period in question is a transcript 
simply because original sources always contain various traces of daily use that transcriptions 
fail to contain. Therefore, speculations suggesting that Carnap intentionally hid his meetings 
with Husserl in the diaries, either from the start or by means of a later act of forgery, are clearly 
pointless. 
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III. THE STRONG ACCOUNT IS EMPIRICALLY  
AND METHODOLOGICALLY ILL-FOUNDED
The strong account is also based on an empirical claim, though one being less 
easily verified or falsified, namely, the claim that Carnap read the manuscript 
of Ideen II at some stage. The claim is less easily falsified because it is signifi-
cantly vague. Possibly, Landgrebe had told Carnap at some stage in the winter 
term of 1923/24 about the manuscript or had even shown portions to him. If 
this had happened, it is not likely that Carnap would have taken this to be so 
important as to describe it in the diary. On the other hand, the strong account 
implies an acquaintance with Ideen II that goes very far beyond a casual glance 
of a manuscript. In this way, even the strong account somewhat hinges on the 
weak account. In order to become plausible, the claim that the Aufbau is mainly 
a result of copying ideas from Ideen II necessarily involves the idea that Carnap 
must have been in the closest touch with Husserl and other people, such as 
Landgrebe, during the entire period when he was preparing the manuscript of 
the Aufbau. Therefore, as soon as it turns out that Carnap was not in touch with 
Husserl and people from his group during that period at all, the entire strong 
account becomes similarly unlikely and ill-founded. Therefore, we are justified 
in calling the strong account empirically ill-founded (viz., falsified). 
That said, the strong account is also ill-founded at a methodological level. In 
order to demonstrate this, let us assume for the sake of the argument that Car-
nap had access to the manuscript of Ideen II at any time while writing the Aufbau. 
This would imply that Ideen II might have been present to Carnap in the same 
sense as other books, such as the monographs of Hans Driesch, Hans Freyer, 
Günther Jacoby, Oswald Külpe, Ernst Mach, Wilhelm Ostwald, Josef Petzold, 
Johannes Rehmke, Heinrich Rickert, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, Wilhelm 
Schuppe, Hans Vaihinger, Theodor Ziehen, and others that were mentioned in 
the Aufbau. All these monographs show significant parallels with the Aufbau and 
Ideen II in that they offer similar construction procedures in one or another way. 
Therefore, in order to evaluate the similarities between the Aufbau and Ideen II 
that Mayer highlights, these similarities firstly would have to be compared with 
those similarities that we can find between the Aufbau and the other books in 
the list. Due to space considerations, we cannot provide such a comparison here 
at all. Note, however, that exactly a comparison of that kind is what Mayer’s 
account is lacking, for in order to justify the claim of concrete ideendiebstahl, it 
is by no means enough to point out certain similarities between the Aufbau and 
Ideen II. One also would have to demonstrate that these similarities only hold 
between the Aufbau and Ideen II. Only if Carnap could have found the ideas in 
question only in Ideen II and in no other book that he was citing in the Aufbau the 
accusation of concrete ideendiebstahl would cease to be entirely implausible. 
Even then, however, one additionally would have to provide certain rock-solid 
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arguments for Carnap having Ideen II on the shelf, while writing the Aufbau, in 
order to, say, obtain a somewhat viable proof of guilt. Arguments of the former 
kind clearly do not exist. It is neither to be expected that any further account 
of the plagiarism story might be able to provide evidence of the latter kind, for 
it seems rather obvious – though it cannot be proven here in detail – that all 
kinds of similarities as well as dissimilarities between the Aufbau and Ideen II 
also show up in one or another way in any book of the aforementioned list. Most 
importantly, some of these books were read by Carnap before 1923 and even 
before he first started to read Husserl. Moreover, the first sketches to the Auf-
bau, which already contain large parts of the later layout of spheres of reality and 
their mutual relationships, was already formulated in August 1920, viz., at a time 
where Carnap had not yet read Husserl at all. In this early manuscript, the major 
influences are Wilhelm Ostwald, Bertrand Russell, and some representatives of 
the Dilthey School and Neo-Kantianism. To conclude, Mayer’s strong account 
is not only empirically but also methodologically ill-founded. Carnap could not 
only find the same ideas contained in Ideen II in a huge number of books who 
were at least partly mentioned by him in the Aufbau, but it also appears that the 
main parts of the philosophical layout of the Aufbau were already developed long 
before Carnap allegedly got acquainted with Ideen II, some of them even before 
he firstly started to read Husserl. This implies that there is no reasonable way at 
all to talk about ideendiebstahl here. 
The bottom line is that Carnap neither plagiarized Husserl nor did he take 
ideas from Husserl without enough acknowledgement. Having noted this, we 
may now move on in order to investigate all these interesting aspects of the 
relationship between Carnap and Husserl that remain on the table after having 
rejected the “plagiarism” hypothesis of Mayer and Rosado Haddock. 
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thomas uebel
Overcoming Carnap’s Methodological 
Solipsism: Not As Easy As It Seems
Methodological solipsism is the position adopted by Rudolf Carnap in his Der 
logische Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World, 1928, hereafter: Aufbau). 
My concern here is to investigate whether, and if so, how, it can be effectively 
argued against – under certain conditions. That is, I will not take account of 
perhaps the most famous criticism Carnap received and pursue a question of 
principle. I will assume that Carnap’s Aufbau “does what it says on the tin” and 
ask on what grounds one can then take issue with it. I will argue that Carnap had 
remarkable resources to resist the criticisms he did receive.1 
I.
According to the methodological solipsism of the Aufbau, it is possible to devel-
op by logical construction a conceptual system encompassing all of empirical 
science on a so-called autopsychological basis. “Within the autopsychological 
basis, the available basic elements are restricted to those psychological objects 
which belong only to one subject” (§ 63, 100); in other words, the construc-
tion starts exclusively from what is “given” to an individual consciousness (§ 64, 
102).2 This basis was chosen so as to reflect the “epistemic order”: the construc-
tion was to begin with objects that are “epistemically primary”, namely objects 
whose recognition is “presupposed” for the recognition of “epistemically sec-
ondary” objects (§54, 88–89), which in turn are presupposed by epistemically 
tertiary objects, and so on as long as required. From a basic type of object, after 
1  This is admittedly not the first time that I have been considering these matters, but on-
going discussions with neo-Carnapians lead me to think that revisiting the matter from a fresh 
angle may help the understanding of certain subtleties that previous discussions neglected. 
Note that my discussion is limited to methodological solipsism in the context of the Aufbau 
project. 
2  All references with paragraph and page numbers are to the English translation of Car-
nap’s Aufbau.
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a certain number of steps, another type of object can be constructed, and so 
on, up to four kinds in total. In ascending order of complexity, “the sequence 
with respect to epistemic primacy of the four most important object domains is: 
the autopsychological, the physical, the heterosychological, the cultural” (§58, 
94). Notably, the methodologically solipsist system was but one several possible 
construction systems of concepts; Carnap also envisaged, but did not develop, 
systems with a physical base (§§ 59–60).3 
While the technical aspects of Carnap’s construction project do not concern 
us here, we must briefly reflect on its radical nature. The basic elements are a 
person’s “elementary experiences”, that is, experiences “in their totality and 
undivided unity” (§ 67, 108). This means, to be precise, that the basic elements 
of the system are “conscious experiences (in the widest sense): all experiences 
belong to it, whether or not we presently or afterwards reflect on them. Thus, 
we prefer”, Carnap wrote, “to speak of the ‘stream of experience’” (§64, 102). 
This bare “given” is unanalyzable as such; all that can be done with it is that 
“statements can be made about certain places in the stream of experience, to 
the effect that one such place stands in a certain relation to another place” (§67, 
109). In this way, even sense data are to be constructed by a method of so-called 
quasi-analysis so as serve as building blocks for further constructions. 
Even more daring is Carnap’s choice of basic relations according to which 
the basic elements are to be ordered: only a single one was to be used, namely 
“recollection of similarity” (§ 78, 127). (From this basic relation that of “part 
similarity” can be derived for use in quasi-analysis, such that elementary experi-
ences are recollected as similar in part, and it was from classes of such similarities 
that basic sense data are constructed.) The aim was that all scientific statements 
were to be shown translatable into statements employing only iterations and 
logical permutations of these elementary elements and the elementary relation. 
To be sure, predicate logic and classical mathematics are presupposed (§107), 
but few if any constructive projects in philosophy have shown such ambition. 
Now importantly, it must be stressed right away, as it was by Carnap, that 
“since the choice of an autopsychological basis amounts merely to an application 
of the form and method of solipsism, but not to an acknowledgement of its cen-
tral thesis, we may describe our position as methodological solipsism” (§ 64, 102, 
orig. emphasis). Methodological solipsism made no ontological claims; it was 
one possible stance of construction theory. Let’s see what this comes to.
3  Carnap offered no discussion of the epistemic primacy of the autopsychological over the 
physical, which indeed was a very widely shared assumption at the time. Among represent-
atives of the Austrian tradition it was shared by theorists as different as Franz Brentano and 
Ernst Mach (see Crane 2006).
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II.
The Aufbau’s combination of reach of ambition and instrumentalist minimalism 
was not pursed for logical sport only. One of the main points of the Aufbau was to 
pursue “the formalization of scientific statements”, namely their translation into 
sentences which replace each term with its constructional definition, i.e. their 
definition in terms of the elementary elements and relation alone. The ultimate 
aim was “to complete this formalization by eliminating from the statements of 
science these basic relations as the last nonlogical objects” (§ 153, 235) – to 
achieve the complete structuralization of knowledge.4 
This aim, in turn, was to complete Carnap’s theory and afford it reflexive 
blessing. According to the Aufbau, the objectivity of sciences rested on what 
he claimed to be a fundamental fact, that “scientific statements relate only to 
structural properties”, that is, “they speak only of forms without stating what the 
elements and the relations of these forms are” (§12, 23). By furnishing a strictly 
scientific redescription of human knowledge, one that by complete structural-
ization stripped it of its “intuitive” features and represented it in terms of its 
purely structural features, the Aufbau was to provide constructive proof of the 
claim about objectivity. What Carnap set out to do, then, were two things: first, 
the provision of the conceptual skeleton of possible human empirical knowl-
edge, and, second, the provision of a theory of how to go about producing such 
conceptual systems. In Carnap’s terms, he provided both a “rational reconstruc-
tion” and a theory of such rational reconstructions.5  
Now importantly, that Carnap’s construction of objects proceeds according to 
their epistemic order “does not mean that the syntheses or formations of cogni-
tion, as they occur in the actual process of cognition, are to be represented in the 
constructional system in all their concrete characteristics” (§ 54, 89). The point 
was philosophical. Now the Aufbau itself shows little concern with “justifying” 
knowledge claims as such, but only interest in developing “constructional sys-
tems”, in the logical construction of systems of concepts. That said, the point 
of these constructions, Carnap himself conceded, was the “rational justification 
of intuition”. He elaborated: “The constructional system is a rational reconstruction of 
the entire formation of reality, which, in cognition, is carried out for the most part 
intuitively” (§ 100, 158, orig. emphasis; cf. § 179, 289). 
Needless to say, this epistemological engagement of the Aufbau remained 
pretty minimal. It provided only the logical-conceptual foundations for justifi-
cations of knowledge claims. Yet precisely by showing all concepts to be struc-
4  For various forms of non-foundationalist interpretations of the Aufbau that are drawn 
upon in this section see, e.g. Friedman 1987, 1992, Richardson 1998, Pincock 2005 and the 
discussions in Carus 2007. ch. 6 and Pincock 2009.
5  This metatheory, the theory of rational reconstruction provided what nowadays we can 
call a toolbox of formal epistemology.
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turally reconstructible, it was the objectivity of science that was to be explained 
and substantiated, so it was an epistemological engagement all the same. The 
Aufbau was not altogether epistemologically innocent – as the Index of Subjects 
of the Aufbau reveals. There we read under “Justification”: “see Rational recon-
struction”, and then find “Rational reconstruction [rationale Nachkonstruktion] 
(rational justification)” (360 and 363).6 
It is therefore not at all irrelevant to note that while Carnap abjured the claim 
to paint a psychologically realistic picture, he did claim that the relations of epis-
temological justification that obtain for our cognitions are correctly portrayed in 
the way they were portrayed in the Aufbau. It is true that Carnap stressed that the 
system with an autopsychological base was but one possible way of providing a 
construction system (one with a physical base was also possible), but likewise is it 
true that his choice of which one to develop in the Aufbau was not arbitrary. “From 
an epistemological viewpoint (in contradistinction to the viewpoint of empirical 
science), we are led to… a constructional system with autopsychological basis” (§ 
59, 95). In other words, what is epistemological about the construction system of 
the Aufbau that was developed in it, is precisely its methodological solipsism. 
But, and this also is extremely important, while this methodological solipsism 
was long regarded as entailing a form of reductionist foundationalism, its episte-
mological interest lay elsewhere for Carnap. There is, for instance, the (already 
mentioned) structuralist agenda which it facilitates, and with it the distinctive 
idea of how to sustain science’s claim to objectivity: “science wants to speak 
about what is objective, and whatever does not belong to the structure but to 
the material (i.e. anything that can be pointed out in a concrete ostensive defi-
nition) is, in the final analysis, subjective” (§16, 29). Another central concern, 
also facilitated, is the exemplification of the unification of concept formation as 
something postulated by the concept of unified science (§ 2, 7). 
Some of these epistemological interests may, of course, also be served by 
constructions with other kinds of bases or other approaches to epistemology 
altogether. (It is an interesting question, not pursued here, which can survive 
the overcoming of methodological solipsism.) For now, however, it should be 
clear that methodological solipsism manages to combine these interests in the 
construction of its conceptual system. And one more thing: some of these inter-
ests are wholly independent of epistemological foundationalism, the grounding 
human knowledge claims in non-inferentially justified beliefs (let alone indu-
bitable ones) and the desire to secure human knowledge against philosophical 
skepticism (beyond establishing objectivity for science), and therefore remain 
viable motivations for the Aufbau even if the foundationalist one is discounted.
6  Originally, “Rechtfertigung, s. rationale Nachkonstruktion” and “rationale Nachkonstruktion 
(rat. Rechtfertigung)”, with §§ 100 and 143 in bold as indicating special importance among the 
nine sections mentioned. No such differentiation was made in the Index of the English version.
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III.
Now, turning finally to criticisms of methodological solipsism, I will bracket the 
most famous criticism of it, Quine’s. According to Quine, Carnap’s Aufbau pro-
ject breaks down because the predicate “is at” (placing a perceived quality in 
physical space) does not receive an eliminative definition (at § 126).7 (Call this 
the “physicalist charge”.) This criticism is widely, but not universally, accepted, 
even by some authors who oppose Quine’s interpretation of the Aufbau as foun-
dationalist empiricist epistemology. For present purposes I disregard it, since 
its acceptance would pretty much render my inquiry void. Failure to provide 
eliminative reductions would certainly show that the slim base Carnap chose to 
provide an adequate basis for methodological solipsism in the Aufbau was inade-
quate, whichever of the aims mentioned is pursued. (Whether a more Machian 
strategy, starting from a small number of types of sense data, would do better, is 
anybody’s guess.)8  The conditions under which I wish to investigate whether 
methodological solipsism can be effectively argued against, advertised in my 
introduction, are precisely those that obtain when Carnap’s construction is not 
yet viewed as having its reconstructive proficiency challenged. 
But while I here bracket Quine’s criticism, I must to stress that we should 
grant him with considerable more insight and subtlety than your average critic 
of logical positivism displays in at least one respect – one in which the present 
investigation must emulate him. Quine accepted that Carnap’s strategy of con-
structing a genealogy of all non-formal concepts on the sole basis of the rela-
tion of remembered similarity with unanalyzed whole first-person experiences 
as relata was to be of only reconstructive import. Certain shortcomings simply 
would not count. Two misunderstandings in particular must be guarded against. 
First, as Carnap himself stated (§ 50), rational reconstruction was not meant to 
be descriptively adequate to knowledge acquisition as it actually took place. The sec-
ond misunderstanding is more subtle and can be illustrated with reference to 
Quine’s “is-at” objection.
Any failure of reduction that constitutes a legitimate complaint about the ra-
tional reconstruction must show that this strategy betrayed its promise to re-
construct our ordinary and scientific discourse even in its own terms. Therein lay 
the Aufbau’s failure on Quine’s reading. His complaint of failure was not that 
with methodological solipsism reference to anything but phenomenal objects 
7  See Quine 1951/1953. 39–40; 1969. 74–75. There is, of course, also Goodman’s criticism, 
in Goodman 1951 and Goodman 1963, of earlier stages of the reconstruction which is still 
more controversial (see Carnap 1961. ix–x; Proust 1984, Mormann 1994) and which does not 
seem to turn on assumptions peculiar to methodological solipsism as such but on specific 
aspects of Carnap’s way of formalizing its realization.
8  When Carnap envisaged one such in the “Preface to the Second Edition” (1961–1967. 
vii), he did not motivate his preference for it on these grounds. 
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became impossible. That much is taken for granted when we accept Carnap’s 
strategy. It is rather that methodological solipsism fails in its aim to simulate or-
dinary cognition. That is, it fails to reconstruct physical object discourse in its 
own reconstructive terms, namely by not providing indicators necessary and suf-
ficient for the recognition of the basic states of affairs in which physical objects 
figure.9 (Even if the Aufbau had succeeded with its reductions contrary to what 
Quine claimed, it would only have been make-believe physical objects that he 
ended up with, but that would not have mattered then.) Quine’s criticism, in 
other words, was immanent to Carnap’s project.10
The criticism I want to consider here is likewise immanent to Carnap’s pro-
ject, but differs from Quine’s in its focus. Note that, however new-fangled Car-
nap’s logic and however radical his structuralism may be, the ground plan of the 
Aufbau, the order of epistemic primacy which is followed in the process of ever 
more complex constructions of concepts and objects of cognition, is very tradi-
tional indeed. It is so, to be sure, not in virtue of appealing to atomistic founda-
tions – the conceptual system is so deeply holistic that the atomism charge large-
ly misfires – but it is so traditional in virtue of the austere individualism of its 
base. The criticism I want to consider is that it is this individualism that brings 
the Aufbau to its fall, in other words, that Carnap’s methodological solipsism is 
responsible for a highly significant and non-negotiable failure of the reconstruc-
tive project, namely, the failure to do justice to its own aim of reconstructing 
intersubjectivity.11 (Call this the “social charge”.) Again it may be helpful to 
illustrate what criticism would not fit the bill before proceeding.
An example of non-immanent criticism would be that Carnap’s reconstruc-
tion of intersubjectivity in the Aufbau in its later stages fails on account of its 
inability to sustain a certain conception of it that is endorsed earlier in the book. 
Consider that the kind of objectivity that was in fact reconstructed in the Aufbau 
consisted of “intersubjective correspondences” that allowed the construction of 
an intersubjective world (§ 146). These intersubjective correspondences con-
sisted in the far-reaching structural agreement between a constructional system 
as a whole (which holds for me and represents my experience of the world, call 
it “CSself”) and the constructional systems which are ascribed to others within 
this all-embracing constructional system (call them “CSother”). It was on the basis 
of this agreement that intersubjective objects and properties can be construct-
9  For these conditions, see Aufbau §§ 2 and 49.
10  It is criticism that in principle should sway Carnap to take it on board (as, without change 
of agenda, one is not likely to do in the face of non-immanent criticism).
11  To be painfully explicit it’s the austere epistemic individualism of methodological sol-
ipsism that is being attacked here – which is not related to the position of methodological 
individualism in the philosophy of social explanation (even though that attracted much heat-
ed criticism on account of being misunderstood as a sociological analogue of methodological 
solipsism). 
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ed, i.e. objects and properties constructed in an analogical fashion in CSself and 
CSother. This intersubjective world then allows for the construction of physics. 
All along, what this process of “intersubjectivizing” provides, however, are con-
structions that “do not consist in a hypothetical inference or fictitious postula-
tion of something that is not given, but they consist merely in the reorganisation of 
the given” (§ 148, orig. emphasis).12 
Compare now how Carnap answered the question of “how science can arrive 
at intersubjectively valid assertions if all its objects are to be constructed from 
the standpoint of the individual subject, that is, if in the final analysis all state-
ments of science have as their objects only relations between my experiences”. 
His answer was that “[t]he solution to this problem lies in the fact that, even 
though the material of individual streams of experience is… altogether incompa-
rable…. all streams of experience agree in respect of certain structural properties” 
(§ 66, 107, trans. amended, orig. emphasis). Note that this defense of the inter-
subjective validity or objectivity of science depends on having taken a stand-
point external to the epistemic subjects in question by postulating all of their 
“streams of experience” to “agree in respect of certain structural properties”: 
no such objective agreement was reconstructed later in the book, nor could it 
even be stated from the perspective of an individual with the autopsychological 
language as in Aufbau.
Now why would this not qualify as criticism immanent enough to satisfy 
our desiderata? To begin with, there’s a delightful ambiguity in the phrase “all 
streams of experience agree in respect of certain structural properties”. On an 
ordinary understanding, this phrase speaks of different streams of experience 
(mine, yours, his and hers) and so provokes the charge of inconsistency: what 
is reconstructed later is not what was talked about earlier.13 But a committed 
Carnapian is likely to interpret the phrase in question as already speaking from 
within the perspective of the Aufbau: what accounts for objectivity in the Aufbau 
is precisely that each subject is able, by the process of intersubjectivization, to 
build up an intersubjective world shared with (reconstructed) others. For pres-
ent purposes, there is no need to disambiguate, for we may ask whether Carnap 
has any need, in the first place, to invoke whatever may be the objective nature 
of objectivity, let alone to reconstruct it. Once it is noted that the Aufbau’s point 
is to simulate, not recreate, human cognition, then it becomes readily apparent 
12  Likewise, the Aufbau’s reconstruction of the intentional relation and its directedness 
never reaches real world objects (§ 164).
13  This was the criticism voiced first in Uebel 1992. 94, where it was also attributed to 
Heinrich Neider (see §4 below), and then more or less repeated in his 2007. 133. That Car-
nap employed two different conceptions of intersubjectivity in the Aufbau is also noted in 
Richardson 1998. 89-91 and made the basis of a fundamental criticism of the Aufbau. How 
Richardson’s criticism relates to those considered and developed here must be considered on 
another occasion.
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that the committed Carnapian is right to reject the criticism of inconsistency as, 
at a mimimum, irrelevant, for reconstructing an intersubjectivity involving two 
independent subjects was never the point. 
IV.
What this brings out clearly, I think, is that it is not at all easy to come up with an 
immanent criticism of Carnap’s methodological solipsist construction system in 
the Aufbau – as long, that is, as one grants him technical success. Not only does 
this mean that any demonstration that experience-transcendent objects remain 
out of reconstructive reach is bound to miss the dialectical mark, but that any 
demonstration that the process of intersubjectivization does not deliver a social 
space involving independent others is bound to miss the dialectical mark as 
well. What has to be shown, rather, is that Carnap’s methodological solipsist con-
struction system in the Aufbau did not manage to realize its legitimate aim: that 
it failed to show that there obtained no epistemologically significant discrepancy 
between the reconstruction and what it was a reconstruction of, in particular, 
that their subjective origin was no bar to the objectivity of scientific knowledge 
claims as here conceived. 
Readers will have noted that the dialectical situation just outlined is pretty 
much like the one in which critics of Carnap’s methodological solipsism found 
themselves before Quine’s physicalist charge. So how did opponent of method-
ological solipsism react? The first concrete objection Carnap himself was con-
fronted with (more diffuse ones had been voiced in Neurath’s review of the 
Aufbau)14 focused on the fact that, according to the model provided, different 
subjects could not test and confirm or disconfirm the same knowledge claims 
about that world, but only very different claims about their own experience. If 
everyone only ever tests (and understands) a sentence by translating it into their 
autopsychological language, then there are no sentences that are ever tested 
in common by different people. It is clear why this is an instance of the social 
charge: whatever was reconstructed here, it was not the intersubjectivity of sci-
ence, for methodologically solipsist simulacra for that were not provided.  
This criticism was put to him first by Heinrich Neider in December 1929.
 
I said to Carnap: “You will have to drop the auto-psychological basis, because sen-
tences concerning the auto-psychological domain are not intersubjectively verifiable, 
and sentences which are not intersubjectively verifiable cannot belong to science. 
Philosophy can consider them in explanations of how these sentences came to be 
formed and once they are formulated then they must be intersubjectively verifia-
14  For discussion and references, see Uebel 2007. 103–123.
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ble.” We talked for a long time and then Carnap asked me: “That is indeed a correct 
observation …” Neurath was delighted. Neurath had not been with us then, but the 
following evening we were at his house and told him about it. He said: “Of course, fi-
nally!”, for with this a bridge was built towards materialism, which he valued so much 
as the philosophy of the workers’ movement. (Neider in Haller & Rutte 1977. 29–30.)
In light of the foregoing remarks, we must consider the logic of Neider’s criti-
cism and see whether it really does apply, whether, for instance, the difference 
between simulation and recreation was observed.15 
V.
The difficulty of making the social charge stick can be brought out by consid-
ering disagreement about an observational claim.16 In the intersubjective lan-
guage LIS, differences about observational claims concerning a physical object, 
say “PoIS”, are unproblematical: subject A affirms “PoIS” and subject B denies 
“PoIS”. There are two subjects which take conflicting attitudes towards the same 
proposition about a physical object. But how would things look according to the 
Aufbau? 
If we imagine — from the vantage point of the objective perspective that 
also can observe the structural similarity of different streams of experience — 
different subjects operating with autopsychological protocol languages, we get 
the following result. Agent A has to translate the observational claim “PoIS” into 
her protocol-language LA, “PoA”, and affirm it, while agent B has to translate the 
observational claim into her protocol-language LB, “PoB”, and deny it. Clearly, 
what A affirms is not what B denies – contrary to the situation we wanted to re-
construct. Intersubjective disagreement stays unreconstructed.
Now it might be thought that this misdescribes the situation. Are the state-
ments in the protocol languages of the two subjects not translations of a state-
ment of the intersubjective language (or its denial) and is it not in virtue of 
this relation of translatability that the two statements of the different protocol 
languages stand in the logical relation of contradiction? The objection is not 
without merit, but it holds only as long as it is the case not only that intersub-
jective languages are translatable into autopsychological protocol languages but 
also that the latter are translatable into the former. But precisely this they are 
not according to the Aufbau – it was only in 1932 with “The Physical Language 
15  For a dating of Neider’s argument and discussion of its context, see Uebel 2007. 130–
136; for the subsequent campaign by Neurath, with numerous references, see Uebel 2007. 
Chs. 6–8.
16  The argument could also be put in terms of agreement, but disagreement makes it more 
vivid.
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as the Universal Language of Science” that Carnap granted this (in effect: re-) 
translatability of the autopsychological language into the physical language.17 
Prior to 1932, Carnap’s autopsychological protocol languages possessed a je-
ne-sais-quoi that prevented their translation into the intersubjective language 
(and thereby presumably also the re-translation of a formerly intersubjective 
content which, once mixed with the autopsychological je-ne-sais-quoi could not 
be distilled out again).18 We must conclude, given the state of reconstructive 
play defined by the Aufbau (i.e., no re-translatability from the autopsychological 
into the physical language), that if there ever are two subjects operating accord-
ing to methodological solipsism, they could neither agree nor disagree with each 
other, in fact, they could not communicate at all. They would be caught in their 
autopsychological protocol language – a state clearly at variance with science as 
it is conducted: intersubjectively. 
So much the for what methodological solipsism (under the Aufbau conditions 
outlined) comes to from an objective or outside vantage point which recognizes 
there to be two different subjects. This is not a conclusive argument against 
methodological solipsism (as deployed in the Aufbau), however, for this only 
shows that intersubjectivity cannot be recreated by intersubjectivization, but not 
that it cannot be simulated by it. To investigate this we must try to model the 
situation subjectively, from the inside, as the agents involved envisage it from 
the perspective of a subject in the methodologically solipsist condition. Can A 
17  See Carnap 1932a. The Aufbau itself keeps quiet about this untranslatability, but Edgar 
Zilsel 1932. 145–146 also noted and remarked upon this asymmetry. It might be thought that 
I make too much of what is but an oversight in the Aufbau. To think so is to forget, however, 
that according to the model of the Aufbau testing and understanding happen only at the level 
of the autopsychological language: the physical language is understood mediately only.Given 
the direction of reduction, understanding depends on the autopsychological base. Likewise 
it is no good to point to Carnap’s claim elsewhere in the Aufbau that, given psycho-physical 
parallelism, not only are “all physical objects reducible to psychological ones” but also “every 
statement about a psychological object is translatable into a statement about physical ob-
jects”, that between them obtains “mutual reducibility” (§§ 57–58, 92–93). Surely then, the 
counter would go, autopsychological statements PoA and not-PoB are translable back into the 
physical language so as to disagree there (as to whether PoIS obtains). To this it must be re-
sponded that in §§ 57–60 Carnap addressed the general theory of constitution systems, as he 
did when he stated, in § 62, that a constitutional system of concepts could also be erected on a 
physical basis. Such statements say nothing about the specific constitution system developed 
in the Aufbau, but outline the possibilities opened up for constitution systems generally by 
the assumption of psycho-physical parallelism. It was from this array of possibilities that Car-
nap then chose the particular reduction relations of the Aufbau, namely the methodologically 
solipsist ones that mirrored the order of epistemic primacy that he took to obtain: cultural 
objects to heteropsychological objects, heteropsychological objects to physical objects, and 
physical objects to autopsychological objects (§§ 59 and 64, at 95 and 101). The distinctive 
feature of Carnap’s actual Aufbau among the many possible Aufbaus he could have constructed 
is that the autopsychological language translates the physical language but is not translatable 
back into it. For further discussion see Uebel 2014.
18  Carnap never specified the je-ne-sais-quoi element beyond suggesting it to be peculiar to 
the meaning of the autopsychological language; see again Uebel 2014.
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represent B’s disagreement with A’s observational claim? Let’s put aside the 
question of how B’s body (to which psychological states are to be attributed) is to 
be constructed from A’s evidence in the absence of explicit definitions of physi-
cal objects in phenomenal terms (Quine’s complaint): suppose (per impossibile) it 
had been done. What’s relevant now is the question how B’s disagreement with 
A’s observational claim is rendered by A. 
We begin by observing, as before, that B’s own description, “not-PoB”, would 
not be available for A, for that employs B’s autopsychological protocol-language 
LB: evidently, A cannot use that. But “not-PoA” will not do either, it would ap-
pear, for, equally evidently, B cannot use A’s autopsychological language LA. PoA 
and PoB do not speak about the same thing or have the same content, they are 
not identical protocol sentences. (One talks about A’s experiences, the other 
about B’s experiences.) However, if it is not the recreation of intersubjectivity 
that we are after, but merely its simulation, why isn’t it good enough for A to 
represent B as holding “not-PoA” etc.? Why will the solipsist fiction not do? For 
purposes of simulation (unlike for those of recreation) no pre-established har-
mony is needed, only assurance that the merely fictitious intersubjectivity en-
tertained by methodologically solipsist subjects is harmless and does not impede 
the maintenance of a belief system that is functionally equivalent to the belief 
system their non-methodologically solipsist counterpart possesses. 
It may be wondered whether a thin reconstruction of intersubjectivity, one 
that abstracts from the give and take of real intersubjectivity (like the simula-
tions under consideration), could do the job. In particular it may be thought 
that there is an additional layer of complexity that emerges when we turn from 
the question whether physical objects have been successfully reconstructed to 
the question whether other subjects have been successfully reconstructed – and 
that this additional layer remains out of reach for methodological solipsism, so 
that attempts to simulate another with the resources of an autopsychological 
language inevitably compare unfavourably with simulations of physical object 
discourse in autopsychological language. Attempts at simulating intersubjec-
tivity, the suspicion goes, are much more complex. For the other is not just a 
body but also a mind and that means that the task is to simulate that mind’s 
representational activity – which includes the reflexive representation of its own 
and others’ representational activity. 
Again the critic stumbles over the difference between simulation and recrea-
tion. Of course, from a methodologically solipsist base I cannot recreate a point 
of view truly independent from mine: in that sense it can and must be ques-
tioned whether an autopsychological language can sustain the conception of an-
other mind. But if it is granted that from a methodologically solipsist position I 
can simulate cognition of another body (as it is, prior to the physicalist charge, 
by default) and that a description of a mental event can be attached, under cer-
tain conditions, to another body whose cognition is simulated, then what should 
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stop a methodologically solipsist subject from attributing the ability to represent 
representing, reflexive mental states, to another body? It is hard to see what 
should make the simulation of complex, i.e. reflexive, mental states of another 
so difficult, if the simulation of first-order mental states of another is granted.19
It must be admitted that is difficult to establish that methodologically sol-
ipsist reconstructions like those envisaged by Carnap are functionally inferior 
– given what we have to grant (we may add: counterfactually) to avoid anach-
ronism. Granted that another body (by definition a transcendent object) can be 
simulated, there seems to be nothing to stop Carnap attributing mental states 
to that body so as to make sense of the “expressive events” observed to be 
happening there (§ 140, 216). But does this mean that methodological solipsism 
carries the day?
VI.
Let us return to Neider’s charge that Carnap’s methodological solipsism fails 
to reconstruct the intersubjectivity of science as required. In light of our dis-
cussion we must distinguish: required for what? It is clear that Neider’s charge 
is correct in this respect: Carnap’s methodological solipsism fails to represent 
the intersubjectivity of scientific discourse correctly. Scientists do agree or disa-
gree about statements in the intersubjective physicalist language. But what this 
criticism amounts to is that true intersubjectivity is not being recreated. What 
Neider’s criticism does not establish is that Carnap was unable to simulate inter-
subjectivity for his own epistemological purposes (which do not include, as we 
saw, humdrum justification).
Precisely this is the conclusion that Carnap came to. In The Old and the New 
Logic he therefore drew a new picture of the relation between the intersubjec-
tive physicalist language and the methodologically solipsist protocol language.
The analysis of the concept of science has shown that […] they can be reduced to 
root concepts which apply to the ‘given’, to the content of immediate experience. […] 
Thus, a genealogical tree of concepts results in which every concept must in principle 
find its place according to the way it is derived from other concepts and ultimately 
from the given […] (‘methodological positivism’) […] A second constitution system, 
which likewise includes all concepts, has physical concepts for its basis, i.e., concepts 
which apply to space and time […] (‘methodological materialism’) […] the positiv-
19  Nota bene: it is Carnap’s Aufbau that is immunized from typical criticisms by the distinc-
tion between simulation and recreation. Once a more traditional epistemological agenda is 
pursued, as in Scheinprobleme der Philosophie (“Pseudoproblems of Philosophy”, 1928b), the 
dialectical situation changes significantly, but this cannot be dealt with here beyond some 
brief hints below.  
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ist and the materialist constitution systems do not contradict one another. Both are 
correct and indispensable. The positivist system corresponds to the epistemological 
viewpoint because it proves the validity of knowledge by reduction to the given. The 
materialist system corresponds to the viewpoint of the empirical sciences, for in this 
system all concepts are reduced to the physical, to the only domain which exhib-
its the complete rule of law and makes intersubjective knowledge possible. (Carnap 
1930/1959. 143–144.)
Note that here both constructional systems — and so also the physical one — 
are “indispensible”. This marks a change from the Aufbau where the physical 
system was merely recognized as possible and where the rational reconstruction 
of scientific knowledge was assumed to be able to get by with just the construc-
tional system on an autopsychological basis. So Carnap now operated with a 
two-language model, according to which the business of intersubjective science 
was conducted in the physicalistic language, but for which a translation into a 
phenomenalist protocol language was still required to provide its claims with 
epistemological justification.20 (At this point, the physical language was held 
be a universal language into which all and only other intersubjective languages 
were translatable.)21 
Needless to say, this only ameliorated but did not solve the problem that 
critics of methodological solipsism perceive. It remained the case that, as in the 
Aufbau, first-person reports about psychological states were not translatable into 
physical statements. The asymmetry between autopsychological and heteropsy-
chological stayed in place: only the latter were translatable into the physical 
language. Epistemologically nothing much had changed.22 Predictably, this was 
the point subsequently pressed by Neurath, who had started a campaign for 
radical physicalism, i.e. the sole employment of the physical language, and to 
this end devised a succinct private language argument. This story I have told 
elsewhere.23 Here I can only summarise the brisk development and note three 
questions arising. 
In order to accord fully with the intersubjective nature of science, one’s ev-
idence sentences required full translatability into the intersubjective physical 
language, for without it they fall outside of science while science itself remains 
20  Another change, vis-a-vis Aufbau, is this emphasis on reduction for validational purposes.
21  This was spelt out in manuscripts from 1930 – early drafts, later revised, of “Die 
physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft” and “Psychologie in physikalis-
cher Sprache” – in which Carnap spoke of two universal languages, the physical and the 
phenomenal language of which the former was limited to the domain of intersubjective lan-
guages; see Uebel 2007. ch. 6.
22  Except, as noted in a previous footnote, the switch to the project of now validating indi-
vidual knowledge claims.
23  For a detailed analysis of this stage of the Carnap–Neurath debate, see Uebel 2007. 
chs. 7–8.
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epistemologically incomplete. The consequences are evident. Originally Car-
nap’s protocol sentences were meant to formulate what was directly given and 
to provide the basic sentences for methodological solipsism. But once they are 
treated like physical sentences they fall under the same epistemological regime 
as the rest of the physicalist language. This means that the primacy of the in-
tersubjective language has been established and that the first person has lost its 
unconditional privilege. This, of course, was the position Carnap endorsed by 
the end of 1932. Accordingly, Carnap excluded methodological solipsism from 
playing any further role in “the logic of science”, which he soon declared take 
the place of (traditional) epistemology.24
One question which arises is how Neurath’s argumentation dealt with the 
distinction which helped Carnap to block Neider’s argument from having con-
sequences for his epistemology, the distinction between recreation and simula-
tion. The short answer is that Neurath’s private language argument called into 
question whether it was possible for a solitary individual to sustain and ensure 
the consistent use of her language and thereby undercut a fundamental assump-
tion of the simulation project pursued by methodological solipsism. The second 
question is closely related. What prompted Carnap, who, after all, found Neur-
ath’s argumentation difficult, to drop his simulationist resistance? The all-too-
short answer is that Carnap changed his meta-philosophical perspective from 
rational reconstruction to adopt the stance of “logical tolerance”.25 Thus arises 
the third question. Given this change of perspective, does it still make sense 
to speak of Carnap’s “overcoming” of methodological solipsism? The again too 
short answer is that logical tolerance does not prevent the adoption of non-es-
sentialist, pragmatic first-order philosophical positions as superior to the compe-
tition. Needless to say, longer answers are needed but must be deferred. 
What I tried to show here was only that and how Carnap’s methodology of 
rational reconstruction in the Aufbau appeared to render impervious to criticism 
a conception of epistemic order that, given his revolutionary philosophical fervor 
elsewhere, was remarkably traditionalist. 
 
24  See Carnap 1934/1937. Part V and 1936; for discussion, see Uebel 2018. 
25  While logical tolerance introduced as such only in Carnap 1934/1937, § 17, it was already 
operative in his (1932b) which renounced the unconditional privilege of the first-person per-
spective and the demand for methodological solipsism.
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GerGely ambrus
Austrian Identity Theory and Russelian 
Monism: Schlick, Russell and Chalmers*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE COMMON FEATURES 
OF ALL RUSSELLIAN MONIST VIEWS
In this paper I present Moritz Schlick’s views on the mind-body problem in 
some detail, which, beyond being an original contribution to the topic, may also 
be seen as a representative of a wider “Austrian” approach to the psychophys-
ical relation, sometimes dubbed as the “Austrian Identity Theory”. Further, I 
will investigate Schlick’s connections with certain views of Russell (which they 
developed independently),1 and to a representative of kindred contemporary 
views, namely David Chalmers’ “Russellian monist” views. 
The motivation for investigating these authors in particular are varied. As 
for the reasons of scrutinizing Chalmers’ present views in particular: Russellian 
monism about the consciousness-brain relation became rather popular in the last 
two decades,2 the main motivation for this development being Russellian mon-
ism’s promise to solve certain problems which other contemporary naturalist 
theories, including reductionist, non-reductionist and eliminativist materialism 
and naturalist property-dualism theories, are notoriously unable to solve – and 
a major protagonist in this development has been David Chalmers.3 As for put-
ting Russell on the list: all contemporary Russellian Monists consider Russell’s 
(1927, 1948, 1956) views as their common ancestor. As for Schlick: his “Austrian 
view” on the mind-body problem, propounded in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre 
(1918, 1925) is rather similar to the views of Russell, and may also be considered 
as an alternative to the later-day materialist identity theories of Smart, Arm-
strong and Lewis – as Herbert Feigl emphasized long ago.4
* This paper is based on research carried out in the frames of the K112542 research project 
of the National Research, Development and Innovation Office, Hungary.
1  See Feigl’s comment on the independence in Feigl 1975.
2  See e.g. Stoljar 2001; 2006, Strawson 2006, Chalmers 2013, and some earlier proponents 
as e.g. Lockwood 1992 and Maxwell 1979.
3  See in particular his „Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism” (2013).
4  See Feigl 1975. Russell and Schlick: a Remarkable Agreement on a Monistic Solution to 
the Mind-Body Problem.
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So, by examining Schlick’s and Russell’s ideas together with Chalmers’ Rus-
sellian monism in some detail I hope to lay out their similarities and differences, 
which, besides being of historical interest, may contribute to the evalution of 
their respective merits and failings.
* * *
According to Alter–Nagasawa 2015, the common features of Russellian monist 
views are the following: 
Structuralism about physics: physics describes its basic properties in only structural/dis-
positional terms.
Realism about the relevant intrinsic properties: there are intrinsic properties that both 
constitute consciousness and serve as non-structural/categorical grounds for the 
structural/dispositional properties described in physics.
Phenomenal or protophenomenal foundationalism: at least some of those intrinsic prop-
erties are either phenomenal properties or protophenomenal properties (nonphe-
nomenal properties that perhaps also in combination with structural/dispositional 
properties, constitute consciousness).
The virtues of Russellian monism over all contemporary naturalist theories of 
consciousness (reductionist, non-reductionist and eliminativist materialism and 
naturalist property-dualist theories alike) are, according to Chalmers 2013, are 
the following. Russellian monism solves the problem of mental causation: it 
accounts for the causal efficacy of qualia, in a way that evades the mental ep-
iphenomenalism versus overdetermination dilemma which threatens all other 
naturalist theories. Further, it answers the conceivability argument: it provides 
an explanation of why zombies are conceivable which does not imply that qualia 
are non-physical properties. 
Besides these common features, we may find some further fundamental 
assumptions shared by Schlick, Russell and Chalmers, namely: (1) linguistic 
physicalism; (2) physicalist dualist property-pluralism; (3) Russellian or Austrian 
identity theory; and that (4) physical-concept-structuralism grounds all (1), (2) 
and (3). Somewhat more detailed: 
According to (1) linguistic physicalism, the linguistic-conceptual thesis, all real 
entities can be identified by physical (or: microphysical or theoretical physi-
cal) terms, i.e. we can refer to any real entity by a physical concept (as well). 
According to (2), the ontological thesis, all Russellian monists are pluralist: they 
assume that many different kinds of qualities constitute the world. Further, they 
are dualist in holding that this set of variagated qualities divides into two large 
groups: phenomenal (“mental”) and non-phenomenal (“physical”/non-mental) 
qualities, and both are taken to be real in the same sense. Their ontology is also 
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physicalist in holding that phenomenal qualities reside on the same ontological 
level as the non-phenomenal, “merely physical” qualities.
As for (3), the thesis about the psychophysical relation: they advocate a Russellian or 
Austrian identity theory. This is a dual-language view, asserting that since physical 
concepts determine only the structural properties of qualities (in different sens-
es, see below) hence it is possible that the denotatum of some physical concept 
is a quale; and hence that some physical concepts like “c-fibre firing” refer to a 
mental event, and not to an ontologically distinct but co-instatiated brain event. 
Further, there are arguments to the the point that it is in fact so.
For (1), (2) and (3) the following similar arguments may be reconstructed 
from Schlick’s, Russell’s and Chalmers’ texts. 
As for premise (1): Schlick, Russell and Chalmers all hold what Schlick calls 
epistemic parallelism, namely the view that sychronically with the perception of 
any mental event, a physical event (a brain event) is also perceptible. This is a 
very widely accepted view since the late 19th century, considered as empirically 
well-confirmed. Further, they all reject metaphysical parallelism, i.e. that the 
parallelly perceived mental and brain events are ontologically distinct. From 
these two tenets (1) follows, for in case (1) were not true, then the two epis-
temically parallel perceptions ought to be about ontologically distinct events, 
since the perceived mental event could not be referred to by a physical concept, 
hence it were not possible that the perceived mental and the physical events are 
identical, since necessarily, an event referred to by a mental concept could not 
be identical with an event referred to by a physical concept.
As for the arguments in favour of (2): pluralism about qualities follow from 
external world realism, which was extensively argued for by Schlick and also by 
Russell (in his realist periods), and taken for granted by Chalmers; and from the 
claim that different structural properties are associated with different qualities 
– a view, I take it, is also shared by all three authors. As for dualism: on the one 
hand, we have direct knowledge of the existence of phenomenal qualities, on 
the other we also know that there are non-experiencable extra-mental qualities, 
since this is implied by external world realism. (In the Allgemeine Erkennntislehre 
Schlick argues in detail for the existence of extra-mental qualities, e.g. by argu-
ing against “the philosophies of immanence”, neo-Kantian and phenomenalist 
views, and also against reductionist materialism about phenomenal qualities. 
Russell also accepts both the existence of percepts and non-experienceable 
“external to the mind” qualities. Chalmers all the same: he is a realist about 
both about physical properties and qualia.) As for physicalistic dualism: epistem-
ic parallelism in itself would allow metaphysical parallelism (or natural super-
venience), i.e. non-physicalistic property-dualism, but these views apparently 
cannot account for the causal efficacy of conscious events (or phenomenal prop-
erties). Schlick and Russell takes the causal efficacy of the mental for granted, 
and Chalmers also accepts it in his later Russellian monist views, unlike earlier, 
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e.g. in Chalmers 1996, where he seemed to lean more towards mental epipheno-
menalism. According to physicalistic property-dualism, qualia (or micro-qualia 
or proto-qualia) are on the same ontological level as physical (or microphysical) 
qualities, hence my label “physicalistic dualism” as opposed to non-physicalistic 
dualism, according to which qualia naturally supervene on physical properties, 
hence they form a kind distinct from the kind of physical properties. 
In favor of (3), the Schlickian and Russellian consciousness-brain state iden-
tity theory: contrary to supervenient physicalism and parallelism, such identity 
theories can explain the causal efficacy of the consciousness easily: phenome-
nal property instantiations are on the same ontological level as the non-phenom-
enal property instantiations, and they are not adjoined by parallelly instantiat-
ed non-phenomenal properties; hence their causal efficacy is not called into 
question.
(1), (2) and (3) are all supported by (4) structuralism about physical concepts. 
Structuralism, however, is laid out in various ways by Schlick, Russell and Chal-
mers. In the next section I will discuss these different accounts of structuralism 
in more detail.
II. SCHLICK’S VIEWS ON THE NOTION OF THE „PHYSICAL”  
IN THE ALLGEMEINE ERKENNTNISLEHRE
Schlick’s views on the “physical” are quite complex, hence I find it enlighten-
ing to present it from diverse angles, i.e. by presenting Schlick’s views on the 
meaning of scientific physical terms, his views on the concept of the “physical” 
and his account of the methods of constructing scientific physical terms.
According to Schlick, the meaning of scientific physical concepts is the conceptual 
role implicitely defined by the axioms of the relevant physical theories. For ex-
ample, the meaning of electric field “E”: the conceptual role “E” plays in the 
Maxwell-equations. Schlick’ model was Hilbert’s conception of the meaning of 
geometrical concepts: the implicit definition by the axioms of geometry. An impor-
tant characteristic of such an account, which is underlined by Schlick, that no 
appeal is made to any intuitive element in the definition. Schlick applied this idea to 
interpreting the meaning of theoretical physical terms (e.g. of physical space, time, 
mass, charge etc.), also emphasizing the essentially non-intuitive character of 
the content of these concepts.
As for the nature of the “physical”: on Schlick’s understanding, the “physical” is 
a system of concepts, not a metaphysical category. “Reality is called ʽphysical’ in so far 
as it is designated by means of the spatio-temporal quantitative conceptual system of nat-
ural science” (Schlick 1918/1925/1985. 294). Hence, Schlick contends, a physical 
entity is not an extended and quality-less entity (as according to Democritus or 
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Descartes).5 The natural world consists of variegated qualities, among them sub-
jective, experiential qualities, accessible to consciousness and non-subjective, 
non-experiential qualities, not accessible to consciousness, which depend on 
each other in law-like ways.
The method of constructing scientific physical concepts is laid out by and large as 
follows. We obtain scientific physical conceptual systems in several steps. 
Step 1. Determining intersubjective qualitative concepts, from the subjective 
sensory experiences directed at the same (Ding an sich) entity.
Step 2. Determining quantitive relations between the properties identified by 
the intersubjective qualitative concepts.
Step 3. Introducing a theory that explains the quantitive relations (identified 
in step 2.), such that its theoretical terms are characterized exclusively by 
non-intuitive/non-experiential quantitative features.
We may illuminate these steps by two examples, by the construction of the 
concept of physical space and of thermodynamical concepts. The notion of objective 
physical space is of fundamental importance for Schlick, since physical spatial 
location plays a role in the construction of all scientific physical concepts. The 
steps are the following:
Step 1. Obtaining the concepts of objective, Ding an sich space-points from the 
points of subjective sensory spaces, e.g. the visual field, by the method of 
coincidences: i.e. by correlating an objective (Ding an sich) point to the sin-
gularities of the sensory intuitive fields (e.g. the visual experience of a finger 
pointing to a location on a blackboard) of different subjects observing the 
same (Ding an sich) objects (viz. the finger and the blackboard).6
Step 2. Determining quantitive relations between the points of objective space 
(e.g. the notions of distance, interval).
As for thermodynamical concepts: 
Step 1. Determining intersubjective qualitative concepts of thermodynamics: 
pressure, volume, temperature. (As for temperature: correlating the subjec-
tive thermal sensations of observers with thermometer readings – the length 
of the mercury rod; as for pressure: correlating the subjective pressure sensa-
tions of observers with pressure-meter readings.)
5  Schlick 1918/1925/1985. 293.
6  Cf. Schlick 1918/1925/1985. 272 ff. 
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Step 2. Determining quantitive relations between such intersubjective qualita-
tive concepts, i.e. between pressure, temperature and volume (for example, 
the gas law: PV/T=const.)
Step 3. Introducing the non-qualitative quantitative concepts of microscopic par-
ticles with mass, velocity, location, number, kinetic energy, and explaining 
the quantitative relations between the intersubjective qualitative concepts in 
terms of these quantitative concepts, e.g. the number of particles hitting the wall 
in a time unit and mean kinetic energy.
As a consequence of the general features of such method of construction, the 
resulting (scientific) physical concepts are purely quantitative. And, Schlick contends, 
by these quantitative concepts we can identify all qualities of the natural world; both 
the experiential/ phenomenal qualities with which we are acquainted, and the 
non-phenomenal ones with which we are not.
As for the concepts of microphysical entities: atoms or electrons are accounted 
for as bundles of interconnected (microphysical) qualities, like mass, charge etc. 
Thus, we are not acquainted with the qualities of such theoretical physical entities 
(and hence with microphysical entities), but we can be identify them by the quanti-
tive physical concepts the meanings of which are determined by implicit definitions, 
i.e. by their „role” in the relevant physical laws. Hence the theoretical physical 
concepts involve no reference to the qualities of the natural entities – but this does not 
imply that natural entities have no qualities. As Schlick formulates: qualities are 
absent from the physical description of Nature, not from Nature itself.
Such a view may by dubbed as structuralist in the following respects: scien-
tific physical concepts do not appeal to the intrinsic qualities of physical prop-
erties, and their meaning is the conceptual role they play in certain physical law 
statements, which themselves express relations between physical entities, not 
their intrinsic qualities. 
III. SCHLICK’S MOTIVATIONS AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT
After briefly canvassing the diverse aspects of Schlick’s notion of the “physical”, 
I shall address the philosophical context in which Schlick views emerged, and 
the question of what motivated his account. 
In general, it seems fair to characterize Schlick’s project as aiming at a rec-
onciliation of his complex empiricist epistemological theory with his external 
world realism. The main features of Schlick’s epistemological theory proposed 
in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, may be characterized briefly by the following 
features:
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(1)  According to Schlick’s general analysis of the concept of knowledge:
i.  Knowledge is never intuitive, it cannot be merely an act of intuition or „liv-
ing through” (erleben), nor some sort of unification between the object 
and subject of knowledge – not even in the case of our knowledge about 
the qualities of phenomenal experiences.
ii.  Knowledge is always mediated by concepts; it is always a matter of compar-
ing, fitting into a system.
iii.  Knowledge is a re-identification of an already known object as something 
else.
(2) Knowledge about the external world must be “anchored” in sensory experi-
ence.
(3)  Physical knowledge is knowledge gained through the application of physical 
theories and methods.
i.  The characterization of physical knowledge must be based on the investi-
gation of physical science, on the reconstruction of the creation/construc-
tion of scientific physical concepts.
ii.  The meaning of theoretical physical concepts: the conceptual role implicitely 
defined by the axioms of physical theories.
iii. The advancement of physical knowledge progresses from the subjec-
tive/“perspectival”/qualitative perceptual experiences towards the – 
more and more – objective/“perspectiveless”/quantitative theoretical 
descriptions of the phenomena.7 
Schlick’s external world realism was in important respects close to a version of 
critical realism, propounded earlier by Alois Riehl.8 Accordingly, the Ding an sich 
world outside consciousness exists and certain aspects of it can be known; gen-
uine scientific knowledge is about the nature of the external, Ding an sich world.
Schlick’s theory of knowledge aims at integrating his external world realism 
with his empiricist epistemology the following way. It is admitted that we have 
no direct knowledge of the external world; but this is not a problem, for we have 
no direct knowledge about anything else either (there is no intuitive knowl-
edge whatsoever). But we do know that there is an external world (based philo-
sophical arguments directed against immanence philosophies), and we also have 
knowledge about (certain aspects of) it, along the way Schlick’s general theory 
of knowledge and his account of physical concepts describe it.
7  “Perspectival” and “perspectiveless” in the sense of Nagel's use of these terms in Nagel 
1986.
8  See Riehl 1887, Heidelberger 2006.
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IV. RUSSELL’S UNDERSTANDING OF PHYSICAL-
CONCEPT-STRUCTURALISM
Russell advocated structuralism about physical concepts mainly in his Russel-
lian monist period, e.g. in The Analysis of Matter (1927) and in Human Knowledge 
(1948) but he formulated structuralist views already earlier, in the Introduction to 
Mathematical Philosophy (1919), and even in The Problems of Philosophy (1912). His 
brand of structuralism was markedly different from Schlick’s as the following 
quotes attest. 
There has been a great deal of speculation in traditional philosophy which might have 
been avoided if the importance of structure, and the difficulty of getting behind it, 
had been realised. For example, it is often said that space and time are subjective, but they 
have objective counterparts; or that phenomena are subjective, but are caused by things in them-
selves, which must have differences inter se corresponding with the differences in the phenomena 
to which they give rise. Where such hypotheses are made, it is generally supposed that 
we can know very little about the objective counterparts. In actual fact, however, if 
the hypotheses as stated were correct, the objective counterparts would form a world having the 
same structure as the phenomenal world, and allowing us to infer from phenomena the truth of 
all propositions that can be stated in abstract terms and are known to be true of phenomena. If 
the phenomenal world has three dimensions, so must the world behind phenomena; 
if the phenomenal world is Euclidean, so must the other be; and so on. In short, every 
proposition having a communicable significance must be true of both worlds or of 
neither: the only difference must lie in just that essence of individuality which always 
eludes words and baffles description, but which, for that very reason, is irrelevant to 
science. (Russell 1919. 61; my emphasis.)
Thus it would seem that, wherever we infer from perceptions, it is only structure that 
we can validly infer; and structure is what can be expressed by mathematical logic, 
which includes mathematics (Russell 1927. 254).
 
The only legitimate attitude about the physical world seems to be one of complete 
agnosticism as regards all but its mathematical properties (Russell 1927. 270).
In order to illuminate Russell’s conception we have to clarify some of his funda-
mental notions, namely: intrinsic properties are first-order properties of entities, 
both monadic and relational. Structural properties are second- or higher-order 
formal-mathematical properties of intrinsic properties. Physical concepts refer 
to structural properties of physical (i.e. external worldly) objects, that is to sec-
ond- or higher-order formal-mathematical properties of them. Some examples 
of intrinsic properties may be: the location of perceptual events in phenomenal 
space and time; colour qualities; relations of colours as e.g. colour distance, col-
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our temperature; location in physical space, relations between spatial points, e.g. 
distance.
Structural properties are the abstract, mathematico-logical properties of these 
intrinsic properties such as reflexivity, symmetry or a transitivity (for example, 
the similarity of colour qualities is symmetrical and intransitive). These abstract 
structural properties, Russell emphasizes, say nothing about the intrinsic nature 
of the properties they are properties of; hence a colour-space and a sound-space 
may have the same abstract structural properties.
Very briefly, Russell’s argues for his structuralist understanding of physical 
concepts as follows. According to Votsis’ (2004) reconstruction, Russell’s argu-
ments are based on the Helmholtz-Weyl principle and the Mirroring Relations 
principle. According to the Helmholtz-Weyl Principle “we assume that differing 
percepts have differing stimuli” (The Analyis of Matter. 255). In short, different 
effects (i.e. percepts) imply different causes (i.e. stimuli/physical objects). The Mirroring 
Relations Principle asserts that “(…) the relations which physics assumes (…) 
are not identical with those which we perceive (…) but merely correspond with 
them in a manner which preserves their logical (mathematical) properties” (The 
Analyis of Matter. 252). In short, relations between percepts mirror (i.e. have the 
same mathematical properties as) relations between their non-perceptual causes.
From these principles, Russell’s thesis apparently follows, according to which 
the structural properties of the external world are knowable, and the scien-
tific physical concepts grasp these structural properties. As it is well-known, 
Newman (1928) formulated an objection asserting that Russell’s structuralism 
is near-vacous,9 but I will not address this topic here, since my aim is not the 
evaluation of Russell’s view but its reconstruction and comparison with other 
structuralist views. 
V. RUSSELL’S CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION
Russell’s motivation for advocating structuralism about physical concepts was 
similar to Schlick’s: his goal may also be seen as to reconcile external world 
realism with an epistemology with strong empiricist leanings.10 Russell was an 
external world realist from 1898 (since his break with idealism) – though, of 
9  According to objection, in case the cardinality of the physical objects and the percepts 
representing them is the same, then the existence of a concrete structure of the physical 
entities isomorphic with the concrete structure of the percepts (which represent the physical 
entities) follows simply from set theory, hence it provides no empirical information about the 
properties of the physical objects (except for their cardinality).
10  Russell’s attitude towards empiricism was not so unambiguous as Schlick’s. Until around 
1912 Russell was a platonist concerning logic and mathematics, further he accepted the ex-
istence of universals and also held that some universals are known directly by acquaintance. 
These are, of course, no empiricist views.
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course, his ontological views changed greatly from his early extreme ontological 
pluralism towards his later more modest realism. In 1914 he abandoned external 
world realism in favor of phenomenalism – in e.g. Our Knowledge of the External 
World (1914); The Relation of Sense Data to Physics (1915) etc. –, but then 
again he switched back to external world realism (Introduction to Mathematical 
Philosophy [1919]; The Analysis of Matter [1927]; Human Knowledge [1948]). On 
the other hand, Russell advocated the principle of acquaintance since 1905, accord-
ing to which „whenever a relation of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to 
which the supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or 
judging must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted” (Knowl-
edge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description [1910]). The principle 
can be viewed as a linguistic grounding of the Cartesian demand for certain 
knowledge by a meaningfulness criterion: only such statements are meaningful 
which can be known, in principle, with certainty. Further, after returning to re-
alism from phenomenalism Russell advocated a causal-representational theory 
of perception: perceptual experiences are caused by the external objects, which 
they represent.
These views, however, seem to be prima facie in conflict. For on the one hand, 
the content of perceptual sentences are external objects and properties, but on 
the other, according to the principle of acquaintance, for a sentence to count 
as possibly expressing knowledge, its terms must refer to objects with which 
we are acquainted; but we are not acquainted with external objects, only with 
sense data or percepts (plus universals). Russell’s solution to this problem is the 
following. We do not know the intrinsic qualities of the objective world, since 
our perceptual experiences of the external world screen them off (the veil of 
experience). But we can know the structural properties of the external world. For 
we can know the structural properties of our percepts, since they are abstract, 
second-order properties of the intrinsic properties of our percepts with which 
we are acquainted. And the structural properties of our percepts are isomorphic 
with structural properties of those objective, external (extra-mental) events that 
are spatio-temporarily continous with our percepts and cause them. Further, 
knowledge claims about the structural properties of the external objects can be 
formulated meaningfully because we know these structural properties, since they are 
isomorphic with the structural properties of our percepts, and we know the latter 
by relying on our acquaintance knowledge about the intrinsic properties of our 
percepts.
As it is well-known, Russell then abandoned his Platonism due to the influence of Witt-
genstein. However, his later views concerning universals were still ambiguous. Nonetheless 
it is evident that his interest turned towards empirical sciences and the nature of empirical 
knowledge. Further, that his analysis of the meaning of sentences about the external world 
may be seen as expressing an empiricist attitude, due to its being constrained by the principle 
of acquaintance, which may be seen as (a partly) empiricist criterion of meaningfulness. 
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VI. PHYSICAL-CONCEPT-STRUCTURALISM BY CHALMERS
Among the contemporary advocates of physical-concept-structuralism the dom-
inant view is that microphysical terms are causal-role concepts.11 A characteristic 
representative of such views is Chalmers’ account: according to him, physical 
concepts – among them microphysical concepts – describe the functional/causal 
role their referents play. For example, the meaning of “mass” is to be understood 
as: the property that plays the “mass-role”, i.e. an entity having the property of 
mass causes other entities also having mass to move in certain ways, and other 
entities having mass cause it to move in certain ways. (Somewhat more precise-
ly: an entity having mass m1, in the neighbourhood of another entity having mass 
m2, behaves (moves, exerts force) in accordance with the equation F =km1m2/r
2).
Such an account of microphysical concepts can be accommodated both with 
Chalmers current Russellian monist views, and his earlier non-physicalist nat-
uralist property-dualist view (proposed in The Conscious Mind, 1996). According 
to the former some microphysical concepts refer to micro-phenomenal quali-
ties or proto-phenomenal qualities identifying them by their causal role (not by 
their micro-phenomenal qualities). According to the latter, they refer only to 
non-phenomenal microphysical qualitities.
Chalmers’ motivation for structuralism about physical concepts, in contrast 
with Schlick and Russell (and Maxwell), was not the goal of reconciling external 
world realism and empiricist epistemology. Such a reconcilition was a real task for 
Schlick or Russell, partly because external world realism was a real issue for 
them; phenomenalism and different versions of neo-Kantianism were serious 
11  Among the contemporaries or near contemporaries, Grover Maxwell’s view is histor-
ically very significant as it represents an important link in the story leading from Russell’s 
physical-concept-structuralism towards the contemporary Russellian views, which all take 
physical concepts to be causal-role concepts. Maxwell held, similarly to Russell, that all phys-
ical concepts are theoretical concepts (all entities not given to the mind are theoretical entities). 
But, contrary to Russell, he interpreted the meaning of theoretical terms in the framework 
of the Ramsey-sentence account of the meaning of theoretical terms. Accordingly, theoretical 
terms have reference, and their reference is determined indirectly, by their role in the network of 
the causal (and logical) relations expressed by the physical theory, i.e. “by description”. Thus 
theoretical terms, hence all physical terms, refer to external objects, which are identified by their 
structural properties. But at the same time, the identifying descriptions of physical terms con-
tain only terms with the reference of which we are acquainted (viz. only terms referring to the 
phenomenal qualities and to logical relations which appear in the Ramsey-sentence), in line 
with what Russell’s principle of acquaintance demands.
Accordingly, we cannot know any intrinsic properties of physical events by direct obser-
vation, i.e. by acquaintance, the whole physical world is unobservable. But by description, i.e. 
with our physical theories we can obtain knowledge about certain properties of the physical 
world, namely the structural (higher-order) properties of physical events. These structural 
properties are the causal roles of the physical events. In general, all theoretical physical concepts 
are causal role concepts, according to Maxwell. More specifically, brain event concepts like 
“c-fibre firing” are also causal-role concepts, which refer to a causal structure which a certain 
event-complex of the c-fibre regions of the brain possesses (see Maxwell 1979).
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contenders in the early 20th century when they formulated their structuralist 
views; and an epistemology according to which knowledge must be anchored in 
perceptually observable facts was not readily reconcilable with it. 
However, the later developments in philosophy of science and analytic met-
aphysics in the 20th century reshaped the theoretical context in such a way that 
the original formulation of problem became obsolete. With the idea, advocated 
by the logical empiricists, that the best available knowledge about the physical 
world is provided by physical science, which need not and cannot be be justified 
from without, by a special philosophical epistemology, and with realism about the 
content of physical theories, the original question was overcome. So what, then, 
were the sources and motivations of Chalmers’ structuralism?
One motivation may have been that structuralism about microphysical con-
cepts underlies Russellian monism, which, according to Chalmers, facilitates 
a more adequate account of the consciousness-brain relation then the alterna-
tives (namely that it solves the problem of mental causation and answers the 
conceivability argument). It is worth remarking that while other proponents of 
physical-concept-structuralism also recognized this implication, it was not their 
main motivation for accepting it; it was rather taken as a further bonus for those 
wishing for a naturalistic account of the consciousness-brain relation.
However, some further motivations may be unearthed from Chalmers’ works. 
It seems Chalmers’ microphysical-concept-structuralism is based on what we 
may call as the functional analysis thesis: 
(FA) The meaning of all physical concepts, viz. micro- and macrophysical, chemical, 
biological and cognitive psychological concepts is provided by a functional analysis 
which identifies the causal role of the denotatum of the terms.
So if the general (FA) thesis is justified, so is microphysical-concept-structural-
ism. But what are the sources and the support for the functional analysis thesis? 
In my view, these may be the following: 
A. (FA) may be based on Chalmers’ account of the meaning of natural kind terms.
B. (FA) may help to explain why the ontology of the physical has a layered structure.
And perhaps also
C. (FA) may be based on the „Canberra Plan”.
Let’s see these in turn.
A. The meaning of natural kind terms. In my view, one source of Chalmers’ un-
derstanding of the meaning of microphysical concepts is his theory of meaning 
of natural kind terms. Prima facie, there is a plausible connection here; after all, 
if there are natural kinds at all, electron or charge seem obviously candidates for 
being natural kinds.
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Chalmers’ semantic theory about natural kind terms may be seen as a synthe-
sis of Kripkean and Fregean insights. The gist of these views may be illustrated 
roughly as follows.12 According to Kripke, the meaning of “water” is: the sub-
stance that has those essential properties (in this case: chemical consitution) which 
that substance has which plays the “water-role” in our world. According to the 
Fregean view: “water” is the substance which plays the “water-role” whatever 
it(s constitution) may be. Chalmers embraces both these aspects of meaning in 
his two-dimensional semantics, expressing it by the concepts of primary and 
secondary intension. According to the primary intension, “water” is the sub-
stance that which plays the “water-role” in world w, considering w as actual. 
According to the secondary intension, “water” is the substance that which plays 
the “water-role” in world w, considering w as counterfactual. Now, if electron 
is a natural kind, then accordingly the secondary intension of “electron” is: the 
entity that which actually plays the “electron-role”, in all worlds. (As for the 
primary intension, the issue is more controversial: for it may be argued that in 
the case of fundamental microphysical types such as electron, the “role” and the 
intrinsic property which it identifies are necessarily connected so that it is not 
possible that the “electron-role” is played by some property different from that 
which is the realizer of the role in our world – unlike in the case of “water” and 
other higher-level types.)
Some doubts, however, may be raised about such an extension of the theory 
of meaning. For the theory of natural kind terms of Kripke, and also of Chalm-
ers, relies on the ordinary language use of such terms, and some related metaphysical 
and semantic intuitions and arguments: i.e. on a piece of analytic metaphysics. But it 
is questionable whether the meaning microphysical terms can be adequately 
based on such grounds. 
In other words, the theory of meaning Chalmers extends to microphysical terms 
(like “electron”, “proton”, “charge”, “spin”) is originally about macrophysical or 
chemical kind terms (“water”, “gold”) or macro-biological kind terms (“tiger”). 
But is such an extension readily acceptable? Kripke himself did not indicate much 
how his theory should be applied to theoretical terms. There are certain problems 
with the application of Kripke’s account of the meaning of natural kind terms to 
the meaning of theoretical terms like microphysical terms (cf. e.g. with Papineau 
1996) and these problems may be inherited by Chalmers' account of microphysi-
cal terms. However, I shall not pursue this issue here any further. 
B. (FA) helps to explain why the ontology of the physical has a layered structure. Another 
source of support for the (FA) thesis may be the supposition that if we accept 
(FA) then we have an explanation of the layered ontological structure of physi-
12  Chalmers 1996, Chalmers 2006a.
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cal phenomena, which Chalmers accepts (in line with the widespread view). For 
Chalmers hold that 
(1) All higher-order physical properties (i.e. chemical, biochemical, biological, cogni-
tive psychological) are metaphysically determined by the microphysical properties. 
And
(2) Every physical property is metaphysically determined by properties one level 
below; these determining properties are also metaphysically determined by other 
properties one level below them; and a fortiori, until the lowest (micro)physical level 
which is not determined by anything under it, these are the ultimate fundamental 
properties.13
This layered structure of metaphysical determination is explicated by Chalmers, 
relying on the (FA) functional analysis thesis as follows. Of any property Pn on 
level n a reductive explanation can be given, namely: there exists another property 
Pn-1 (or a set of properties Pn-1
1,…, Pn-1
m), on level n-1 which satisfies the functional 
description of Pn, viz. it realizes the causal role associated with Pn. This is so down 
until the lowest level; but of P0, the property realizing the causal role of P1, a 
functional analysis cannot be given, P0 is an irreducible ultimate quality. 
Now, relying on this account we may obtain a justification of (FA), in the 
following way: if (FA) is true, then the layeredness of the ontology of the physical 
can be well explicated relying on (FA). That is, we can explicate how microphys-
ical properties metaphysically determine higher-level physical properties. The 
explanation is provided by the level-by-level reductive explanations of Pn-s by 
Pn-1-s, (i.e. Pn-1-s realizing the causal roles of Pn-s) which is enabled by the as-
sumption that all Pn-s (expect for P0) have a functional analysis. Although this is 
not a conclusive argument in favour of (FA), nonetheless it provides strong support 
for it (especially if there is no alternative explicatory conception).
There is, however, a problem with such a justification. This argument in sup-
port of the (FA) thesis may work only if (1), the claim that higher-level physical 
properties metaphysically supervene of on microphysical ones, is independently justi-
fied. But this seems not so. For Chalmers argues for (1) by an (in)conceivability 
argument. Briefly: if we set all microphysical facts, then it is inconceivable that 
some higher-level physical fact would be different from what it actually is. (An 
example of such a scenario may be: if we set all microphysical facts of the world 
then it is not conceivable that a particular wombat having in actual fact two off-
springs, could have only one, or three; see Chalmers 1996. 73).
But why would it be inconceivable that there may be higher-level physical 
properties which are not fixed by the microphysical properties? Because Chal-
mers denies the existence of emergent physical properties which are not determined 
13  Cf. e.g. Chalmers 1996. 43–46, Chalmers–Jackson 2001.
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metaphysically (i.e. not entailed a priori) by the microphysical properties. The 
problem is, however, that Chalmers seems to ground the exclusion of such high-
er-order emergent physical properties on the (FA) thesis, together with the further 
idea based on (FA), according to which all properties can be reductively explained 
in terms of one level lower properties. For if a property is reductively explainable 
in terms of properties one level below, then this is tantamount to the claim that 
the lower-level property implies, logically determines the higher-level one. Hence 
there is no such logical possibility that the lower-level property is instantiated 
while the higher-level property does not; hence such a scenario is inconceivable.
But then, Chalmers’ inconceivability argument for (1) the metaphysical super-
venience thesis, relies on (FA), the functional analysis thesis. Hence the justifi-
cation of (FA) cannot be that (1) the metaphysical supervenience thesis can be 
well explicated by the (FA), since such justification would require that the truth 
of (1) does not depend on (FA) – but it does, it seems.
There is also another formulation of the argument for the metaphysical super-
venience of all higher-level physical facts on microphysical facts is provided in 
Chalmers-Jackson 2001. Accordingly, PQTI, the conjuction of all microphysical 
(P), phenomenal (Q), that’s all (T) and indexical (I) truths implies M, where M 
is any arbitrary macrophysical truth, like e.g. „Water is H2O”, or „Water is to be 
found in lakes on Earth” etc.14 
PQTI implies M, because
(1) PQTI implies complete information (in the language of physics) about the struc-
ture, dynamics, composition and distribution of macroscopic systems.
(2) This information about the structure, dynamics, composition and distribution of 
macroscopic systems, and appearance implies ordinary macroscopic truth, such as M.
So, for example „Water is H2O” is implied by PQTI (in particular by P, the com-
plete set of microphysical facts).
According to Chalmers, such a justification for the thesis that microphysical 
facts (P) imply all macrohysical facts is that the thesis is „extremely plausible”. 
So, we may ask, why is this thesis extremely plausible?
i. One support for the „extreme plausibility” claim is that Chalmers rejects 
that there is downward causation from higher-level physical states to microphys-
ical states. If we allowed for a downward causal capacity of some higher-level 
physical properties then the entailment thesis would fail. In „Strong and Weak 
14  Here I will not address the particular issues which were debated between Chalmers 
and Jackson with Block and Stalnaker, i.e. whether the explicit definability of the concepts 
of higher-level properties in terms of microphysical concepts are required for the entailment 
thesis to hold (Block–Stalnaker 1999, Chalmers–Jackson 2001). I am not concerned with this 
issue here, because the worries I discuss seem to be grounded even if we accept Chalmers’ 
position in this debate.
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Supervenience” (2006b) Chalmers contends that downward causation is not log-
ically impossible, however, there is no empirical evidence for it, so he is sceptical 
about it. So, accordingly, Chalmers’ view is that the metaphysical supervenience 
thesis has a strong empirical support.
ii. Second, Chalmers also argues as follows: 
(the information in P) includes complete information about the structure and dynamics 
of the world at the microphysical level: in particular in includes or implies the complete 
truth about the spatio-temporal position, velocity and mass of microphysical entities. 
This information suffices in turn to imply information about the structure and dynamics 
of the world at the macroscopic level, at least insofar as this structure adn dynamics can 
be captured in terms of spatiotemporal structure (position, velocity, shape, etc.) and 
mass distribution. For example, for any given region of space and time, the information 
in P implies information about the mass density in the region, the mass density in vari-
ous subregions, the causal connections among various complex configurations of matter 
in the region, and the extent to which the matter in the region behaves or disposed to 
behave as a coherent system. (…) The central point here is that a macroscopic descrip-
tion of the world in the language of physics is implied by a microscopic description 
of the world in the language of physics. Such a thesis is extremely plausible: it is not 
subject to any worries about the translation between vocabularies, and involves only a 
change in scale. (Chalmers–Jackson 2001. 330.)
So the extreme plausibility is based on the idea the microscopic and macroscop-
ic objects and states of affairs are characterized by the same kinds of properties 
(with the concepts of “spacetime position”, “velocity”, “mass” having the same 
meaning both in the micro and macro descriptions). However, even if we ac-
cept this account of the relation between the macroscopic and the microscopic 
descriptions of the world in the language of physics (which may be questioned 
cf. e.g. Block-Stalnaker), it is clear that biological properties of macroscopic bi-
ological systems (i.e. complex macrophysical systems) are not described in the 
language physics; so that all biological facts are implied by the microscopic de-
scription of the world is not obvious. Here again, the (FA) thesis may come 
to the rescue. For provided there is a functional description of the biological 
property, then according to Chalmers’ assumption it is in principle possible to 
find some biochemical properties satisfying this causal/functional description, 
and then some lower-level chemical properties satisfying the causal roles of the 
biochemical properties, a fortiori until we get to the level where the realizer 
properties are described in the language of physics. But then, it seems, in order 
to support the general metaphysical supervenience thesis about physical phe-
nomena, according to which all higher-level physical facts are metaphysically 
determined by the microphysical facts, we again relied on the (FA) thesis, so the 
metaphysical supervenience thesis is not independently justified.
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C. The Justification of (FA) in line with the „Canberra Plan”?
Just to mention very briefly a further possible support for the (FA) thesis: 
Chalmers and Jackson also advocated a general metaphysical programme, the 
so-called „Canberra Plan”, according to which all concepts, not only scientific 
physical concepts but also folk concepts, ought to be constructed in the way 
theoretical physical concepts are. Accordingly not only „charge” is what actu-
ally plays the „charge-role”, but also „free will” is what actually plays the „free 
will role”, and „Gödel” who actually plays the „Gödel-role”. So if it were true 
that for all terms a corresponding causal-functional concept can be provided, 
according to the methods of the Canberra Plan, then this may provide support 
for the (FA) thesis such that it does not rely implicitly on the thesis according 
to which microphysical truths (or the PQTI) logically entail all higher-level 
physical truths.
I think, however, that no further support is available for the (FA) thesis from 
this direction, since the Canberra Plan is an extension of the (FA) thesis to other 
kinds of concepts beyond the theoretical physical concepts. Further, it seems, such 
extension leaves untouched the objections against (FA) formulated above. 
To sum up: we have seen that Chalmers’ view about the meaning of physical 
concepts comes from a very different background, theoretical framework than Schlick’s 
and Russell’s. Further, that Chalmers’ arguments for his version of physical-con-
cept-structuralism have their own problems, namely: 
(1) It is not unambiguous that the theory of meaning about ordinary (macrophysical 
or macrobiological) natural kind terms (“water”, “gold”, “tiger”) is readily applicable 
to microphysical terms.
(2) The argument for (FA) based on the layered ontology of the physical seems ques-
tion-begging.
(3) The Canberra Plan does not provide a further justification of (FA), since it is an 
extension of it to other (not physical) concepts.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE VIRTUES OF SCHLICK  
OVER RUSSELL AND CHALMERS
Since the content, background and motivation of Schlick’s, Russell’s and Chal-
mers’ structuralism about physical concepts are rather different, it is difficult 
to give an evaluative comparison of them. Therefore I focus instead on some 
virtues Schlick’s account may have over the others’.
The general method of determining the meaning of physical concepts. Schlick grounds 
his theory about the meaning of theoretical physical concepts on the reconstruction 
of the actual methods of concept formation in physical sciences. Russell, in con-
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trast, bases his account on a specific philosophical theory of perception, and also 
on a strong philosophical epistemological constraint, expressed by the principle 
of acquaintance. This seems too restrictive, and further, it is in opposition with 
Schlick’s general approach, according to which scientific knowledge need not and 
cannot be justified from without, by philosophy. As for Chalmers: he bases his account 
on a conceptual analysis grounded in ordinary and philosophical (metaphysical, 
linguistic and epistemological) intuitions, in the vein of contemporary analytic 
metaphysics.
The explanation of why physics do not grasp the intrinsic qualities of natural phenomena. 
Schlick explains more plausibly why scientific physical concepts do not involve the 
qualities of their referents. This is a consequence of the general features of scien-
tific physical concept formation; i.e. it simply follows from the proposition that 
theoretical physical descriptions are purely quantitative, they leave out qualities 
from the description of nature, but not from nature itself. For Russell this is a 
consequence of his quasi-Cartesian account of the perception-world relation, 
according to which perceptual experiences screen off the intrinsic properties 
external objects. This seems too a restrictive. (Note also, that this formulation of 
“screening off” would be nonsensical according Schlick, a sort of category-mis-
take.) According to Chalmers, all physical concepts can be functionally analysed, 
and functional descriptions eo ipso leave out the qualities of their referents. But 
the functional analysis thesis seems not sufficiently supported.
Explaining (away) dualistic intuitions. The meaning of scientific physical concepts 
involve no appeal to qualia; hence the intuitiveness of qualia not being phys-
ical. But scientific physical concepts may nonetheless refer to qualia – hence 
the explaining away of the intuition. (Note that this way of explaining away 
dualistic intuitions is not a refutation of property-dualism, rather its acceptance, as it 
accepts the reality of qualia on a par with non-phenomenal physical qualities. So 
it is rather the refutation of non-physicalistic property-dualism, according to which 
qualia naturally supervene on non-phenomenal physical properties, and the vin-
dication of physicalistic property-dualism, according to which qualia are on the same 
ontological level as non-phenomenal physical qualities.
So we may conclude that Feigl was right, the views of Schlick and Russell 
(and we may add: Chalmers) are in fact in a remarkable agreement: they all accept 
(1) linguistic physicalism; (2) physicalist dualist property-pluralism; (3) a du-
al-language account of the consciousness-brainstate identity thesis, i.e. Austrian 
or Russellian identity theory; and that (4) structuralism about physical concepts 
play a substantive role in the grounding of (1)-(3). However, they also important-
ly differ in how they lay out the structuralist idea, both in content, context and 
motivation.
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FrieDrich staDler
Austrian Philosophy: Outlines of 
a Discipline at the University of Vienna 
in the 20th Century*
I. BACKGROUND
Since the foundation of the University of Vienna, the Faculty of Philosophy, as 
a “faculty of the arts”, had played a subordinate role – also as a field of study 
– in relation to the faculties of Medicine, Law and Theology.1 The Faculty con-
tinued to be instrumentalized as an ancilla by the respective prevailing powers 
until 1848. In predominantly Catholic Austria, Immanuel Kant’s philosophy was 
marginalized for being enlightening or revolutionary, and the position on the 
philosophy of German idealism was regarded as crucial to the development of 
a specifically “Austrian philosophy” after 1848. This happened in the spirit of 
an alleged Austrian Sonderweg (distinct course in Austria-Hungary) against each 
form of dialectic, transcendental and aprioristic philosophy of Prussian-German 
origin.2 But given the specific development in the monarchy, this very claim 
should be examined with a critical eye to increase the focus on Kant’s polariz-
ing or identity-defining role in proportion to the Austrian line of tradition ex-
tending from Bernard Bolzano through Robert Zimmermann and up to Franz 
Brentano and his influential school.3 There is no question that the Königsberg 
philosopher remained a reference until the heyday of the Vienna Circle and also 
thereafter. It was about answering the question of the autonomy and scientific 
nature of philosophy given the growing importance of individual disciplines of 
the cultural, social and natural sciences (including mathematics) in the mael-
strom of the second scientific revolution. From the beginning, the propaedeutic 
nature of the Faculty of Philosophy and the subordinate role of philosophy had 
in any case simultaneously prompted Kant’s appeal to revalue the “lower” fac-
ulty against the three “higher” ones due to its intrinsic formative aspect and the 
* This article is an abridged English version of Stadler 2015.
1  A descriptive overview is the unpublished dissertation of Wieser 1950.
2  Regarding the thesis of a typical “Austrian philosophy”: Lehrer et al. 1997.
3  On the relation of scientific philosophy and the Vienna Circle to (Neo-)Kantianism see 
Stadler 2015 and 2018.
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reflective reason versus the profession-oriented faculties for physicians, govern-
ment officials and theologians.4
If we characterize the philosophical scene at the University of Vienna during 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the mid-19th century to the end of the First 
World War, we can identify the following main lines:
– A marginal Hegelianism and a moderate Kantian tradition. 
– A predominantly anti-idealistic philosophy concerned with linguistic 
criticism, which was oriented towards empirical individual disciplines 
and spanned ideologically from the Catholic to the social-liberal (late-)
Enlightenment. The direction of empirical philosophy and psychology 
claiming exact methodology that took its origin from Brentano dominated 
towards the end of the 19th century; in the latter phase, up until the First 
World War, Ernst Mach prevailed with his teaching, which had an impact 
up until the inter-war period.
– At the same time, a diverse philosophical “counter world” of a metaphysical 
supreme discipline existed apart from actual research work.
If – despite all differentiation – we want to mention essential characteristics of 
“Austrian philosophy” in Vienna during the monarchy, we can certainly agree 
with Carl Siegel in noting a trend towards objectivism and realism from an epis-
temological and logical perspective (Siegel 1930). Schools, institutions and so-
cial movements make the contents and outlines of all these trends more under-
standable, which document a stronger presence of philosophy within the faculty 
and university.5
II. NEW BEGINNINGS IN THE FIRST AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC
Following the vacancies during the First World War (with the exception Adolf 
Stöhr), three chairs were filled at the same time in 1922. This represented an 
upswing, which was to secure Viennese philosophy and psychology being recog-
nized worldwide up until the time of the Austro-fascist Ständestaat (corporative 
state).
With this unique initiative, Moritz Schlick who was to become the centre 
of the world-famous Vienna Circle until his assassination at the university in 
June 1936 and also served as head of the Ernst Mach Society (1928–1934) con-
tinued the direction pursued since Mach and Boltzmann. On the other hand, 
the emerging developmental, experimental and cognitive psychology became 
established by 1938 with Karl Bühler and his wife Charlotte Bühler.
4  Kant 1798/1986; for a discussion of Kant’s late writing: Gerhardt 2005.
5  As general references: Meister 1927 and 1937; Bauer 1966; Benedikt 1992; Acham 1999.
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The history of philosophy and the tradition of transcendental philosophy 
continued to be systematically backed, also by Robert Reininger, within the 
Vienna Philosophical Society, later on covering the Austrian Kant-Gesellschaft. 
As of 1924, the history of ancient philosophy was further strengthened through 
Heinrich Gomperz’s appointment to the fourth chair before he had to leave his 
position early due to his opposition to the Schuschnigg regime. In 1935, his full 
professorship was converted into a tenure track assistant professorship to which 
the Catholic philosopher Dietrich von Hildebrand who came from Munich was 
appointed for two years until the “annexation”.
Alois Dempf who held this professorship from 1937 to 1938 until his dismiss-
al by the national socialists was called to succeed Schlick. This represented a 
markedly radical change of the tradition and denomination of Schlick’s chair 
for natural philosophy, which now became Catholic-oriented metaphysics and 
Christian Weltanschauung – a direction that again displayed continuity in terms 
of personnel and content after 1945 with Dempf’s return and the appointment 
of Leo Gabriel.
Among the external lecturers who attained their habilitation in the inter-war 
period, Sigmund Kornfeld, Hans Eibl, Karl von Roretz and Rudolf Carnap, who 
along with Schlick was to be found at the very core of the Vienna Circle before 
moving to Prague in 1931, are worth mentioning here. Friedrich Waismann, a 
student and long-term assistant of Schlick’s was able to work at the institute as 
a librarian until 1936 without being officially employed. He gave lectures on a 
regular basis and was a key member of the Vienna Circle, also as a dialogue part-
ner of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (McGuinness 1984).
Looking at the subject of philosophy at the Vienna University in concrete 
terms, we can see that the teaching faculty (altogether 22) during the period 
from 1918 to 1938 included Moritz Schlick who taught scientific and analytical 
philosophy as a full professor from 1922 to 1936, Rudolf Carnap as an outside 
lecturer and titular professor from 1926 to 1931 and Viktor Kraft as an outside 
lecturer and titular professor from 1914 to 1938. The most widely taught subject 
was history of philosophy, which along with ethics also drew the largest num-
ber of listeners. The already mentioned Philosophical Society of the University of 
Vienna was a crucial affiliated institution and simultaneously the local group of 
the Kant-Gesellschaft from 1927. Scientific philosophy accounted for about one 
seventh of the lectures held at the Philosophical Society as part of the Vienna 
International University Courses. If we focus on the discipline philosophy at 
the University of Vienna between 1918 and 1938 (Wieser 1950, 158, 231 and 
235 ff.), we can identify as proponents of scientific philosophy Moritz Schlick, 
Rudolf Carnap, and Viktor Kraft out of 22 teachers in total. The most frequent 
topics were history of philosophy together with ethics, both of which had also 
the largest attendance of students. In parallel, the Philosophische Gesellschaft an 
der Universität Wien (Philosophical Society at the University of Vienna), since 1927 
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also acting as the Austrian branch of the German Kant-Gesellschaft (Kant Socie-
ty), was an important and influential society covering a broad spectrum of philoso-
phical research (Reininger 1938. 21–43). As in the “Wiener Internationale Hoch-
schulkurse” (Vienna International University Lectures) only one seventh is to be 
judged as part of the scientific philosophy paradigm (Gabriel 1972. 8 and 14).
III. ON PHILOSOPHY DURING AUSTROFASCISM  
AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM
Schlick’s assassination on 22 June 19366 marked a de facto end to the then 
already world-famous Vienna Circle and to analytic philosophy in Austria before 
National Socialism caused a violent and definitive close to this philosophical 
movement.7 The consequences of the destruction and expulsion of this scien-
tific culture by the anti-Semitic forces at the University of Vienna continued to 
have an impact for a long time well into the Second Republic (Stadler 2005; Pas-
teur et.al. 2003–2004). After the Nazis seized power in March 1938, dismissals 
and expulsions in the spirit of the racist dictatorial state occurred, with support 
also coming from members of the University of Vienna.
Prior to the “annexation”, three chairs existed at the Institute of Philosophy. 
(As an overview: Benetka 1995. 338 ff.) These chairs were held by Alois Dempf, 
Robert Reininger and Karl Bühler.8 The changes due to the takeover of power 
by the National Socialists after March 1938 signaled the attempt of political and 
ideological “standardizing” but were also an expression of a polycratic science 
policy of National Socialists between the poles of Berlin and the “Ostmark”.9
Professor of Christian philosophy Alois Dempf’s venia docendi was withdrawn 
and he was forced to retire for political and ideological reasons. Due to his activ-
ities in Red Vienna and his Jewish wife Charlotte Bühler, Karl Bühler, founder 
of the Vienna school of cognitive and Gestalt psychology was also dismissed and 
forced to emigrate to the U.S.10 His long-standing coworker Egon Brunswik had 
emigrated to the US to Berkeley one year earlier, too, and was followed by his 
later wife Else Frenkel-Brunswik. We can thus speak of a total break at the Uni-
versity of Vienna in the case of the Bühler school. This break also meant the end 
6  On the background of this murder: Lotz 2009.
7  As a characterization of the preceding “conservative revolution”: Mohler 1972; on 
the expulsion of scientific philosophers and philosophers of science: Stadler 2010; on the 
intellectual migration in general: Stadler et al. 1995.
8  It has to be mentioned that psychology and pedagogy were linked together within a 
research and teaching field. Cf. Brezinka 2000; Olechowski 2015.
9  Heiss 2003; Huber et al. 2011; Huber 2012; Pfefferle 2014. Memory book for the victims 
of NS at the University of Vienna: < http://gedenkbuch.univie.ac.at > Last access 30-11-2018.
10  On the dismissal and forced migration of Karl and Charlotte Bühler: Ash 2004; Eschbach 
et al. 2004. On the consequences of the NS for psychology: Benetka et al. 1988. 147–167.
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of an innovative cooperation between philosophy and psychology (Karl Bühler 
and Moritz Schlick) as well psychoanalysis, which failed to gain a foothold as an 
academic discipline, and social research (as part of the Research Unit for Eco-
nomic Psychology around the Bühlers).11 It was during the National Socialist era 
that the psychologist Hubert Rohracher launched his career. Similar to Richard 
Meister in pedagogy, Rohracher worked for psychology and university politics 
well into the Second Republic. After the “annexation”, psycholinguist Friedrich 
Kainz was appointed provisional head of the Institute of Psychology and – as a 
successor to Dietrich von Hildebrand who was dismissed in March and emigra-
ted to the U.S. later – received the vacant tenure track position as an associate 
professor for philosophy with a particular focus on aesthetics and the psychology 
of language. (On Kainz in more detail: Heiss 1993.) Kainz is a typical example 
of an opportunist and wryneck who moved up the career ladder in the Second 
Republic (Tilitzky 2002. 778 ff.) and worked as a full professor for psychology of 
language, aesthetics, art philosophy and history of philosophy. (On the life and 
work of Kainz: Gelbmann 2004; Levelt 2014.)
Finally, reconstruction in the Nazi spirit was to be put into practice by electing 
Gunter Ipsen and Arnold Gehlen to the two chairs in philosophy: Karl Bühler’s 
chair was filled by SA and NSDAP member Ipsen who came from Königsberg 
on 22 May 1939 as professor for philosophy and ethnology (Philosophie und Volks-
lehre) and was appointed director of the Institute of Psychology in September 
1943. Expectations of a new philosophy for the purposes of the National So-
cialist expansion policy in the East and South East seem to have played a role 
just as the interdisciplinary perspective for National Socialism’s demographic 
policy ambitions. Since Ipsen was recruited to the military after the outbreak of 
the war, his field of action with regard to the expected philosophical and socio-
logical support of Ostforschung (research on the East) remained limited until 1945 
when he was dismissed from the University of Vienna like all Reichsdeutschen 
(Germans of the Reich). From November 1940, Robert Reininger who retired in 
1939 was succeeded by philosopher and sociologist Gehlen who had held the 
Kant chair in Königsberg since 1938 and was subsequently commissioned after 
the “annexation” by the Reich Ministry of Education to reorganize philosophy 
and the institutes of the Faculty of Philosophy in Vienna. Simultaneously, he 
took up the directorship of the Institute of Psychology in April 1940 and that of 
the Institute of Philosophy in 1942. He supported philosophical anthropology 
and the sociological approach in the context of the new Volksforschung (Volk re-
search). Hans Eibl’s extraordinary professorship was maintained even though 
he strongly urged that it be converted into a full professorship with the help of 
11  Regarding the Pedagogical Institute of the City of Vienna headed by Karl Bühler, and 
the linked research unit with Marie Jahoda and Paul Lazarsfeld see Benetka 1990.
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Dean Viktor Christian. Due to his strong involvement in National Socialism, he 
was obliged to retire early after 1945.
At the beginning of the Second Republic, the philosophers active prior to 
1938 who had not emigrated were recalled, and – after a delayed denazification 
which was terminated as of 1948 – the members of the institute active during 
the national socialist era were rehabilitated and put back into service. This is 
evident in the emerging careers of Erich Heintel and Friedrich Kainz. Between 
clerical restauration and a failed de-nazification, the way was paved for a con-
servative restauration of philosophy after 1945.
IV. PHILOSOPHY IN THE SECOND AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC BETWEEN  
PROVINCIALIZATION AND INTERNATIONALIZATION
Along the lines of the general political and cultural development at the beginning 
of the Second Republic, a characterization of the supreme discipline of philosophy 
along with psychology and pedagogy at the University of Vienna in the first dec-
ade after the Second World War can be described as a phenomenon of both con-
tinuity and disruption (Stadler 2004a). For a long time, the Faculty of Philosophy 
was an important organizational unit of the university in faculty dynamics and also 
had more than just subject-specific significance with the mandatory Philosophicum 
and the general standards in teacher training for secondary schools. (On doctor-
al studies and the Philosophicum: Meister 1958.) As programmatically signaled by 
the headline of a relevant journal, that’s where science and world view (Wissenschaft 
und Weltbild) was taught and transmitted. With the Wiener Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 
Psychologie und Pädagogik (Vienna Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy), the 
Fächerbündel (individual combinations of courses taken from different subjects) 
which also denoted the corresponding teacher training for the subject at secondary 
schools, the so-called Gymnasien (Philosophischer Einführungsunterricht; philosophi-
cal introduction lessons) was featured in another periodical. The biographies of the 
most important editors of these two journals  – Alois Dempf and Leo Gabriel at 
the one hand and Richard Meister and Hubert Rohracher on the other – allow us 
to reconstruct the development of these disciplines from the First to the Second 
Republic on the basis of various university appointments.
Here, we are confronted with considerable elite continuity, which is linked to 
the phenomenon of forced emigration and non-existent remigration in the con-
text of half-hearted denazification followed by the Cold War period. A critical 
examination of the individual disciplines was carried out relatively late (Fischer 
et al. 1993) after a deepening had been provoked in connection with exile and 
emigration research (Stadler 2004b).
As far as the correlated break is concerned, relevant research has already 
brought substantial findings to light: In the context of Vertriebene Vernunft (exiled 
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reason), innovative movements such as the Vienna Circle or the school of Gestalt 
and cognitive psychology, which have an international recognition up to this day, 
were expelled and destroyed (Ash 1995; Ash et al. 1996; Benetka 1995; Stadler 
1997/2001). An adequate description of philosophy, psychology and pedagogy at 
the University of Vienna during the period of “reconstruction” since the so-called 
zero hour (Stunde Null) is only possible against the backdrop of this dual history of 
science. The hardly practiced remigration is to be included in an overall assess-
ment just as the related “second wave” of emigration of a younger generation of 
philosophers from Vienna as a result of the dominance of a clerical-conservative 
culture. (Pasteur et al. 2003–2004; Österreich – Geistige Provinz? 1965.)
What needs to be noted from a gender perspective is that – unlike exiled 
philosophy – the proportion of women in home-grown philosophical activity was 
virtually zero after 1938 and 1945. This is also related to the fact that the pro-
portion of male and female philosophers of Jewish origin in philosophers forced 
to emigrate was relatively high prior to the ‘annexation’ (Frauen im Exil 2005; 
Stadler 1998; Korotin 1997; Ingrisch 2015).
In more recent studies, the social framework has been described as restau-
ration under the sway of the founding myth (Hanisch 1994). To be sure, the 
university-wide context as well as the general situation of philosophy, pedagogy 
and psychology in Austria represents a specific general frame of reference (Pre-
glau-Hämmerle 1986. 197 ff.; Gabriel et al. 1968; Haller 2004; Acham 2004, Vol. 
6.1; Benedikt et al. 2005, Vol. 5).
Only the most important developments can be discussed here (Korotin 1993–
1994; Leaman 1993–1994): Alois Dempf, who had published for a while even 
after his forced retirement, was able to resume his activities after the war in Vi-
enna (Heiss 1993. 138 ff.). He was called to the University of Munich in the year 
1948 but continued to work as a visiting professor in Vienna for several more 
years. Leo Gabriel who had already been active as a cultural official, teacher and 
instructor in adult education during Austro-fascism and had attained his habili-
tation in 1947, became Dempf’s successor to the chair, ensuring the continuity 
of political Catholicism at the university. With his holistic philosophy inspired 
by Othmar Spann – e.g., his Führertum und Gefolgschaft (1937) (leadership and 
followership) – as well as the all-embracing integral logic, he would also shape 
philosophy in Vienna for some decades to come. (As to the autobiographical 
description of Gabriel: Lotz-Rimbach 2004.) As mentioned earlier, Friedrich 
Kainz’s career continued to evolve steadily after 1945 until the crisis year of 1968 
(Heiss 1993. 145 f.; Rathkolb et al. 2010). After 1945, Viktor Kraft was the only 
member of the Vienna Circle who managed to resume his teaching and research 
activities after having been dismissed by the Nazis. In 1945 the university li-
brary was reactivated and he retired as national librarian two years later. In 1947, 
when Kraft was 67, he was appointed associate professor and finally full profes-
sor for philosophy from 1950 to 1952 – for almost two years until his retirement.
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During this time, Erich Heintel pursued his career. He attained his habil-
itation following the “annexation”, becoming a member of the NSDAP and 
lecturer of the new system (Dozent neuer Ordnung) for philosophy (metaphysics, 
epistemology, theory of value and ethics). Following an interruption for po-
litical reasons, he was able to lecture again in the 1949–1950 winter semester 
after having successfully applied for his venia docendi (authorization to teach) 
to be reissued. He was appointed associate professor in 1952 and full professor 
in 1960. With Gabriel and Heintel, both Christian existentialism and German 
idealism based on Protestant theology took root at the University of Vienna. 
Here, we have some sort of continuation of the polarization of the culture war 
during the inter-war period: From Gabriel’s and Heintel’s perspective, both 
Marxism and “positivism” were “labyrinths of philosophy”, which also reflec-
ted the view of the then minister of education Heinrich Drimmel (Knoll 1986. 
278; Vienna University Archives: UAW, PhF, FSP, 16.10.48; Weiss 2009). The 
Vienna Circle, pure theory of law and psychoanalysis continued to be regard-
ed as manifestations of a Jew-ridden liberalism and socialism (Topitsch 1967; 
König 2013; Nemeth 1993).
Ten years of “reconstruction” had resulted in a quantitative development of 
the classical philosophical teaching activities while continuation and stabiliza-
tion were simultaneously observed in the conflicted area between “repressed 
humanism and delayed Enlightenment” (Benedikt et al. 2005, Vol. 5). The at-
tempt to take up the scientific philosophy of the First Republic around Vik-
tor Kraft who was reactivated at short notice remained episodic for a variety of 
reasons (Fischer et al. 2006). In the 1953–1954 academic years, he brought the 
young American philosopher Arthur Pap to Vienna as a visiting professor with 
the support of the Fulbright program. The latter was a pioneer in post-war ana-
lytic philosophy and had unsuccessfully attempted to pick up the earlier links 
of Viennese philosophy to what was the “golden age of Austrian philosophy” 
(Fischer 1995) on a global scale. For this purpose, he hired the highly talented 
Viennese philosopher Paul Feyerabend who assisted him in publishing his book 
Analytische Philosophie. Kritische Übersicht über die neueste Entwicklung in den USA 
und England (Analytic Philosophy. A Critical Overview of the Most Recent Development 
in the U.S. and England), published by Viennese Springer Verlag in 1955 – “in 
memory of and for the revival of the Vienna Circle”. For Feyerabend, the Kraft 
Circle of the Austrian College 1949–1953 – which included a personal meeting 
with Ludwig Wittgenstein – and the working group at the Vienna Institute of 
Science and Art (Institut für Wissenschaft und Kunst) meant a break with the 
Austrian province and the beginning of his international career (Keupink–Shie 
2006; Topitsch 1960; Feyerabend et al. 1966. 3; Stadler 2010).
This brief renewal attempt is typical for the decade of “reconstruction” – a 
situation Ernst Topitsch, another former member of the Institute of Philosophy, 
characterized as Österreichs Philosophie – Zwischen totalitär und konservativ (1967) 
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(Austria’s Philosophy – Between Totalitarian and Conservative).12 In this work, the 
author, an admirer of Heinrich Gomperz, criticized the ideological philosophy 
of the political Catholicism and the natural law variant of Christian ideology 
in keeping with his book Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik (1958) (On the 
Origin and the End of Metaphysics). Troubled by the philosophy of reality and 
ideology, Topitsch himself accepted a call to a chair in Heidelberg in the year 
1962, before he went to the University of Graz in 1969, where he worked till the 
end of his life (2003).13 Another member of the Kraft circle was Béla Juhos who 
– despite his international reputation - only got as far as becoming an external 
lecturer for theoretical philosophy with the title of an associate professor and 
represents another example of the marginalization of science-driven philosophy. 
In November 1965, the “Juhos case” triggered by Béla Juhos’ article “Gibt es in 
Österreich eine wissenschaftliche Philosophie?” (Is there a thing as a scientific 
philosophy in Austria, 1965) even led to a parliamentary question being direct-
ed to the then minister of education (Theolor Piffl-Percevic), which prompted 
former Austrian President Heinz Fischer to publish a piece of writing on the 
issue of “freedom of science in Austria”. In Vienna, Juhos remained a “thinker 
without any impact” even though he had made significant contributions to epis-
temology and the philosophy of science (Schleichert 1971).
Following Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead and 
especially world-famous Kurt Gödel, the establishment of modern (symbolic) 
logic in Vienna - besides the traditional fields of philosophy, metaphysics, epis-
temology, ethics and logic, came late with a separate institute of logistics headed 
by Curt Christian. In the 1980s, a separate (meanwhile closed down) institute of 
philosophy of science and science studies was added (Stadler 2012). Against this 
backdrop, the “autochthonous provincialization” (Fleck 1996) appears to be a 
targeted strategy of immunization of the political and scientific elites. This is all 
the more the case given the fact that a promising younger generation of philo-
sophers went abroad or left Vienna due to these structural deficiencies: Besides 
the already mentioned Feyerabend and Topitsch, this was, for instance, also 
true for Heinz von Foerster, Werner Leinfellner, Hubert Schleichert, Heinrich 
Kleiner – and not least for Austrian Wolfgang Stegmüller who was most influen-
tial in Germany (Fleck 1996). In Vienna, it is only since the 1970s that returned 
emigrant Kurt Rudolf Fischer, a fellow student of Feyerabend’s in Berkeley, 
contributed to a slow internationalization and pluralization process in his many 
years of working as a visiting and honorary professor at the Institute of Philoso-
12  E.g., there was an attractive list of candidates for an associate professor (1. Friedrich Wa-
ismann and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, 2. Béla Juhos, 3. Erich Heintel), to which Heintel 
was appointed. Cf. Reiter 2011. 77–84.
13  Aufklärung und Kritik, 2004.
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phy and, above all, thanks to his contacts with Anglo-American analytical philo-
sophy (Diem-Wille et al. 2002; Stadler 2017).
Curiously, Leo Gabriel began his career in the Second Republic by taking 
over Schlick’s former chair in the year 1951. “Integral logic and universalism” 
as “all-encompassing truth” was the motto now. The fact that this philosophical 
program did not remain just a personal opinion is demonstrated by the sympto-
matic historical influence in subsequent decades: at the 1968 XIV. International 
Congress of Philosophy in Vienna, Gabriel succeeded in having integral philosophy 
declared as a state philosophy, so to speak.
As a result, we have a continuity, which followed on political Catholicism and 
universalism of the corporative state with “integral logic” and at the same time 
prevented the remigration of philosophers who had been forced into exile. Add 
to this Erich Heintel’s post-war career as an advocate of transcendental philos-
ophy, neither the international remoteness of Viennese philosophy in the first 
decades after 1945 nor the continued exiling of philosophers are surprising. This 
bipolarity was still passed on students of the two mentioned full professors be-
fore the Institute of Philosophy began opening up and assumed a more pluralist 
orientation since the 1970s.
The development after the large the 1968 International Congress of Philo-
sophy in Vienna with the subsequent retirements of Gabriel (1972) and Heintel 
(1982) put an end to the dual dominance with two separate institutes of philo-
sophy since the UOG 1975 (university act 1975). It is characterized by the estab-
lishment of the second generation of the two full professorships and additional 
appointments and calls, which can, first and foremost, be outlined by way of 
calls here. Karl Ulmer from Germany, who succeeded Kainz, was active as a her-
meneutical philosopher focusing on immanent text interpretation and rational 
argumentation for about ten years from 1970. In 1982, he was followed by Hans 
Dieter Klein who had attained his habilitation at the institute and continued 
to nurture German idealism and transcendental philosophy towards systematic 
philosophy. Herta Nagl who developed the classical canon towards philosophy 
of history and feminist philosophy also came from this generation. Hans-Diet-
er Bahr was called from Germany to succeed Heintel who mainly advocated 
a postmodern philosophy of technology apart from the philosophical tradition. 
Norbert Leser was called to a newly created chair in social philosophy and her-
meneutics. He dealt with the Catholic social teaching in the context of Austrian 
intellectual history besides his specialization in Austro-Marxism. By focusing on 
(applied) ethics, French existential philosophy and Austrian philosophy, Peter 
Kampits who came from Gabriel has changed his mentor.
From 1976 until his retirement, Michael Benedikt supported the Kantian tra-
dition as a full professor and linked phenomenology to critical anthropology. He 
earned special merit from the publication of the voluminous six-volume book 
series Verdrängter Humanismus – verzögerte Aufklärung (Repressed Humanism – De-
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layed Enlightenment) on philosophy in Austria from 1400 until the present day 
(Benedikt et.al. 2010).
Johann Mader worked as a professor from 1971 to 1996 in line with German 
transcendental philosophy and classical history of philosophy. During this pe-
riod, Günther Pöltner and Helmuth Vetter, in particular, also developed and 
established phenomenology, which is still strongly represented today. Here, 
attention should be paid not least to Franz Martin Wimmer who was able to 
develop the focus on intercultural philosophy as it exists today in a sustainable 
manner. At the same time, mention should be made of the many representatives 
of the Mittelbau (academic teaching and research staff who are assistant or asso-
ciate with habilitation).14
In the field of philosophy of science and analytical philosophy, a reconnection 
to and further development of the great tradition of the interwar period can be 
linked with Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle research, which had started already 
before at the remaining Austrian universities (Stadler 2012). In 1972, Erhard 
Oeser who had come from Heintel took over the newly created chair in philoso-
phy and philosophy of science. As part of the large 1968 International Congress, 
philosophy of science was still represented marginally, this is confirmed by the 
analysis of the situation of Philosophie in Österreich (Philosophy in Austria) in an 
international comparison carried out at that time (Gabriel et al. 1968; Fischer et 
al. 1993; Stadler 2005; Generally on philosophy in Austria since the Monarchy: 
Benedikt et al. 2005, 2010; Acham 2004, 2006). Thus, it was no coincidence that 
the modern analytical direction has only manifested itself as part of an informal 
working group for linguistic analytical philosophy since 1983 at the Vienna insti-
tute, which was mainly enriched by visiting and honorary professor Kurt Rudolf 
Fischer (Diem-Wille et al. 2002). The institute was extended through the foun-
dation of the no longer existing institute of philosophy of science and science 
studies in the year 1986.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the Institute of Philosophy has de-
veloped into one of the largest ones in the German-speaking area as a result of 
several calls mainly from abroad.15 In the year 2011, the Institute Vienna Circle 
founded as an association in 1991 was established within the organizational unit 
of the Faculty of Philosophy and Education – as a kind of belated token of res-
titution and recognition of the Viennese heritage.16
The past and future calls open up specializations and pluralization between 
“Continental” and “analytical”, practical and theoretical philosophy as well as 
an interdisciplinary and/or transnational networking with an increasing presence 
14  Already in 2013 ca. 50 members of the department incl. project researchers (third party 
financed investigators) were listed in the website.
15  See: < https://philosophie.univie.ac.at > Last access 30-11-2018.
16  See < https://wienerkreis.univie.ac.at/das-institut/ > and < https://univie.ac.at/ivc > Last 
access 30-11-2018.
128 UNITY AND TENSIONS IN AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY 
of female philosophers. Given the institute’s development from the First to the 
Second Republic, this has ushered in a new phase with growing international 
recognition. But that is already a different story.
REFERENCES
Acham, Karl (ed.) 2004. Geschichte der österreichischen Humanwissenschaften. Vol. 6.1. Philosophie 
und Religion: Erleben, Wissen, Erkennen. Wien, Passagen Verlag.
Acham, Karl (ed.) 2006. Geschichte der österreichischen Humanwissenschaften. Vol. 6.2. Philosophie 
und Religion: Gott, Sein und Sollen. Wien, Passagen Verlag.
Ash, Mitchell 1995. Gestalt Psychology in German Culture 1890–1967. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press.
Ash, Mitchell – Söllner, Alfred (eds.) 1996. Forced Migration and Scientific Change. Émigré Ger-
man-Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Ash, Mitchell G. 2004. Österreichische Psychologen in der Emigration. Fragestellungen und 
Überblick. In Friedrich Stadler (ed.): Vertriebene Vernunft. Emigration und Exil österreichischer 
Wissenschaft. Vol. 2. Münster, LIT Verlag. 252–287.
Aufklärung und Kritik. Zeitschrift für freies Denken und humanistische Philosophie. Sonderheft 
8/2004. Schwerpunkt: Ernst Topitsch.
Bauer, Roger 1966. Der Idealismus und seine Gegner in Österreich. Heidelberg, Winter.
Benedikt, Michael et al. (eds.) 2005. Verdrängter Humanismus – verzögerte Aufklärung. Philoso-
phie in Österreich. Vol. 5. Im Schatten der Totalitarismen. Vom philosophischen Empirismus zur 
kritischen Anthropologie, Philosophie in Österreich 1920–1951. Wien, Facultas.
Benedikt, Michael et al. (eds.) 2010. Verdrängter Humanismus – verzögerte Aufklärung. Philoso-
phie in Österreich. Vol. 6. Auf der Suche nach authentischem Philosophieren, Philosophie in Öster-
reich 1951–2000. Wien, Facultas.
Benetka, Gerhard 1990. Zur Geschichte der Institutionalisierung der Psychologie in Österreich: die 
Errichtung des Wiener Psychologischen Instituts. (Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig-Boltzmann- 
Institutes für Geschichte der Gesellschaftswissenschaften; 20.) Wien–Salzburg, Geyer.
Benetka, Gerhard 1995. Psychologie in Wien. Sozial- und Theoriegeschichte des Wiener Psychologi-
schen Instituts. Wien, Facultas.
Benetka, Gerhard – Kienreich, Werner 1988. Hochschulpsychologie in der Ostmark: Das 
Wiener Psychologische Institut. In Karl Fallend et al. (eds.) Der Einmarsch in die Psyche. 
Psychoanalyse, Psychologie und Psychiatrie im Nationalsozialismus und die Folgen. Wien, Junius. 
147–167.
Brezinka, Wolfgang 2000. Pädagogik in Österreich. Die Geschichte des Faches an den Universitäten 
vom 18. bis zum Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Vol. I–III. Wien, Verlag der Österreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Dahms, Hans-Joachim – Stadler, Friedrich 2015. Die Philosophie an der Universität Wien 
von 1848 bis zur Gegenwart. In Kniefacz–Nemeth–Posch–Stadler (eds.) 77–132.
Diem-Wille, Gertraud – Nagl, Ludwig – Stadler, Friedrich (eds.) 2002. Weltanschauungen des 
Wiener Fin de Siecle 1900–2000. Festgabe für Kurt Rudolf Fischer zum achtzigsten Geburtstag. 
Frankfurt/M, Peter Lang.
Eschbach, Achim – Willenberg, Gabi 2004. Karl Bühler. In Friedrich Stadler (eds.) Vertriebe-
ne Vernunft. Emigration und Exil österreichischer Wissenschaft. Vol. II. Münster, LIT Verlag. 
297–305.
Feyerabend, Paul – Maxwell, Grover (eds.) 1966. Mind, Matter, Method. Essays in Philosophy 
and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. Minneapolis, Minnesota University Press.
RIEDRICH STADLER: AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY 129
Fischer, Kurt R. – Wimmer, Franz M. (eds.) 1993. Der geistige Anschluß. Philosophie und Politik 
an der Universität Wien 1930–1950. Wien, VUW Universitätsverlag.
Fischer, Kurt R. (ed.) 1995. Das goldene Zeitalter der Österreichischen Philosophie. Ein Lesebuch. 
Wien, VUW Universitätsverlag.
Fischer, Kurt R. – Stadler, Friedrich (eds.) 2006. Paul K. Feyerabend – Ein Philosoph aus Wien. 
Wien – New York, Springer.
Fleck, Christian 1996. Autochthone Provinzialisierung. Universität und Wissenschaftspolitik 
nach dem Ende der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft in Österreich. Österreichische Zeit-
schrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. 7. 67–92.
Frauen im Exil. Die weibliche Perspektive. 2005. Mitteilungen des Instituts für Wissenschaft und Kunst. 
60. 1–2.
Fröschl, Karl Anton – Müller, Gerd B. – Olechowski, Thomas – Schmidt-Lauber, Brigitta 
(eds.) 2015. Reflexive Innenansichten aus der Universität. Disziplinengeschichten zwischen Wissen-
schaft, Gesellschaft und Politik. (50 Jahre Universität Wien – Aufbruch ins neue Jahrhundert, 
4.) Göttingen, Vienna University Press.
Gabriel, Leo (ed.) 1972. Wiener Internationale Hochschulkurse, 1922–1972. Wien, Selbstverlag.
Gabriel, Leo – Mader, Johann (eds.) 1968. Philosophie in Österreich. Als Beitrag zum XIV. In-
ternationalen Kongreß für Philosophie in Wien, 2–9. September 1968. Wissenschaft und 
Weltbild. 21/2–3.
Gedenkbuch für die Opfer des Nationalsozialismus an der Universität Wien 1938 / Memorial Book for 
the Victims of National Socialism at the University of Vienna in 1938.
<https://gedenkbuch.univie.ac.at/index.php?id=435&no_cache=1&L=2 > Last access 30-
11-2018.
Gelbmann, Gerhard 2004. Sprachphilosophie und Sprachpsychologie. Der sprachkritische Ansatz 
von Friedrich Kainz. Frankfurt/M – New York, Peter Lang.
Gerhardt, Volker 2005. Kant im Streit der Fakultäten. Berlin, De Gruyter.
Haller, Rudolf 2004. Die philosophische Entwicklung in Österreich am Beginn der Zweiten 
Republik. In Friedrich Stadler (ed.) Kontinuität und Bruch. 2nd edition. Münster, LIT Ver-
lag. 157–180.
Hanisch, Ernst 1994. Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. 
Jahrhundert. Wien, Uberreuter.
Heiss, Gernot 1993. „…wirkliche Möglichkeiten für eine nationalsozialistische Philosophie”? 
Die Reorganisation der Philosophie (Psychologie und Pädagogik) in Wien 1938 bis 1940. 
In Fischer–Wimmer (eds.) Der geistige Anschluß. Wien, Universitätsverlag. 130–169.
Heiss, Gernot 2003. Philosophie an der Universität Wien von der Ersten zur Zweiten Repub-
lik. In Michael Heidelberger – Friedrich Stadler (eds.) Wissenschaftsphilosophie und Politik. 
Philosophy of Science and Politics. Wien – New York, Springer. 5–38.
Huber, Andreas 2012. Eliten/dis/kontinuitäten. Kollektivporträt der im Nationalsozialismus aus 
“politischen” Gründen vertriebenen Hochschullehrer der Universität Wien. (Unpublished thesis 
in philosophy, University of Vienna.)
Huber, Andreas 2016. Rückkehr erwünscht. Im Nationalsozialismus aus “politischen” Gründen ver-
triebene Lehrende der Universität Wien. Münster, LIT Verlag.
Huber, Andreas – Posch, Herbert – Stadler, Friedrich 2011. Eliten/dis/kontinuitäten im Wissen-
schaftsbereich in der Zweiten Republik. Zur Reintegration der im Nationalsozialismus aus »poli-
tischen« Gründen vertriebenen Lehrenden der Universität Wien nach 1945. (Unpublished Final 
Project Report, Wien.)
Ingrisch, Doris 2015. Gender-Dimensionen. In Kniefacz–Nemeth–Posch–Stadler (eds.) Uni-
versität – Forschung – Lehre. 337–362.
Keupink, Alfons – Shieh, Sanford (eds.) 2006. The Limits of Logical Empiricism. Selected Papers 
of Arthur Pap. Dordrecht, Kluwer.
130 UNITY AND TENSIONS IN AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY 
Kant, Immanuel 1798/1968. Der Streit der Fakultäten. In Gesammelte Werke. Vol. 7. Berlin, de 
Gruyter.
Kniefacz, Katharina – Nemeth, Elisabeth – Posch, Herbert – Stadler Friedrich (eds.) 2015. 
Universität – Forschung – Lehre. Themen und Perspektiven im langen 20. Jahrhundert. (650 Jahre 
Universität Wien – Aufbruch ins neue Jahrhundert, 1.) Göttingen, University of Vienna 
Press.
Knoll, Reinold 1986. Die Entnazifizierung an der Universität Wien. In Sebastian Meissl et 
al. (eds.) Verdrängte Schuld, verfehlte Sühne. Entnazifizierung in Österreich 1945–1955. Wien, 
Böhlau. 270–280.
König, Thomas 2013. Heinrich Drimmel and the System of Containment. Shaping Higher Education 
in the Early Second Republic. (Unpublished manuscript.)
Korotin, Ilse 1993–1994. Deutsche Philosophen aus der Sicht des Sicherheitsdienstes des 
Reichsführers SS. Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte. 1993. 323–344; 1994. 305–319; 325–326.
Korotin, Ilse 1997. Auf eisigen Firnen – Zur intellektuellen Tradition von Frauen. In Fried-
rich Stadler (ed.) Wissenschaft als Kultur. Österreichs Beitrag zur Moderne. Wien – New York, 
Springer.  291–306.
Korotin, Ilse (ed.) 1994. „Die besten Geister der Nation”. Philosophie und Nationalsozialismus. 
Wien, Picus.
Leaman, George 1993. Heidegger im Kontext. Gesamtüberblick zum NS-Engagement der Universi-
tätsphilosophen. Hamburg–Berlin, Argument.
Leaman, George 1994. Die Universitätsphilosophen der ‘Ostmark‘. Forum. 41/481–484, 25–
32.
Lehrer, Keith – Marek, Johann Christian (eds.) 1997. Austrian Philosophy. Past and Present. 
Essays in Honor of Rudolf Haller. Dordrecht–Boston–London, Kluwer.
Leser, Norbert 1965/2004. Österreich – Geistige Provinz? In Paul Pasteur  – Friedrich Stadler 
(eds.) Exil et retours d’exil. Rouen, Mont-Saint-Aignan – Université de Rouen.
Levelt, Willem J.M. 2014. A History of Psycholinguistics: The Pre-Chomskyan Era. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press.
Lotz-Rimbach, Renate 2004. Zur Biografie Leo Gabriels. Revision und Ergänzung der 
Selbstdarstellung eines Philosophen und Rektors der Universität Wien. Zeitgeschichte. 6/31. 
370–391.
Lotz, Renate 2009. Mord verjährt nicht: Psychogramm eines politischen Mordes. In Friedrich 
Stadler – Hans-Jürgen Wendel (eds.) 2009. Stationen. Dem Philosophen und Physiker Moritz 
Schlick zum 125. Geburtstag. Wien, Spinger. 81–106.
McGuinness, Brian 1984. Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis. Gespräche. (Ludwig Witt-
genstein Werkausgabe; 3.) Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp.
Meister, Richard 1927. Die Geschichte des Faches Philosophie an der Wiener Universität. Wissen-
schaftlicher Jahresbericht der Philosophischen Gessellschaft an der Universität Wien. 1927/28.
Meister, Richard 1937. Das Werden der Philosophischen Fakultät. In Akademie der Wissen-
schafte in Wien, Almanach für 1936.
Meister, Richard 1958. Geschichte des Doktorates der Philosophie an der Universität Wien. Wien, 
Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschafter.
Mohler, Armin 1972. Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland bis 1932. Darmstadt, Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Nagl-Docekal, Herta 1993. Das Institut für Philosophie der Universität Wien. Der Status quo 
und seine Genese. In Fischer–Wimmer (eds.) Der geistige Anschluß. Wien, VUW Universi-
tätsverlag. 206–220.
Nemeth, Elisabeth 1993. Zwischen Orthodoxie und gesellschaftlicher Sichtbarkeit. In Fi-
scher–Wimmer (eds.) Der geistige Anschluß. Wien, VUW Universitätsverlag. 221–238.
RIEDRICH STADLER: AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY 131
Olechowski, Richard 2015. Zwei Forschungsparadigmen in der Pädagogik: der ʽtranszenden-
talkritische’ und der ‘empirische’ Ansatz. In Fröschl–Müller–Olechowski–Schmidt-Lau-
ber (eds.) Reflexive Innensichten. 385–400.
Pfefferle, Roman – Pfefferle, Hans 2014. Glimpflich entnazifiziert. Die Professorenschaft der Uni-
versität Wien von 1944 in den Nachkriegsjahren. Wien, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Preglau-Hämmerle, Susanne 1986. Die politische und soziale Funktion der österreichischen Univer-
sität. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. Innsbruck, Inn Verlag.
Rathkolb, Oliver – Stadler, Friedrich (eds.) 2010. Das Jahr 1968 – Ereignis, Symbol, Chiffre. 
Göttingen, Vienna University Press.
Reininger, Robert 1938. 50 Jahre Philosophische Gesellschaft an der Universität Wien. Wien, Ver-
lag der philosophischen Gesellschaft an der Universität Wien.
Reiter, Wolfgang L. 2011. Wer war Béla Juhos? Eine biographische Annäherung. In Miklos 
Redei – Friedrich Stadler (eds.) Der Wiener Kreis in Ungarn / The Vienna Circle in Hungary. 
Wien, Springer. 65–98.
Schleichert, Hubert 1971. Denker ohne Wirkung. Béla Juhos – ein typisches Schicksal. Con-
ceptus. 5–12.
Siegel, Carl 1930. Philosophie. In Johann Willibald Nagl et al. (ed.) Deutsch-österreichische Lite-
raturgeschichte. Vol. 3. Wien, Fromme. 17–48.
Stadler, Friedrich 1979/1995. Aspekte des gesellschaftlichen Hintergrunds und Standorts des 
Wiener Kreises am Beispiel der Universität Wien. In Hal Berghel et al. (ed.) Wittgenstein, 
der Wiener Kreis und der Kritische Rationalismus. Wien, 41–59. Reprint in Kurt R. Fischer 
(ed.) Das goldene Zeitalter der Philosophie. Wien, Hölder–Pichler–Tempsky. 335–356.
Stadler, Friedrich 1997. Studien zum Wiener Kreis. Ursprung, Entwicklung und Wirkung des Lo-
gischen Empirismus im Kontext. Frankfurt/M, Suhrkamp. English: The Vienna Circle. Studies 
in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism. Wien–New York, Springer, 
2001. Spanish edition: 2010.
Stadler, Friedrich 1998. Der Wiener Kreis. In Claus-Dieter Krohn et al. (eds.) Handbuch des 
deutschsprachigen Exils 1933–1945. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 813–
824.
Stadler, Friedrich 2005. Philosophie – Zwischen „Anschluss“ und Ausschluss, Restauration 
und Innovation. In Margarete Grandner et al. (eds.) Zukunft mit Altlasten. Die Universität 
Wien 1945 bis 1955. Wien, Studien. 121–136.
Stadler, Friedrich 2012. Wissenschaftstheorie in Österreich seit den 1990er Jahren im interna-
tionalen Vergleich. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. 43. 137–185.
Stadler, Friedrich 2015. Philosophie – Konturen eines Faches an der Universität Wien im 
ʽlangen 20. Jahrhundert’. In Fröschl–Müller–Olechowski–Schmidt-Lauber (eds.) 471–488.
Stadler, Friedrich 2017. Exil als Lebensform – Der Emigrant und Remigrant Kurt Fischer 
(1922–2014). In Waldemar Zacharasiewicz – Manfred Prisching (eds.) Return from Exile – 
Rückkehr aus dem Exil. Wien, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 
331–346.
Stadler, Friedrich 2018. Kant and Neo-Kantianism in Logical Empiricism. Elements of a Re-
search Program. In Violetta Waibel – Margit Ruffing – David Wagner (eds.) Natur und 
Freiheit. Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlin–Boston, De Gruyter. 763–790.
Stadler, Friedrich – Weibel, Peter (eds.) 1995. The Cultural Exodus from Austria. Wien – New 
York, Springer.
Stadler, Friedrich (ed.) 2004a. Kontinuität und Bruch 1938–1945–1955. Beiträge zur österreichi-
schen Kultur- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte. 2nd edition. Münster, LIT Verlag.
Stadler, Friedrich (ed.) 2004b. Vertriebene Vernunft. Emigration und Exil österreichischer Wissen-
schaft. Vol. 1–2. Münster, LIT Verlag.
132 UNITY AND TENSIONS IN AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY 
Stadler, Friedrich (ed.) 2010. Vertreibung, Transformation und Rückkehr der Wissenschaftstheorie. 
Münster, LIT Verlag.
Tilitzki, Christian 2002. Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie in der Weimarer Republik und im 
Dritten Reich. Vol. I–II. Berlin, Akademie Verlag.
Topitsch, Ernst 1967. Österreichs Philosophie – zwischen totalitär und konservativ. In Heinz 
Fischer (ed.) Versäumnisse und Chancen. Beiträge zur Hochschulfrage in Österreich. Wien–Han-
nover, Forum. 29–52.
Topitsch, Ernst (ed.) 1960. Probleme der Wissenschaftstheorie. Festschrift für Victor Kraft. Wien, 
Springer.
Weisz, Franz 2009. Der frühe Heintel. Leben, Werk und Lehre von 1912 bis 1949. (Philosophy 
Thesis. Wien.)
THE INFLUENCE OF AUSTRIAN  
PHILOSOPHY IN HUNGARY

csaba pléh
The Impact of Karl Bühler on Hungarian 
Psychology and Linguistics*
Due to his extremely varied and rich professional profile, it is very hard to clas-
sify the work of Karl Bühler (1879–1963). He was a pioneer of experimental 
psychology investigating thought processes, an early synthesizer of child psy-
chology, and a theoretician, who tried to renew the psychology of language, and 
place the renewal of psychology into a complex vision of language. Further, with 
his analysis of the regulatory aspects of animal behavior and the role of selection 
in evolution he has become a mentor and first proponent of multilevel theories 
of selection in cognition. Thus, in a way, Bühler was also a mentor of the later 
evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary psychology (Pléh 2014). (See about 
his life the volumes edited by Eschbach 1984, 1988, and Musolff 1997.)
This paper is partly conceptual, partly historical/philological. My aim is to 
show how the different aspects of the rich oeuvre of Karl Bühler have become 
part of Hungarian linguistics, psychology, and philosophy in mid-20th century. 
That is the conceptual part. In some cases (that is going to be the historical as-
pects) I shall try to show the underlying factual aspect of the intellectual connec-
tions. I shall not try to give a thorough analysis of the work of Bühler, only relate 
to the issues of his work that have become relevant in the Hungarian context.
As Bolgar emphasized in Bühler`s necrology, Bühler was a man with much 
varied interests, who always concentrated on the issues of how.
A catalogue of his concerns would include the psychologies of thinking, perception, 
language, and child development, as well as theories and systems. He did not look for 
a single operating principle, but in all his work he asked the question how […] How 
does man think? How does he perceive? How does he communicate? […] Rarely did 
he ask the question what. (Bolgar 1964. 677.)
* Much of this paper is based on a larger manuscript from a time I was working at Collegi-
um de Lyon. The fruitful discussions with Elisabetta Basso on the philosophy of psychology 
helped to shape my vision.
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I. THE IMPACT OF THE EARLY DENKPSYCHOLOGIE  
OF KARL BÜHLER IN HUNGARY
Bühler had a medical education as well as a philosophy degree, but he was drown-
ing to psychology early on. As one of the leading researchers of the Würzburg 
school of thought processes at the turn of century, working there and later in 
Bonn and Munich as well with Külpe, Bühler had become a proponent for the 
psychological reality of abstract thoughts (Bühler 1907, Bühler 1908). The three 
basic features of the Würzburg research attitude were:
• Mental activities are guided by various non-image-like (unanschauliches) fac-
tors, such as attitudes.
• There are characteristic rules of individual cognition (thus logics is given a 
psychological interpretation).
• All these factors should be interpreted by implying that mental activity is 
always directed outwards, it is characterized by intentionality.
The attitude of the school is well characterized by Ogden (1951), by Humphrey 
(1951), and by the readers of Rapaport (1951), and Mandler and Mandler (1964), 
and Nyíri (1974) showed how it might be related to the general anti-psycholgis-
mus born at the end of 19th-century philosophy. Regarding the substantial mes-
sage, this school has challenged the elementaristic and sensualistic metatheory 
of mental life. Solving of problems is goal oriented and structurally organized, 
and (some) of thought content is structured, not merely an associative chain. 
There is a consciousness of rules, relations, and intentions (Bühler 1907, Rapa-
port 1951, Mandler and Mandler 1964, Mandler 2007). Another consequence 
of this attitude was questioning of the sensualistic bias of most empiricist phil-
osophical tradition and pointing towards a more propositional organization of 
human thought processes. A modern version of this attitude is shown by Fodor 
(1996). All of these pointed towards a more systematic vision of thought and lan-
guage processes, with a concentration on the notions of fields and tasks (Mandler 
and Mandler 1964, Pléh 1984) and towards a more objectivistic, supra individ-
ualistic interpretation of thought and meaning following on the steps of the an-
tipsychologist semantics of Husserl (1900), as interpreted by his mentor Oswald 
Külpe (1912) (see about these influences Krug 1929, Münch 1997, Kusch 1999).
This seemingly rather abstract endeavor had many challenging aspects and 
provocative consequences for modern psychology. One was methodical, that 
concerned the extended use of introspection and detailed report of the inner 
workings while subjects were interpreting for example the meaning of maxims 
or proverbs like Not all that shines is gold. This aspect created many controversies, 
the founding father of German experimental psychology Wundt (1907) ques-
tioning the entire method and classifying the studies as pseudoexperiments.
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II. THE IMPACT OF THE DENKPSYCHOLOGIE OF BÜHLER  
IN EARLY HUNGARIAN THEORETICAL MONOGRAPHS
The early works of Bühler concentrating on the psychology of thought processes 
basically had two impacts in Hungary. First, they have become part of the intel-
lectual discussion of the organization of thought, and the relations of logical and 
psychological models. Early on Valéria Dienes (1879–1978) a young follower of 
Bergson, the first woman to obtain a PhD in Hungary, and a critical analyzer of 
all of the modern psychology published a short synthesis where she analyzed 
the importance of the Würzburg tradition. This was an original synthesis that 
presented both Ivan Pavlov, Vladimir Bekhterev and the Würzburg school of 
the psychology of thought processes as the reformers of modern psychology. For 
Dienes, the key feature was the emphasis on hidden factors and functions. By 
hidden factors she meant that our mental life shows a number of organizational 
aspects that are not directly apparent, they are not transparent to the self-stud-
ying conscious mind. Thinking is governed by hidden rules – as claimed by 
Bühler (1908) and the Würzburg School – that we cannot get to know direct-
ly, only through their products, their mental outcomes. But the real winner for 
Dienes was Bergson who transformed the issue of introspection into the issue of 
intuition (Pléh 2005).
Hildebrand-Dezső Várkonyi (1920) a young Benedictine psychologist, later a 
leader of the new psychology movement at the university of Szeged (see about 
his life and impact Szokolszky 2016) has written a relatively detailed review 
of the debates around non sensory thought. His conclusion, on the basis of a 
contextual analysis of the Würzburg studies and the studies of Binet on his own 
daughters was that while there is a phenomenological non-sensory thought, in 
its origin and context, thinking always has a sensory backing. “there always is 
an ideational background to thought: images follow thought as a shadow. Ima-
geless, ‘pure’ thought we cannot recognize in ourselves” (Várkonyi 1920. 79).
A generation later, Ferenc Lehner (Lénárd) (1911–1988) in the same leading 
philosophy journal in Hungary at the time, analyzed in detail the Denkpsychol-
ogie work of Karl Bühler, Otto Selz and others. Lehner (1939) has mainly sum-
marized the debates about the validity of the Würzburg findings. Lénárd has 
preserved this heritage of Karl Bühler in his later professional life, as well. He 
has referred to the Denkpsychologie of Bühler both in his short history of psy-
chology (Lénárd 1946, Lénárd 1989) and in his monography on problem solving 
published five times (Lénárd 1984). In his history book, he in fact presented the 
Würzburg tradition as the first new psychology of the modern times. He detailed 
the methods and the basic non sensory content oriented research of Bühler in 
great detail (Lénárd 1946).
The presence of the thought psychology of Bühler, and its later combination 
with newer approaches of Gestalt psychology, and psychoanalysis, especially re-
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garding the task aspects of thought were further exemplified by the exhaustive 
reader compiled in America by David (Dezső) Rapaport (1911–1960), a graduate 
both of Hungarian psychoanalysis and of the psychology seminar at Budapest 
University. The book brings back richly annotated translations of Bühler, Ach 
and other Würzburg people along with Lewin, the psychoanalysts, as well as 
Claparède, and Piaget. This classic edited book shows as the editor himself ac-
knowledged, his Hungarian university education.
I had hoped that this volume would be published simultaneously with that of my 
teacher, Paul von Schiller, which was to rescue from oblivion some little-known Euro-
pean studies in the instinctual behavior of animals. But Paul von Schiller is dead, and 
I can only acknowledge again my indebtedness to him. (Rapaport 1951. ix.)
In his own theory of thinking proposed as the concluding chapter of his reader, 
Rapaport in his psychoanalytic attempts to find ways for adaptive thought pro-
cesses combined with drive forces, relies in two notions coming from Bühler. 
The first is the differentiation between reproductive and productive thought, 
and the second is the central importance of the task consciousness as an organ-
izing factor in higher level thought processes.
The other influences of the early Würzburg work of Bühler were mainly in-
direct, but resulted in published German works.1 Two PhD dissertations were de-
fended in Würzburg by Hungarian students after Bühler has left, but along the lines 
set up by him, both directed by Karl Marbe. Though, as he recalled in his au-
tobiography, Marbe (1930) had many controversies with his mentor, Külpe, he 
still followed the line of using introspection to study thought processes, and to 
reveal the contentful flow of thought. His first Hungarian PhD student was An-
tal (Anton) Schütz (1880–1953), a Piarist priest, who obtained a doctoral degree 
in psychology in 1916 in Würzburg, with a research that followed the attitude of 
contemporary cognitive experimental psychology, that of the Würzburg School 
(see Pléh 2005). His dissertation was entitled Zur Psychologie der bevorzugten As-
soziation und des Denkens (Schütz 1916a, 1916b, 1916c) (see about it in his auto-
biography as well, Schütz 1942). He was investigating the hidden tendencies 
determining associative recall. In his actual studies he was using mass verbal 
associations first done in Hungarian over a large number of subjects and stimuli. 
In the book version he analyzed the possible personal determinants of associ-
ation, such as age, emotional status and psychopathology of the experimental 
subjects. What makes his studies elated to the Würzburg School and specifical-
ly even Bühler that in his Hungarian survey paper he emphasized that among 
1  I would like to thank the help of Prof. Dr. Armin Stock University of Würzburg Ado-
lf-Würth-Center for the History of Psychology. He helped me with references for the early 
works of Antal Schütz and Imre Molnár.
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the different determinants of association a most important one is the task. The 
anti-mechanistic Würzburg scholars had shown to him that besides strictly asso-
ciative factors thought related, emotional and volitional factors also play a role in 
verbal associations (Schütz 1916c).
Schütz has later found his place at the University of Budapest not as a psy-
chologist, but as a professor of Catholic dogmatics, in line with his first degree. 
He has tried later on to forge a unique alliance between Catholic dogma and 
a critical appraisal of contemporary psychology (Schütz 1944). In his first ac-
ademic inauguration talk about the relevance of the psychology of Aristotle 
today, he pointed out the importance of the objectivistic trend represented by 
Bühler to support the idea that “in our mental life there are atemporal elements 
beside the temporal ones, as emphasized clearly by Bühler and his school” 
(Schütz 1927. 63).
Schütz has gone beyond merely criticizing experimental psychology for its 
simplemindedness. The main point of the psychological ideas of Schütz was 
that scientific psychology has to be treated with great criticism (Schütz 1941, 
Schütz 1944). This point of view has some messages for professional psychology 
as well. The main idea of Schütz was that the processes of thought – in accord-
ance with the theory of the Würzburg School – cannot be regarded as mere 
sensory accumulation processes: the essential moment of thought comes from 
the subjects’ particular computations or acts. This dynamics of acts was the key 
for him to avoid reductionism, to avoid reducing the mind to its elementary pro-
cesses. Schütz (1944) considered positivism and evolutionary theory as barren 
and factually untenable ideas.
At the same time, he feels a curious attraction towards contemporary characterological 
movements. In one of his works, in his [second] academic inauguration talk (Schütz 
1941), he tried to elaborate connections between schools or streams in logics and per-
sonality types of the representative researchers. In the same way as one can distin-
guish different types of thinking in people, one can distinguish different types of 
thought among scientific trends as well. Logical atomism, for example, is connected 
to a typical analytic personality, while holism in logics is similar to an integrative or 
unit-forming personality. In fact, it is a personal world view that appears in the disguise 
of logical schools, through the filtering effects of personality. […] For Schütz, the[se 
ideas] supported his campaign against reductionistic psychology. In his view, only these 
synthetic ideas based on the integrity of personality will be able to create harmony 
between mind-guided Catholic ideas and modern psychology. (Pléh 2008. 175.)
The other student who obtained a PhD in Würzburg under Marbe was Imre 
Molnár (1909–1996) who has later on become the director of the Child Psychol-
ogy Institute in Budapest between 1948 and 1962, later becoming the research 
institute of psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. As he recalled in 
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his sometimes not too factual autobiography, Molnár (1990), a Hungarian Jew-
ish youngster from Nagyvárad (Grosswardein) in the Partium of Hungary then 
becoming part of Romania first wanted to become an actor or a movie director 
in Berlin, and enlisted to the university under fatherly request. He fell in love 
with psychology under the impact of Köhler, Lewin and Spranger. Moving to 
Würzburg, he obtained his PhD with Marbe studying the relationship between 
set phenomena and the issue of esthetic value. Marbe was earlier involved in 
the psychology of art as well, thus the interest of the disillusioned would be 
actor and the mentor has probably ell meet. The mostly conceptual-theoretical 
dissertation was related to the Bühler heritage in one regard. It revolved around 
the issue of the objective value in esthetics, with a conclusion that one cannot 
abstract from the person regarding the value of artwork. His German pen name 
was Emerich Molnár, and he published his dissertation in a high profile journal 
of the time, and even as a separate monograph (Molnár 1933a, Molnár 1933b). 
Marbe, who was by that time also an acknowledged industrial and marketing 
psychologist, certainly had an influence on the later career of Molnár who has 
become a leading figure in the stabilization of Hungarian industrial psycholo-
gy with his textbooks and with his detailed studies of the psychophysiological 
stress reactions of weavers (Molnár 1982, Molnár and Stadler 1966).
The impact of the early work of Bühler also showed up in the school curricu-
lum and in everyday talk about the mind, where textbooks like the one for high 
schools by Lénárd (1960) on may editions were crucial. His entire outlook fol-
lowed the later Bühler. Youngsters were introduced to psychology as the study 
of (internal) experience, (external) behavior, and (World III) work (of art). But 
he also introduced early Bühler buzz words such as the concept of Aha experience 
(Aha Erlebnis), the sudden recognition of new insights and connections between 
ideas. Similarly, as one of his other ‘brand words’, in fact criticizing Sigmund 
Freud’s supposed wish fulfilment image of man, another concept proposed by 
Bühler was also a shining start of Hungarian educational psychology. The notion 
of functional pleasure (Funktionslust): the recognition that functions are prac-
ticed because their practice itself is a source of pleasure. Bühler (1921, 1922, 
1927) described it to be very crucial in child development but also in several 
aspects of human culture. “In humans the functional pleasure has become a 
central factor of development” (Bühler 1921. 150). In his elaborate system,
Bühler proposes a triad of fundamental ‘drives’ or motivation systems, stemming from 
three variations of the experience of pleasure: (a) pleasure coming from the satisfac-
tion of need; (b) pleasure coming from activity, from functioning; and (c) pleasure 
coming from creative work (Bugental et al. 1966. 198).
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These two expressions, aha experience and functional pleasure have become pop-
ular in Hungarian psychological terminology, without too much awareness as to 
their origins.
III. THE HUNGARIAN IMPACT OF THE VIENNA SCHOOL OF BÜHLER
After serving in the war as a medical doctor, and following Külpe to Bonn and 
Munnich, Bühler had become a professor at the Dresden Technical University, 
and then from 1922 to 1938 at the Institute of Psychology at Vienna University. 
Working together with his wife Charlotte Bühler, he turned this institute into 
one of the main centers of psychology in the German speaking world (Ash 1987, 
1988). Bühler and his wife were sort of leaders of the Austrian pedology move-
ment. Karl Bühler fulfilled two functions, one as a university professor and an-
other as an adjunct leader at the Pedagogy Institute of the City of Vienna. The 
university life was the scene of the more theoretical and experimental works, 
together with people like Egon Brunswik (1934) and Lajos Kardos (1934), while 
the Pedagogy Institute was responsible for fostering a socialist inspired educa-
tional reform, both in teaching and in test development. Nyíri (1986, 1992) the 
Hungarian historian of philosophy provided a good survey of the Vienna intel-
lectual scene to which the work of Bühler was integrated, and Bartley (2004) 
the historian of Wittgenstein and Popper, showed in particular the historical and 
social setting of these educational reforms, and that they mainly represented a 
move towards a less authority-based and more child oriented education.
Karl Bühler (1922) himself had a crucial role in working out the theoretical 
framework for child development studies in Vienna, with 5 German and 3 Eng-
lish editions of his developmental psychology textbook. His book, besides its 
general Darwinian outlook, was a basic textbook mainly about the preschool 
years. Compared to similar textbooks it had a number of interesting peculiari-
ties: the constant use of comparative psychology examples and analogies in in-
terpreting the instinct, habit, and intellect triad of children, the important role 
attributed to language and drawing, and an excellent portrayal of infant social 
behavior. The German edition of this book together with the test work of his 
wife, Charlotte Bühler (Bühler and Hetzer 1932) and her diary studies of youth 
have become standard references in Hungarian educational psychology for dec-
ades.
The institute lead by Karl Bühler had an excellent collection of students and 
assistants, and made contacts with many circles outside psychology as well, in-
cluding the Vienna Circle of philosophers. The atmosphere of the institute is 
well described by the modern decision theorist, Gigerenzer:
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The sparkling intellectual atmosphere of early twentieth-century Vienna produced 
Wittgenstein, Popper, Neurath, and Gödel – in addition to a string of other great 
thinkers. Among them was Karl Bühler, who, when he founded the Vienna Psycho-
logical Institute in 1922, was one of the foremost psychologists in the world. Egon 
Brunswik began to study psychology in Vienna in 1923 and soon became an active 
participant in Bühler’s famous Wednesday evening discussion group; on Thursdays 
he went to Moritz Schlick’s Thursday evening discussion group […] In 1927, Brun-
swik submitted his doctoral thesis to Bühler and Schlick, the same two advisors to 
whom Karl Popper submitted his thesis a year later. (Gigerenzer 2000. 45.)
IV. THE BASIC THEORETICAL COMMITMENTS  
OF KARL BÜHLER IN VIENNA 
As a professor in Dresden, and later for almost two decades in Vienna, Karl 
Bühler (1927) elaborated a sign-based theory of mental organization, a commu-
nication-based, semiotic theory of the mind. The features of his rich oeuvre 
can be summarized as a series of foundational theses, all colored with a strong 
evolutionary commitment. The evolutionary aspects are highlighted with italic 
letter type.
(1)  All behavior is regulated by signs. There is no meaningless behavior.
(2)  Human behavior is oriented to supraindividual meanings. All human behavior 
has three aspects: experience, behavior, and reference.
(3)  All behavior is characterized by holistic organization aimed at species-specif-
ic signals. Structure, meaning, and goals characterize all behaviors.
On the one hand, Bühler was in the uneasy position of defending the reality of 
abstractions in directing human life, and, on the other hand, he was at the same 
time defending naturalism with a strong Darwinian flavor. As part of incorporat-
ing selectionist explanations to different domains, Bühler (1922) also extended 
Mach’s (1905) idea of seeing hypotheses, and trial and error everywhere. He 
proposed continuity between instinct, trial and error learning, and intellect, and 
the domain of selection is, respectively, the organism, behavior, and ideas. Al-
ready Thorndike (1896) interpreted trial and error learning using a selectionist 
terminology. The third level also appears in the famous experiments of Köhler 
(1921, 1925) on chimpanzees, where insight comes as a selection of ‘ideas’, as an 
entirely internal process, with no visible solution attempts.
The three systems of instinct, habit and intelligence always strive to construct 
a model of their environment. In this modeling activity, the role of Darwinian 
selection and its broader interpretation are pivotal for Bühler (1936a). He was 
the first to formulate two principles that dominate today’s philosophy of mind 
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(Dennett 1994) and philosophy of neural processes (Changeux 1983; Edelman 
1987): all behavioral organization is characterized by an early stage where a rich 
and redundant inventory of behavior is formed, with an excessive number of 
elements and associations, and a later, selective stage, where certain patterns are 
chosen on the basis of environmental feedback.
The main point about the relationship between the three levels – as ex-
pressed rather definitively by Karl Popper (1972), a disciple of Bühler – that 
instead of risking survival as in Darwinian evolution, we are only risking our 
ideas in intellectual selection. The three levels also differ in their flexibility, but 
the organizing principle is the same for all of them: initially, there is an attempt 
to develop a variety of responses to an environmental challenge, which is later 
reduced based on the feedback from the environment.
There is no demarcation line between human mentality and animal mental 
life. Intention-based, teleological, and holistic organization is true of all behav-
iors, and it creates unity between the work of biology and that of the psychology. 
Table 1 shows how Bühler distinguished between the different levels of behav-
ioral selection.
Table 1. Three levels and pools of selection according to Bühler (after Pléh 2014).
Features Instinct Habit Intellect
Pool of selection Individuals Behaviors Thoughts 
Roads to selection Darwinian selection Reinforcement Insight
Proofs Species-specific behavior Associations, new 
combinations 
Detour 
Representative author Volkelt, Driesch Thorndike Köhler
Organization “Naturplan” Associative net Mental order
Karl Bühler made these principles and levels central to his idea about child de-
velopment as well. The three levels appear in children in a gradual manner. As 
his interpreters underlined it:
The process of humanization is structured into three ‘stages’ (a) that of the dominance 
of instinct during the first weeks after birth; (b) that of ‘training’ [Dressur]; and (c) that 
of the beginning of an intellectual life, which is distinguished by the use of tools. It is 
hypothesized by Bühler that these different stages are determined by the maturation 
of different brain areas, especially that of the brain stem and the cortex with its various 
functional units. (Bugental et al. 1966. 197.)
On the technical side, however Bühler had doubts about the ‘intellectual’ na-
ture of the chimpanzee achievements shown by Köhler, since he believed that 
real intellect needs reorganization, perspectives, and doubts. Most interestingly, 
he connected his theory of motivation as well to the three proposed levels. Trial 
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and error is made possible by functional pleasure, and human intelligence is 
made possible by creative drives.
These main visions appeared already in his work on the interpretation of per-
ception (1922b), which is in a way a continuation of the communication based 
theory of perception proposed by Helmholtz a generation earlier (Pléh 2008). 
In his view, all perceptual processes should be interpreted from the point of 
signing. Basically he claimed that the stimuli have a subjective appearance, and 
an object reference must be ‘computed’ by the mind based on it. The stimulus 
is always ambiguous regarding its referent object. For the computation of the 
real world, the entire signal context should be considered. This attitude allowed 
for the experimental and mathematical verification by his students, as shown by 
the constancy experiments of Brunswik (1934) for size, and Kardos (1934) for 
lightness.
Perceptions furthermore always have a signal function that goes beyond the 
mere stimulus. As signals, they should be related both to the objects evoking 
the percepts, i.e., the causal agents responsible for them, and to the evoked be-
havior of others. Linguistic signs are special since they also relate to the suprain-
dividual rule-systems that are responsible for them. The sign based (semiotic) 
interpretation of perception is crucial for Bühler to show that all kinds of behav-
iors (including on lower levels) necessarily have different aspects, not unlike the 
linguistic signs he studied later in detail.
The issue of the proper place of Gestalt principles was central for Bühler’s 
interpretation of perception. Bühler was among the first systematic proponents 
of a Gestalt-based organization in perception and mental life (Bühler 1913), al-
though at that time he was mainly interested in Gestalt organization in artistic 
forms. Interestingly enough, the book of Bühler was reviewed early on in Hun-
gary by Gyula Kornis (1915), his later professional friend. Kornis emphasized 
hat Bühler saw the independence of Gestalt organization, but at the same time 
a unity of analytic and synthetic processes in it.
The Berlin Gestalt School did not acknowledge Bühler sufficiently, because 
the experimental attitude of Bühler has been too analytic for them. Bühler fol-
lowed classical psychophysical methodology, when trying to reveal Gestalt or-
ganizing principles in visual displays. According to the Berlin school, Bühler did 
not recognize the primacy of Gestalt organizing principles, such as pregnancy. 
While Bühler and his students (Brunswik 1934 and Kardos 1934, 1935) studied 
Gestalt organization and particularly constancy phenomena, they did not follow 
the Berlin school in all regards. They did not believe in ‘direct perception’, and 
they allowed for much more computations, based on the stimulus array, and a 
comparison of different fields or domains to arrive at an object representation.
Bühler returned to the Gestalt issue at the end of his life (Bühler 1960, 1961). 
For Bühler, even when he returned to the issue at the end of his life, Gestalt or-
CSABA PLéH: THE IMPACT OF KARL BÜHLER ON HUNGARIAN PSYCHOLOGY… 145
ganization was a biological function. As Cattaruzza (2015) analyzed his approach 
in detail, Bühler compared and treated psychological and biological functions 
together. In his examples of animal behavioral coordination, he always interpret-
ed animal behavioral regulations as complex, Gestalt-based sign functions. As a 
matter of fact, much later he even tried to relate his Gestalt convictions to the 
new cybernetic organizing principles (see about this Garvin 1966).
V. THE HUNGARIAN IMPACT OF BÜHLER IN VIENNA
Table 2 summarizes the impact of Bühler on a next generation, setting the Hun-
garians with bold.
Table .2 Students and followers of the Vienna Karl Bühler and some of their ideas  
(after Pléh 2008)
Topic Student, follower Continued topic
Sign functions in 
perception and 
Gestalten 
Ludwig Kardos, Egon 
Brunswik
Constancies, sign theory of 
perception
Teleology of animal 
behavior
Konrad Lorenz, Paul (Harkai) 
Schiller, Kardos 
Releasers, behavioral evolution
Language functions Popper, Lorenz, Jakobson, 
Gyula Laziczius, Iván Fónagy, 
Kardos 
 Anthropogenesis, language 
functions, culture, World III. 
Selection in 
development
Lorenz, Karl Popper,  
F. Hayek, Harkai
Selectionist theory of knowledge, 
competition of ideas
During the Vienna years, Bühler had different types of contacts with Hungarian 
science.
• formal, official contacts
• mentoring Hungarian students and “postdocs”
• influencing the intellectual outlook of Hungarian psychology
• the impact of Bühler’s theory of language on Hungarian linguistics
As for the official contact between and Hungarian intellectuals, he certainly 
had some contacts with influential figures of the time. The society section of 
the Hungarian Philosophical Association published in their journal, Athenaeum 
in 1937 we learn that Bühler had a talk in 1936 in Budapest, on The Future of 
Psychology, that he was probably talking about his multilevel theory of behavior 
published in German the same year (Bühler 1936a).
In 1937 he was elected to be an external member of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences, on the promotion of Gyula Kornis, a most influential conservative 
philosopher, Anton Schütz, and Gyula Moór, a Neokantian legal philosopher. 
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The promotion emphasized his role in developing the psychology of higher 
mental processes, in relation to language and mental development. Specifically, 
as a follower of Külpe he proposed a new vision of non-sensory mental acts, rely-
ing on systematic introspection of the subjects. The promotion also emphasized 
his stage theory of mental development (instinct, habit, intellect). They also 
referred to his Gestalt studies and theory of color vision (Magyar Tudományos 
Akadémia, 1937).
As the archival material of Gyula Kornis kept at the Hungarian Academy 
Manuscript collection shows, they were in friendly, though not intimate terms, 
visiting each other’s seminars in the 1930s. Kornis has referred to Bühler in 
many of his writings, mainly to Bühler’s studies of thought processes. Bühler 
remained in close contact with his Hungarian psychologist colleagues later on 
as well. After he was imprisoned by the new authorities following the Anschluss 
of Austria, and he had to leave Vienna, he arranged for his reprint collection to 
be taken over to Budapest. As Kardos, his doctoral student recalled to me, as a 
Jew Kardos did not dear to go back to the Vienna of the IIIrd Reich, thus Ferenc 
Lénárd, who was an Ungardeutsch safe to travel was actually responsible for the 
transfer (Kardos 1984, Pléh 1985b). The collection, organized in the early 1950s 
by Ilona Barkóczi and Zsolt Tánczos is still in the possession of Loránd Eötvös 
University Institute of Psychology that has taken over the old library of the Psy-
chology Seminar of Pázmány Péter University in the 1950s. Incidentally, the 
exile library of the Bühler couple – that has a few entries from the Vienna years 
– was repatriated to Austria, and is being professionally catalogued (Felsner et 
al. 2016). The same still awaits for the reprint collection, referred to in Budapest 
as the Bühler separatum collection.
VI. PERCEPTION RESEARCH OF LAJOS (LUDWIG) KARDOS
The most direct influence of Karl Bühler in Vienna towards Hungarian psycholo-
gy came from his perception research. Although Brunswik the other Vienna per-
ception pupil of Bühler would also be considered to be Hungarian, he was in fact 
coming from the upper Hungarian (today Slovakia) branch of the Brunswik family 
famous in Hungarian intellectual history, and was raised in Vienna as son of a 
government employee, and was never part of Hungarian psychological and intel-
lectual life. The real Hungarian influence was on Lajos (Ludwig) Kardos. Kardos 
(1899–1985) has been both the mentor and the savior of Hungarian experimental 
psychology in the 1950-s–1960s acting as a chair of psychology at Budapest Eöt-
vös University between 1947 and 1972, at a time when psychology was less then 
welcome as a discipline (Pléh 2008, 2013), and there he developed a locomotion 
based theory of animal memory. However, in his early years in Vienna, he has be-
come a leading follower of Karl Bühler in perception research. Kardos was a liberal 
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left wing youngster, who has become part of the Jewish exodus in the 1920s due to 
numerus clausus, and he started and finished his university studies in Vienna. Nu-
merus clausus was the first practically anti-Semitic law in Hungary that was trying 
to limit the proportion of Jewish students to 6%, which was the proportion of Jews 
in the general population of Hungary at that time, while the actual rate of Jewish 
students was 25–40% in the 1910s in different faculties (Kovács 1994). Kardos 
studied both medicine and mathematics at the University of Vienna, obtaining his 
medical degree in 1925. But the real turning event of his life was that in the 1920s 
he became a student of Karl Bühler (Kardos 1984a, Pléh 1985b, Murányi 1985). 
After defending his thesis he published it in Nazi Germany (Kardos 1934), with 
some benevolent lying from Bühler as Kardos mentioned in an interview (Pléh 
1985). As Dejan Todorović pointed out to me,
The book was dedicated to Karl Bühler, and in the preface Kardos extends thanks to var-
ious people including Bühler, Spearman, Woodworth, Brunswik, Heider, MacLeod, and 
especially Koffka, for “long and deep discussions”. This shows that he was in communi-
cation with leading researchers in the field at that time. (Todorović 2010.)
Starting as a student of Karl Bühler Kardos worked on constancy phenomena 
(Brunswik and Kardos 1929, Kardos 1930), and he became well known through 
his monograph on the role of shadows and lightness constancy in object percep-
tion (Kardos 1934). He was among the first perceptual psychologists to com-
bine the attitudes of careful experimentation with courageous mathematical 
modeling, basically claiming that constancy can be rendered with a mathemat-
ical model comparing the light input from a surface with that coming from the 
neighborhood (Kardos 1934, 1935).
According to Kardos, color and lightness constancy phenomena are a key to 
object perception. He has taken over his interest towards color and lightness 
constancy as well as the theoretical attitude of treating perception as a signal is-
sue from Bühler (1922b). Constancy itself can be rendered with a mathematical 
model comparing the light input from a surface with the average light coming 
from the neighborhood. As Alan Gilchrist (2010) pointed out to me in personal 
correspondence 
The idea that lightness depends on a comparison of target and surrounding luminance 
was, I think, widely accepted among at least Gelb, Koffka, and others. The central 
idea of Kardos was that “neighborhood” was much more concrete. It was not a matter 
of distance from a target surface, but rather a frame of reference. He used the terms 
relevant and foreign “field” as in field of illumination. Furthermore it was not the 
kind of vague idea others had. He defined how a field is segregated within a complex 
image – two factors: penumbra, and depth boundaries (corners and occlusion bound-
aries). (Gilchrist 2010.)
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The treatment of constancies by Kardos is a rather striking combination of phe-
nomenological analysis, careful experimentation about contextual effects, and 
an innovative application of higher mathematics. In his phenomenological anal-
ysis there is careful consideration of notions like object, field, sign, and the like. 
Phenomenology for Kardos was by far not a license for loose talk. Rather, it was 
rather a combination of conceptual analysis and presentation of primary expe-
riences. “In the natural, lay attitude directed towards ʽobject properties’ vision 
provides a phenomenal field in which there is no real articulation between shad-
ows and parts without a shadow similar to a figure–ground organization” (Kardos 
1934. 23).
This attitude is the reason his treatment continues to be central even in 
contemporary theories of lightness constancy. The modern synthesis of Alan 
Gilchrist (2006) about black and white perception is basically centered on the 
interpretation of the Kardos experiment and his models.
Kardos proposed that the lightness of a surface is co-determined by both its relevant 
field of illumination and the foreign field of illumination, although the main influence 
is that of the relevant field. The relevant field is the field to which a target surface 
belongs; the foreign field is the adjacent field of illumination. Perhaps his most im-
portant insight was that failures of constancy are the expression of the influence of 
the foreign field. He studied the competing influences of these fields where they are 
most equal in strength: in perceptually segmented but weak frameworks. (Gilchrist 
2006. 65.)
In a way, Kardos belongs to the rare type of historical heritage who’s work (at 
least his work on perception) is not merely of historical interest today, but forms 
part of contemporary mainstream perceptual psychology.
In a peculiar manner, Kardos has later on fell for information theory, and was 
among the first psychologists in Hungary to use the cybernetic idiom to char-
acterize the mind (Kardos 1964), and elaborated a complex neuro-cybernetic 
proposal for the origin of mental life (Kardos 1980). Kardos has felt the continu-
ity of the signaling theories of his mentor in his own perceptual research. In the 
1984 Hungarian translation of his 1934 monograph, he felt pity for his missing of 
cybernetic notions that would turn the phenomenological language into a more 
mathematically neutral idiom.
How much easier would have been my task (in 1934) had I available the conceptual 
apparatus of present day information theory and cybernetics! […] How easier would 
it have been to state that our color experiences are informations about some optical 
aspects of objects, and to state that stimuli work as information channels characterized 
by noise. (Kardos 1984. 13.)
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VII. BEHAVIORAL TELEOLOGY NOTIONS OF BÜHLER  
IN HUNGARIAN COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
Bühler outlined his mature theoretical position in an influential book on the 
supposed crisis of psychology, which was published in 1927. Bühler proposed 
a vision of mental life that was modeled on language. He considered three en-
tities, out of which two were agents. The Subject, with his first person experi-
ence, the Partner, with his second person experience, whose behavior the Sub-
ject tries to modify, and the Object of the situation, which the behavior reacts 
to and which the behavior is coordinated with. From the point of view of the 
history of ideas, in the 1920s and 1930s Bühler tried to overcome in a sometimes 
eclectic, but certainly in a liberal way the controversies among the internalist, 
the behavioral, and the culturalist approaches to the human mind, and the task 
of psychology (Bühler 1922a, 1927, 1934, 1936a, 1990). He belonged to the class 
of those Central European scholars who were looking for a meaningful unity 
in their science, while being aware of the divisive naturalistic and spiritualistic 
trends. The much cited quote below shows how relevant his attitude is even for 
contemporary debates of the study of the human mind.
When someone raises a new topic, why does he have to look down scientifically on 
his neighbor? In the large house of psychology there is room for everyone; one could 
direct his spectacles on the skyline of values from the attic, others could at least claim 
for themselves the basement of psychophysics, while the walls are intended to out the 
entire enterprise into the causal chain of events.” (Bühler 1927. 142.)
Bühler started from the idea that the foundations of traditional psychology had 
been challenged due to the severe criticism of associations. The structured prin-
ciple of the Gestaltists, the search for an underlying, non-conscious order by the 
psychoanalysts and the Würzburg Denkpsychologie, the idea of elementary be-
havioral organizations proclaimed by the behaviorists, and a search for spiritual 
organization in Spranger all challenged elementarism and association as an ex-
planatory principle. In the market of ideas all of these novelties presented them-
selves as exclusive. In reality, however, they were supplementary to each other.
Karl Bühler postulated three ‘concentric’ levels of selection:
For me, in Darwinism the concept of play field seems to be productive. Darwin has 
basically known only one such play field, while I point to three of them […] These 
three play fields are: instinct, habit and intellect. (Bühler 1922. VIII.)
Early ethologists, with whom Bühler was familiar, such as Heinroth, Uexkühl 
and Konrad Lorenz, clearly described three factors in the unraveling of animal 
behavior (see Lorenz, 1965, for a review). The first is the postulation of species 
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specific behavioral patterns. The development of these patterns is predeter-
mined, and is a characteristic of the species in evolutionary terms, but it also 
requires critical, environment-dependent experiences. In addition, exactly due 
to the existence of innate/internal biological programs, the animal can never be 
described as a passive, merely reacting creature: its entire behavioral range is an 
expression of internal behavior program-patterns.
Karl Bühler tried to unify psychology by relying on these early ethological 
principles. The key element in this unification account was the idea that all be-
havior – from the simplest animal behavior to human culture-creating behaviors 
– is assumed to be meaningful. As a matter of fact, Bühler on the evidence of his 
unpublished manuscripts, went back to the crisis issue several times, but less 
with a negative, and rather with a positive message. He hoped to prove both on 
factual and historical material that psychology has a double commitment, it does 
belong to the biological sciences, but at the same time to the mental sciences. In 
this later aspect it does define the attributes and modes of human existence. For 
example it gives a categorial analysis of language, and for the modes, the issue of 
gender or age differences (Bühler 1969. 180).
VIII. THE WORK OF HARKAI SCHILLER
This meaning and intention or teleology centered vision of animal and human 
behavior had a decisive influence on Hungarian theoretical and comparative 
psychology. Paul von Harkai Schiller (1908–1949), or under his English pen 
name, Paul von Schiller was the most important theoretical and experimental 
psychologist in Hungary to take up this message of the heritage of Karl Bühler. 
As the careful analysis of both Magda Marton (1996) and Dewsbury (1994, 1996) 
clearly showed Harkai was a groundbreaking researcher of an international sta-
tus in his attempts to connect comparative psychological thought with a semiotic 
and Gestalt based notion of behavioral organization.
His one and a half decade long work in Hungary in a historical sense was cru-
cial in establishing experimental psychology at the Faculty of Arts at Pázmány 
University in Budapest, being responsible for the organization of a psychology 
Seminar, with many doctoral student, including David Rapaport. (See about this 
broader framework Lénárd 1946, Pléh 1997). His attitude tried to combine epis-
temological philosophical issues with the experimental methodology of natural sciences. 
He formed his research attitude during his postdoctoral travels to Köhler in Ber-
lin, and Bühler in Vienna. His entire attitude of trying to reveal holistic and at 
the same time teleological organization in behavior showed the impacts of the 
Berlin Gestalt, the meaning based proposals of Bühler, the comparative ideas of 
early ethology, especially Lorenz, and the action based developmental theory of 
Piaget (Pléh 2005).
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The first peculiar feature of his work is an empirically and theoretically mo-
tivated renewal of Aristotelian functionalism. For Harkai The task of psychology 
(1940, modified German version Schiller 1947) is to overturn traditional Carte-
sian dualism, the postulation of a “multi-level man”, a vision that supposes the 
reality of a mental world on the same abstraction level as physiological processes. 
Harkai juxtaposes with this image a view of biological man, which is in fact the 
renewal of an Aristotelian thought by proposing that body and soul, physiology 
and psychology are not two different levels. Mental phenomena are a particular 
organization of human bodily or physiological processes. This peculiar biological 
functionalism links him in the history of Catholic psychology to the works of 
Mercier (1897/1925), a Belgian neo-Thomist “modernizer”, who – well aware of 
the facts of experimental psychology of the time – advocated the unity of body 
and mind. Mercier contrasted this view with that of Wundt who basically de-
fended Cartesian dualism in a modern setting. For Harkai it was also pivotal that 
there is continuity between Cartesian dualism and the ideas of Wundt (1903).
As far as the impact of Bühler is concerned in his work, Harkai analyzed the 
early Bühler and the Würzburg school and related efforts (Meinong, Marbe, 
Watt, Messer, Bühler, Ach, Külpe, Selz, Hönigwald) already in his doctoral the-
sis as bringing the victory of the introspective methods and the non-sensory 
elements. In his vision that lead to a “clear differentiation in our mental life 
between acts and contents. [With the advent of non-sensory elements] teleolog-
ical, active moments had to be postulated that permeate the mental world with 
their directionality. This moments were first outlined as central by Brentano.” 
(Harkai 1930. 51.)
In his continuing theoretical work that first appeared as a series of papers 
(Harkai 1937, 1939) he constantly used Bühler as one of the foundations for 
his idea of an intentional motivational behavior theory, in a way as a biologized 
Brentano. He even claimed that while Bühler was a good organizer of action 
research, at the same time he was too loose regarding teleology (Harkai 1939).
In his later, finalized synthesis the organization of behavior was interpreted 
as the interaction of the environment and a unified biological organismic entity 
(Harkai 1940, 1944). The motivational system of organisms only makes sense in 
an evolutionary background and cannot be interpreted merely as an interaction 
of experience and physiological processes. This gives a curious flavor to the view 
of Harkai on the unity of psychology. For him the key to unity is that one has to 
consider the actions in animal behavior, their motivational aspects, the direction 
of mental processes (their intentionality) and their unified organization. Accord-
ing to Harkai the inspiration for this psychology should come from the followers 
of the intentionality tradition initiated by Brentano (1874), and of course Karl 
Bühler (1927) talking about the semiotic unity of psychology, claiming that all 
human or animal action is characterized by a goal and at the same time it is 
guided by certain signals. At the same time, behavior has an objective reference 
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and is organized as a whole. This is what Bühler and Harkai thought to be the 
right attempt to overcome the contradictions of the fragments of contemporary 
psychology – motivation-centered psychoanalysis, cognition-centered experi-
menters and overt action centered behaviorists should unite in a goal centered 
holistic experimental psychology.
Harkai was expressly a biological functionalist, taking the contemporary early 
German ethology seriously, parallel with the attitude of Bühler. He has taken 
up an idea popular in German zoology especially in the writings of Jakob von 
Uexküll (1864–1944) that the animal lives in a world articulated by its body and 
by its nervous system, attributing certain meanings to certain elements in the 
environment. Animals live in a partly constructed Umwelt (Uexküll 1909, 1925). 
“Uexküll thus starts off not from the idea of an objective environment but from 
a ʽsubjective external world’ given to the living being, selected by its sensory 
and effector apparatus” (Harkai Schiller 1940. 113–114).
What he called “psychological biologism” was an empirically and theoretical-
ly motivated renewal of Aristotelian functionalism.
He compared the inspiration of Bühler and Piaget in their ideas about the 
genesis of consciousness.
In his expression theory Bühler sees in signs a saving on actions; consciousness arises 
when the operations of physiological regulation do not assure our vital values. Action 
accommodates the occasions of our life field the needs of our organism. According to 
Piaget reflex, habits, intention and thought are all instruments of adaptation. They 
develop in cyclic circles, from restless search towards theories, towards action organ-
izing schemata. In all of these conceptions, joint by the best representatives of our 
science, it becomes more and more clear that physiological and conscious events are 
in their higher organization aspects of action organization. (Harkai 1944. 33.)
His theory also appeared in actual experimental work. His numerous (partly 
posthumous) publications concentrated on what we would call today representa-
tional phenomena in animals. Detour behavior (Schiller 1948, 1950), figural pref-
erences and drawings by apes (Schiller 1951, 1952, Schiller and Hartmann 1951).
IX. THE IMPACT OF BÜHLER ON THE LATER COMPARATIVE  
WORK OF KARDOS
The approach Bühler was taking towards a critic of early non intentional visions 
of animal behavior promoted by behaviorists lead to the other aspect of his criti-
cism of naive behaviorism: the issue of regulation (Garvin, 1966). Animal behav-
ior is regulated not in a mechanistic manner but in a complex cybernetic way. In 
a late paper of his, Bühler (1954) outlined directional and object-based naviga-
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tion both in aviation and in bird flight; he analyzed the mechanical conception of 
Loeb (1900, 1912) on animal tropism. Interestingly, Bühler claimed that the me-
chanical vision of Loeb is mistaken because it did not consider cybernetic regu-
latory factors such as the ones already highlighted by Claude Bernard regarding 
the regulation of the inner milieu. It is remarkable that the last manuscript of 
Bühler (1969) that was only published posthumously also presented a theory 
and a series of experiments on animal navigation, mainly concentrating on bees 
and birds. The issues of animal teleology figured in earlier works of Bühler, 
especially in his child development book. As analyzed by Ter Hark (2007) the 
1927 book was rather crucial in presenting the intention based synthetic theory 
of animal behavior, in contrast to the entirely mechanistic vision of Loeb. Frie-
drich (2018) also shows very clearly how crucial was for Bühler to contrast the 
mechanistic vision of Loeb with the trial and error vision of intentional animal 
behavior promoted by Thorndike an Jennings.
Interestingly enough, the former student of Bühler, who started with con-
stancy phenomena, Lajos Kardos, two generations later in a way returned to the 
Bühler inspiration as a comparative psychologist. Kardos started his theory on 
the genesis of mental life with an analysis of the Loeb–Jennings debate, and of 
the coordinative, cybernetic attitude: the genesis of prediction is necessary for 
the genesis of the mind (Kardos 1980). This theoretical book of Kardos com-
pared to all his other work reads as surprisingly speculative. He is not doing ex-
periments, neither is he doing too much reading. On the basis of some elemen-
tary biological background Kardos set out to analyze the postulated behavior of 
theoretical monocellular organisms. This excursion is used to shed light on the 
origin of mental life. In this regard it is remarkable that his teacher half a century 
earlier used the same attitude when proposing a unified sign based framework 
for psychology, and also started from the Loeb–Jennings debates (Pléh 2013). 
Unity of biological and meaningful elements in human life on all levels of men-
tal organization was the key notion for Bühler.
The distance between the integrated behavior of the amoeba and human scientific 
thought is certainly impossible to grasp. Still, on the basis of the most modern obser-
vations both can come under two common concepts: they are holistically organized 
and are characterized by meaningful events. (Bühler 1927. 392.)
In his analysis of the origin of mind the starting point for Kardos was avoidance 
behavior. Warning signs are crucial in the development of mental life. Starting 
from the etymology of prevention (‘prevent’ → ‘praevenio’) he claimed that 
organisms use information that precedes harmful events: “harmful impacts are 
consistently preceded by biologically irrelevant impacts” (Kardos 1980. 24). Sig-
nals precede the harmful event. The animal avoids the harmful space, and “the 
adiaphore space is a secure starting place; from here, by well-controlled action it 
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can avoid any dangerous contact or can achieve contact when desirable” (Kardos 
1980. 94).
Kardos initiated a long series of experimental studies on animal learning and 
memory in rodents from the 1950-as on. On the theoretical level he started from 
an analysis of the relationships between the “animal way of life” and mental 
organization. In this regard he is a Gestaltist who was sensitized in the circle of 
Bühler (1934) to the ideas of early ethology emphasizing species specific behav-
ior and the different Umwelts of animals. For Kardos, the essential difference 
in the way of life between other mammals and apes is the opposition between 
locomotion and manipulation. The actual animal learning experiments of Kardos 
were run through 30 years, using maze and discrimination learning technologies. 
His starting point was the idea that behavioral equivalence is crucial to learn-
ing. That is an idea again that goes back to the concept of behavioral equiva-
lence claimed by his teacher Bühler (1927) in the framework of early continental 
ethology. The underlying sign based equivalences in animal learning for Kardos 
are One place – one sign – one behavior.
The first studies along this line were his experiments on “aequiterminal 
routes”. (Kardos and Barkóczi 1953). Rats had to learn two slightly different 
types of mazes, where in one version they had to learn that the same goal has 
different values depending on the route taken. That was impossible to learn. 
Rats are not able to learn the distinction that if you came from left than you have 
food, and if you come from the right, you have no food.
The interpretation of the experiment was that memory representation in ani-
mals with a locomotory way of life is place tied, rats being unable to learn differ-
ent targets being on the same place if the place was reached by different routes. 
These behavioral results are to be explained according to Kardos by postulating 
a mnemonic field (Kardos 1988). Using some more complex spatial learning situ-
ations such as star shaped mazes, Kardos proposed a mnemonic theory slightly 
different from the cognitive maps of Tolman (1948). Kardos (1988) was claiming 
that rodents basically are maintaining memory images as vivid as their percepts, 
rather than cognitive maps as Tolman (1948) claimed.
X. THE IMPACT OF BÜHLER’S THEORY OF LANGUAGE  
ON HUNGARIAN LINGUISTICS
Bühler has started to use his general model of language already in his arguments 
for a three aspect psychology in 1927. His theory is a self-proclaimed Organon 
model, referring to the logical theory of Aristotle. It is a conceptual framework, 
starting from ‘axioms’ that treat language not in an abstract way, but as an instru-
ment of communication. Persyn-Vialard (2005, 2011) analyzes the functional na-
ture of his model. Human language has by necessity three functions: a) it has an 
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experiential, inner, first-person reference, it is an expression (Ausdruck), b) it has 
a relation to other people’s behavior, i.e., it has a directive function (Appel), and c) 
most specifically, it represents something form the external world; it is a symbol 
(Darstellung). For Bühler the proposal is not merely about dimensions of linguis-
tic signs. According to his “crisis-book” (Bühler 1927), this tri-partiality is not a 
characteristic of language exclusively. It is also a story about the triple aspects 
of the human condition: the inner world, behavior, and reference to something 
external and objective are all crucial to mental life. Bühler in this regard speaks 
about the general semiotics of behavior.
Signs of human language obtain their object reference trough a supraindi-
vidual logical intentionality. In human language, there is a hierarchy among the 
three functions. The descriptive and intellectual function is always the leading 
one. We can express emotions mainly by naming things, and the same holds for 
the directive functions. At the same time, Bühler was not insensitive to what we 
would call today the “expressive aspects of speech”. He claimed that while the 
referential function is the basic and defining function of human language, tone 
of speech, interjections, and other elementary features of our speech channel are 
also used to express emotions (Bühler 1936b).
The supraindividual semantics shall be the foundation of the existence of a 
human sphere of thoughts. Through his “objective semantics” Bühler’s early 
interest towards the reality of thought obtained a new anchorage. It will be ech-
oed a generation later by a follower of Bühler in the philosophy of science, Karl 
Popper (1972, 1976, 1994).
Bühler put rather clearly the connections between his psychological ideas 
and the communicative specificities of sign based coordination. Social life needs 
coordination, and in this regard semantics is always social. By developing the 
descriptive function, animal signal systems increase their efficiency.
1. When where there is real social life, there is a need to coordinate meaningful behav-
iors of the members of the community. Since the reference points of this coordination 
are not given in a common perception, they have to be provided with a higher order 
contact, specifically with semantic dispositions.
Individual needs or dispositions have to be manifested somehow and these manifes-
tations have to be noticed in order for them to be validated in the joint enterprise.
By coordinating signs with objects and states of affairs, they do obtain a new semantic 
dimension. And due to this process, their communicative efficiency increase impor-
tantly. (Bühler 1927. 50–51.)
For Bühler the central issue in the study of language use was the role of gram-
mar, or linguistic organization at large. He relied on the proposal of Saussure 
(1922), the founding father of modern structure-based linguistics, to start from 
a differentiation between langue and parole (language and speech), and empha-
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sized repeatedly that the study of speech as an activity presupposes the study 
of grammatical linguistic structures. At the same time, regarding relationships 
between language and speech, under a Humboldtian inspiration, Bühler has 
turned the Saussure-ian system from a single-instance system differentiating 
social and individual as langue and parole, into a four-instance system. The entire 
system is shown in Table 3.
Table 3. The full system of aspects of language in Bühler
Level/objectivity Subjective I. Objective II.
Lower level 1. speech activity language product 
Higher level 2 speech act linguistic construction 
XI. EARLY HUNGARIAN STRUCTURALIST INTERPRETATIONS  
OF THE MESSAGE OF SPRACHTEORIE
The Ausdrucktheorie of expressive movements analyzed by Bühler (1933a) was 
early on absorbed by Hungarian philosophers and philologists. László Bóka 
(1934) the later literary theorist criticized Bühler in his early review to be too 
far from language, and too much following Klages. In Bóka’s view Bühler was 
mainly treating in this book language as lacking expressive powers. As a matter 
of fact, the language theory of Bühler a few years later (1933b) proved the oppo-
site, the same year.
They discussed in many aspects his vision of expressive power in a pres-
entation of a paper by László Gáldi (1940), a later influential lexicographer and 
style theorist on the expressive power of language as is it is related to the lexical 
choices, mood and the likes. The debate centered around “language character-
ology”, the issue for expressive differences among languages, and the individual 
use of language for emotion expressions.
Bühler’s theory of language was also discussed in many details form a philo-
sophical point of view by Gáldi (1943). The linguistic reactions around the same 
time were more consequential. In a way, Bühler figured as a central author in the 
Saussure inspired first wave of structural linguistics in Hungary.
Gyula Laziczius (1896–1957) the founding father of a Saussure and Prague 
school inspired structural linguistics in Hungary (see about his impact Kiefer 
2008). Laziczius criticized this extension at the time. In general he was very 
receptive of the general frame of the theory of language promoted by Bühler in 
his textbook (Laziczius 1942, 1966). As Fónagy (1984), his student reminded us, 
in the textbook of Laziczius, there are over 100 (!) pages presenting the Sprach-
theorie of Bühler. At the same time, he was very critical of the combination of 
Saussure and Humboldt. 
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The principle that Bühler treats as his third axiom is questionable to the first sight. 
There is a fourfold distinction involved here, as of speech actin [Sprechhandlung], speech 
work [Sprachwerk], a speech act [Sprechakt] and linguistic construction [Sprachgebilde]. […] 
Bühler did not realize that the distinction of action and act, work and construction 
cannot be fit into the distinction of “langue” – “parole” since they do cross classify. 
[The crucial issue is that in this combination] We abstract in a mixed manner the 
individual and social aspects, and the „language” nature of the extracted set is un-
questionable. With the procedure of Bühler we thus arrive to the undifferentiating 
of “language”, to the undifferentiating that was to be resolved by Saussure exactly 
through distinguishing “langue” and “parole” […] This faulty thesis should necessar-
ily deleted from the axioms of linguistics, and replaced by the correctly interpreted 
distinction by Saussure between “langue” and parole. (Laziczius 1940. 42–43.)
XII. INTERPRETING BÜHLER’S FIELDS AND PRAGMATIC MESSAGE 
Two generations later, I tried to treat the fourfold distinction of Bühler as a 
positive program, where the social–Individual dimension is combined with a 
speech act like theoretical frame. On the subjective side, Bühler stresses the 
processes rather than ‘knowledge’ in the classical sense, and in a sense similar 
to another Aristotelian rejuvenation theory proposed by Gilbert Ryle (1949) the 
British philosopher, differentiating between knowing how, rather than knowing 
what. Bühler supposed that individual actions are accommodated to the system, 
therefore the analysis of the system (linguistics) was always prior to its usage, to 
the psychology of language, and also supposed that the social system manifests 
itself through individual acts (Pléh 1984).
Bühler emphasized two crucial aspects when he talked about the structure 
of language. The first is the structure dependence of the value of individual items. 
Along with his commitment to Gestalts in the organization of all of perceptual 
psychology, Bühler believed that each linguistic sign obtains its function only 
with reference to the entire system of signs. On the other hand, signs in combi-
nations form new unities, often by rounding up meanings.
Regarding the structural elements of language, he postulated, in line with 
structuralist principles, three levels: sounds, words, and sentences. It was es-
pecially important for Bühler to show that human language has a double articu-
lation: words and sentences. The other logical possibility – and he has lengthy 
thought experiments about this – would be to have unstructured long distinct 
strings to correspond to each individual state of affairs. Unlike this logical possi-
bility, this is the sense in which human langue has a double articulation.
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Human language is based at least on two classes of institutions (conventions) and 
accordingly, has two classes of linguistic structures. […] this corresponds to the choice 
of words and the construction of sentences. There is a type of linguistic structure that 
cuts the world into pieces, decomposes it into objects, events etc., in order to reduce 
it to abstract elements, and apply a sign to each of these elements; while the other 
provides semiotic tools for an integral construction of the same world along relations. 
[…] At the same time these two articulations can move from one to the other, what 
was syntactic may become part of the vocabulary, and what was lexical may become 
syntactic. (Bühler 1934. 160.)
This kind of structuralist credo was much appreciated by Laziczius (1940, 1942) 
at the time. Two generations later I have also pointed out the importance of the 
early pragmatic vision of the psychology of language concentrating on the notion 
of fields and deixis.
The notion of field taken over from Gestalt psychology was a main tool for 
Bühler to connect Gestalt considerations with structural linguistics (Garvin, 
1966). Bühler spelled out clearly this relationship between fields and Gestalts:
I am convinced that the concept of field in the future should be as central [in lin-
guistics] as it is for us psychologists. As for the notion of “form” […] let its use be 
constrained to cases where two things are alternating, such as content and form. In 
this constrained sense, the most elaborate form can always become content, and the 
most substantial content can become form for the specialist of Gestalts and for the 
theoretician. (Bühler 1936b. 61.)
Language in the vision of Bühler functions in two fields. The first field is the 
deictic field, or demonstrative field, which is the world of perception “out there”. 
Language has an entire class of signs, deictic elements (in the terminology of 
Peirce (1883) indexical signs) that have their meaning filled from the percep-
tual field. In this regard the notion of the origo of the here, now, and me was very 
important for Bühler (Marthelot 2012). In his vision, deictic signs are not some 
remnants of an ancient status of language. Communication merely via “naming 
signs” would make it rather clumsy. The logical criticism of deictic elements in 
scientific language should not be extended to natural language use.
Where is it written that intersubjective understanding of things […] is only possible 
one way with the use of naming signs [Nennwörter], with conceptual signs, linguistic 
symbols? (Bühler 1934. 105.)
The other field in language is the symbol field, of which the specific components 
are concept–word–symbols. These are not tied to a situation, but create an in-
ternal linguistic context, and form a continuum; on one extreme of the scale 
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they function in sentences that are entirely devoid of context, like mathematical 
propositions. For Bühler such a duality represented the unity and the duality of 
sensual and abstract moments in language. On the other end of the continuum, 
the internal, linguistic field provides an interpretation for the signs – as signs are 
interpreted in relation to each other.
The particular sign obtains its anchorage and the filling of its meaning in the syntag-
ma with other signs of its kind. In this situation the physical environment falls in the 
background and becomes irrelevant, as the surface of the paper becomes irrelevant as 
we read books. […] What is conserved and becomes an object of most careful work is 
the synsemantic anchorage of the sign; it requires be interpreting and understanding in 
a deeper manner from the linguistic context. In extremis, it is merely the intralinguis-
tic, synsemantic field that gives its relevance. (Bühler 1936b. 60.)
The expressive and directive functions are related mainly to the deictic field, 
while the descriptive function to the symbolic field.
Karl Bühler’s theory of language was rather modern both in its combination 
of a philosophical tradition with his intimate knowledge of modern linguistics, 
and in its argument for an active theory of language. His concentration on the 
‘descriptive function of language’ was accompanied by a hypothesis of constant 
joint social work and coordination between speakers and hearers. While the rep-
resentational function was conceived as crucial by him, it does not passively 
determine our vision of the world through language. Bühler has combined a 
Kantian inspiration of a priori determination by categories, with a more dynamic 
activity theory he has taken from Husserl (Persyn-Vialard 2005). As his French 
editors, Bouveresse (2009a, 2009b), Bühler treated the representational func-
tion in a mediating way. Symbolic language drives representation in a dynamic 
way, much like an instruction system for the hearer to look for things in the real 
world. This idea is spelled out in detail in his theories of deixis, anaphora, and 
the relation between the two fields (Marthelot 2012).
There is a cognitive division of labor that corresponds to these linguistic 
structural levels. First, articulation into words and sentences makes for human 
memory economy. We do not have to memorize a different sign for each situa-
tion. Second, both the constitutive signs and the entire sentence are anchored 
in the perceptual field. Words look for their referents in the actually perceived 
world, as well as sentences look for situations corresponding to them.
In my interpretation a generation ago, I contrasted Bühler with the decontex-
tualized modern experimental psycholinguistics of the 1970s (Pléh 1984). Bühler 
proposed or represented a more complex foundation both for linguistics and for 
the psychology of language. He has treated language as both a biological and as 
a social system, where the biological and social are not in contrast or opposition. 
This was supplemented with the idea of communication having varied functions, 
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and being embedded in the field of perception and signs as well. One point was 
missing from the theory, however, and it is very interesting regarding the history 
of psycholinguistics. Bühler, just like the other great synthesizer of language and 
psychology a generation earlier, Wilhelm Wundt, did not intend to connect and 
confirm his axiomatic and theoretical approach to language with his experimental 
inspiration. Most likely there were two aspects missing to turn psycholinguistics 
into an experimental chapter. The lack of technical means to easily manipulate 
and register language stimuli, which has come with magnetic sound recording and 
analysis systems. Bühler and his generation were also missing language statistics 
and information theory that later allowed to characterize linguistic stimuli, words 
and sounds, and even sentences as independent variables, with numbers.
XIII. LANGUAGE FUNCTIONS AND THE DOUBLE CODING  
THEORY OF IVÁN FÓNAGY
Regarding the nature of sign-relations, Bühler (1933a, 1933b, 1933c, 1934) had 
very clear ideas about the communication of emotions and iconicity. He be-
lieved that even though the arbitrariness, the lack of motivation between sign 
and signified is crucial for human languages, human signs are still treated by 
the users as iconically and emotionally expressive, hence language has an emo-
tionally important iconic basis as well (Bühler 1933c). This suggestion is relat-
ed to Bühler’s general biological commitment: signs are originally biologically 
relevant movements, and they always functions as expressions of emotions be-
side their cognitive functions. The Hungarian linguist and psychoanalyst Iván 
Fónagy (1920–2005) had a very creative extension of the ideas of Bühler regard-
ing the types of linguistic signs and language functions. Regarding the signs 
themselves, Fónagy claimed that language signs are conventional in the sense 
of Saussure, but they are not arbitrary. There is an iconic relation between signs 
and the emotional status of the sender. Regarding the actual communicative sit-
uations, Fónagy (1966, 1971) claimed that all speech events, while they serve a 
descriptive function, they also have a second layer of coding: they code the inner 
status of the speaker as well. There are coding mechanisms that are responsible 
for descriptive function of language, but its output is always supplemented by 
the work of a “Distorter” that tries to use linguistic variations and possibilities to 
express emotional meanings directly.
From a phylogenetic point of view we might consider the Distorter as a residue of a 
pre-linguistic communication-system, integrated with the linguistic code, and distor-
tion as continuous synchronic motion, a permanent recreation of language. The coex-
istence of Grammar and the Distorter, the double coding of messages is a successful 
means of self-programming. (Fónagy 1971. 219.)
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An interesting aspect of this theory was that it treated the emotional/expres-
sive functions as secondary ones. Like the Sprachtheorie of Bühler (1933a, 1934), 
Fónagy also accepted the human specificity of the descriptive, cognitive func-
tion of language. The phylogenetically archaic expressive/emotional function is 
secondary in relation to this. The interpretation of this issue of functions is pro-
posed, however, by Fónagy (1984) in the framework of a more extended multi-
functional model of Roman Jakobson (1970) where expressive functions relate 
to sender and poetic function to the message itself. An innovation of Fónagy is 
the connection between the poetic function and double coding. In his view, a 
key to analyze art is to realize that artistic form is also a realization of emotional 
double coding in language. Form that is unmotivated regarding the referential 
objects is in an iconic relation with emotions. (Fónagy 2001). Later working to-
gether with his psychonaltic son, Peter Fónagy he argued that double condign is 
based on a „internalized oral mimicry” (Fónagy and Fónagy 1995).
* * *
Bühler was a general inspiration for Hungarian psychologists in the mid Cen-
tury by proposing unification inspired overcoming of the assumed crisis of psy-
chology. Bühler abstracted three basic parameters of the assumed crisis: (1) the 
problem of mechanistic explanation, (2) the indirect study of hidden processes, 
and (3) the subjectivity–objectivity issue. Contrary to the postulation of a split 
within psychology between natural science and human science, proposed by the 
followers of Dilthey, according to Bühler, meaningful organization is a charac-
teristic of all behavior, and is not a specificity of the human mind. At the same 
time, however, behavior should also be interpreted in new ways. It is always a 
self-initiated activity, never simply reactive as most behaviorists would like it to 
be. Not even animals – and certainly not humans – can be regarded as merely 
reactive creatures, as mere automata. Organisms always attempt to construct a 
model of their environment. In this modeling activity the role of Darwinian se-
lection and its broader interpretation is pivotal for Bühler (1921, 1922a, 1936a). 
This modeling and motivational inspirations were his most lasting impacts both 
in Hungarian linguistics and philosophy and psychology. 
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miklós réDei
Parallels and Divergencies: 
Gödel and von Neumann*
I. A WEAK CLAIM
John von Neumann (1903–1957) and Kurt Gödel (1906–1974) are two towering 
figures of 20th century science, contributing in particular to mathematics in ex-
ceptionally significant ways that had a lasting impact on modern mathematics. 
Their life and scientific careers had many parallels and their research interests 
overlapped. But their philosophical views about sciences, especially about the na-
ture and foundations of mathematics were very different. The aim of this paper 
is to highlight some parallels and what appears to be a correlation between the 
divergences of their philosophical positions and differences in their scientific re-
search and career. Correlation is not causation in general. So no simplistic claim is 
formulated here about either scientific research determining the nature of a philo-
sophical position or about their philosophical views setting their research agenda. 
Rather, on their example it should become clear that scientific research and philo-
sophical views are intertwined and they both enfold conditioned both by personal 
traits and by a broader social context, some of which the paper indicates.
II. BEFORE THE 1930 KÖNIGSBERG ENCOUNTER
Both von Neumann and Gödel were born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire: Gödel 
in Brünn/Brno, Bohemia; von Neumann in Budapest, Hungary. Their life and ca-
reers have been reviewed by several biographers (see Feferman 1986, Buldt et al. 
2006. Chap. B), especially Köhler 2006a and Köhler 2006b for Gödel, and Macrae 
1992, Aspray 1990, Rédei 2005 for von Neumann). Below I rely on these sources 
when it comes to recalling some episodes from their life and career.
The families they were born into were both well-to-do, headed by a father 
working successfully in textile industry (Gödel’s father) and in banking (von 
Neumann’s father). The financial security provided by the family environments 
* Written while staying at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig 
Maximilians University, supported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and by the 
National Research, Development and Innovation Office, Hungary, K115593.
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made it possible to realize talents, first by receiving solid elementary education, 
and, subsequently, allowing to benefit from the higher education provided by 
universities in the German speaking segment of the European university sys-
tem: Gödel studied in Vienna, von Neumann in Berlin and in Zürich.
Gödel, after considering physics as a field of study, finally chose to study 
mathematics in Vienna University. His teacher was Hans Hahn, a major figure 
in functional analysis (“Hahn-Banach Theorem”). Although von Neumann was 
already a reasonably trained mathematician at the time of graduating from high 
school, which was due to private tutoring he had received from a university 
professor, he enrolled in the chemical engineering program in the Eidgenössische 
Technische Hochshule in Zürich. Simultaneously, he registered as a PhD student 
in mathematics in Budapest. Gödel’s PhD (1930) was in logic, proving com-
pleteness of first order logic, von Neumann’s PhD (1926) presented a new ax-
iomatization of set theory. Both PhD’s were major contributions to logic and 
mathematics, respectively – a very similar start of their academic careers.
In Vienna Gödel was in touch with the philosophers in the Vienna Circle from 
1926 but he distanced himself intellectually from this circle because “he had de-
veloped strong philosophical views of his own which were, in large part almost 
diametrically opposed to the views of the logical positivists” (Feferman 1986. 4). 
According to Gödel’s reply to a questionnaire, he had embraced a realist philoso-
phy of mathematics by 1925 (Gödel 1986. 37). Such a philosophy of mathematics 
was in sharp contrast to the logicist understanding of the nature of mathematics 
adopted by the Vienna Circle. So, from 1931 Gödel started abandoning the Vienna 
Circle meetings and from 1933 he stopped attending completely (Köhler 2006a).
Von Neumann did not have contacts to the Vienna Circle – or to any signifi-
cant philosophical school – during this time. His interest in philosophy was weak 
at best, and at that time was restricted to the rather internal, technical issues of 
the Hilbert program. He hoped to be able to help to show that the Hilbert pro-
gram can succeed. Accordingly, von Neumann was regarded as the major repre-
sentative of the formalist understanding of mathematics. But to the extent this 
classification of von Neumann’s view is correct, it is only so by qualification: he 
was a moderate formalist, emphasizing the importance of the intuitive content 
behind the concepts in formal axiomatization. This is expressed already in his 
axiomatization of set theory (von Neumann 1928): 
We begin with describing the system to be axiomatized and with giving the axioms. 
This will be followed by a brief clarification of the meaning of the symbols and axioms 
[…]. It goes without saying that in axiomatic investigations as ours, expressions such as 
“meaning of a symbol” or “meaning of an axiom” should not be taken literally: these 
symbols and axioms do not have a meaning at all (in principle at least), they only rep-
resent (in more or less complete manner) certain concepts of the untenable “naive set 
theory”. Speaking of “meaning” we always intend the meaning of the concepts taken 
from “naive set theory”. (Taub 1961. 344, translation from Rédei and Stöltzner 2006.)
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After receiving his PhD von Neumann went to Göttingen to work as Hilbert’s 
assistant; apparently with the intention of continuing his work on the Hilbert 
problem (von Neumann 1927d); however, in Göttingen his interest turned to 
the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics.
The publication of the three foundational papers on quantum mechanics (von 
Neumann 1927a, von Neumann 1927c, von Neumann 1927b) marks a signifi-
cant deviation of von Neumann’s scientific interest from that of Gödel. Not just 
in the sense that von Neumann’s attention gets diverted from the problems of 
mathematical logic and foundations of mathematics to the foundations of phys-
ics – while Gödel was working on his dissertation on completeness –; but, more 
importantly, the pure mathematical problems von Neumann solves in these pa-
pers (first and foremost the spectral theory of unbounded selfadjoint operators 
defined on an abstract Hilbert space) are obviously directly motivated by the 
problem situation in the sciences (physics). This type of mathematical work, 
which is growing out from the empirical sciences, is uncharacteristic of Gödel – 
a divergence between von Neumann and Gödel about which more will be said 
below, and which is already present at this early stage of their career. This is 
due to some extent to the contingent fact that Göttingen was a major center of 
theoretical physics where the newest results of the emerging quantum mechan-
ics were followed and Hilbert happened to be lecturing on the foundations of 
quantum theory in 1926.
Working on foundations of physics in Göttingen von Neumann also had to 
deal with a problem which, to the best of my knowledge, Gödel did not address 
systematically: the problem of the nature of the axiomatic approach in the con-
text of empirical sciences. The problem of how to carry out an axiomatization 
of an empirical science, which goes back to Hilbert’s 6th problem Mathemati-
cal Problems. Lecture delivered before the International Congress of Mathematicians at 
Paris in 1900 (Hilbert 1976; see also Wightman 1976 and Corry 1997), and which 
is very different from the problem of axiomatization within mathematics and 
logic. Von Neumann addresses this problem explicitly first in his joint publica-
tion with Hilbert and Nordheim (Hilbert et al. 1927). The position they work 
out is a characteristic mixture of formal axiomatics and informal but explicit stip-
ulations linking mathematics to empirical postulates. This position was dubbed 
“opportunistic soft axiomatics” in the papers Stöltzner 2001, Stöltzner 2004, 
Rédei and Stöltzner 2006, Rédei 2005, where the details of this concept can be 
found, together with an illustration of this sort of axiomatization by the example 
of (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics as systematized by von Neumann in 
his book von Neumann 1932. What is relevant from the perspective of the com-
parison of Gödel’s and von Neumann’s views is that for von Neumann this sort 
of “soft” axiomatization is, again, directly motivated by the problem situation 
in empirical science (physics). Furthermore, this concept takes into account the 
actual practice of creating mathematical models of physical phenomena.
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III. THE 1930 KÖNIGSBERG ENCOUNTER
The world lines of Gödel and von Neumann crossed the first time at the Königs-
berg conference in 1930, and their meeting coincided with the well-known sub-
stantial turn in the history of logic and hence philosophy of mathematics: it was 
during this conference that Gödel announced his first incompleteness theorem 
the first time in public. The main events at (and right after) the conference 
are described in Sieg’s introductory comments (Gödel 2003. 329–335) to the 
von Neumann–Gödel correspondence (see also Köhler 2006a). The essential 
points are the following: von Neumann, after learning from Gödel the existence 
of undecidable propositions, proved the second incompleteness theorem inde-
pendently and reported on this to Gödel in a letter dated November 20, 1930. 
But by then Gödel had also arrived at this result and had in fact submitted his 
paper containing this result on November 17. Von Neumann, acknowledging 
Gödel’s priority, did not wish to publish on the matter (von Neumann’s letter to 
Gödel, November 29, 1930. Gödel 2003. 339–340).
From the perspective of parallels and divergences between von Neumann 
and Gödel the remarkable aspect of the von Neumann-Gödel exchange right af-
ter the Königsberg conference is that they sharply disagreed on the philosophi-
cal significance of the second incompleteness theorem: von Neumann declared: 
Thus, I think that your result has solved negatively the foundational question: there is 
no rigorous justification for classical mathematics. What sense to attribute to our hope, 
according to which it is de facto consistent, I do not know – but in my view that does 
not change the completed fact. (Von Neumann to Gödel, November 29, 1930. Gödel 
2003. 339–340.)
Von Neumann held this position consistently from the moment of discovery of 
the second incompleteness theorem and he expressed it unambiguously several 
times: in a letter to Carnap in which he discusses the publication of the Königs-
berg talks and also in a letter to his Hungarian friend, the physics professor in 
Budapest, Rudolf Ortvay. The relevant passages from these letters are as fol-
lows:
To Ortvay:
Gödel’s results mean that there is no “complete” axiomatic system, not even in 
mathe matics, and I believe that there is actually no other consistent interpretation 
of this complex of questions. (Von Neumann to Ortvay, July 18, 1939. Rédei 2005.)
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To Carnap:
(1) Gödel has shown the unrealizability of Hilbert’s program.1 
(a) There is no more reason to reject intuitionism (if one disregards the aesthetic is-
sue, which in practice will also for me be the decisive factor).
Therefore I consider the state of the foundational discussion in Königsberg to be 
outdated, for Gödel’s fundamental discoveries have brought the question to a com-
pletely different level. (I know that Gödel is much more careful in the evaluation of 
his results, but in my opinion on this point he does not see the connections correctly). 
(Von Neumann to Carnap June 7, 1931. Rédei 2005; also see Mancosu 1999.)
Gödel disagreed with this interpretation; at least initially, in 1931:
I wish to note expressly that Theorem XI [the second incompleteness theorem] does 
not contradict Hilbert’s formalistic viewpoint. For this viewpoint presupposes only 
the existence of a consistency proof in which nothing but finitary means of proof is 
used, and it is conceivable that there exists finitary proofs that cannot be expressed in 
the formalism of P [Russell’s Principia plus the Peano axioms]. (Gödel 1931, Gödel 
1986. 195.)
The disagreement between Gödel and von Neumann is explained by their dif-
ferent interpretations of intuitionism and finitism: for von Neumann these were 
essentially the same from the start whereas Gödel regarded finitism a narrower 
concept. Identifying finitism with the Hilbert program Gödel thus came into 
agreement with von Neumann’s evaluation of the significance of the second 
incompleteness theorem in 1933 (see Sieg’s description for more details about 
Gödel’s changing position and eventual agreement with von Neumann’s inter-
pretation of the second incompleteness theorem; Gödel 2003. 332).
Although Gödel’s and von Neumann’s views on the interpretation of the 
second incompleteness theorem converged eventually, they diverged in the 
more informal philosophical conclusions they had drawn from the failure of the 
Hilbert program. The divergence was both explicit and tacit: it got formulated 
explicitly as a Platonist philosophy of mathematics in the philosophical works of 
Gödel and it led to an empiricist concept of mathematics in the philosophical 
reflections by von Neumann; furthermore, it manifested in a tacit manner in the 
different types of mathematical research they carried out.
1  Von Neumann’s footnote: “I would like to emphasize: nothing in Hilbert’s aims is false. 
Could they be carried out then it would follow from them absolutely what he claims. But they 
cannot be carried out, this I know only since September 1930.”
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IV. DIVERGENT CONCLUSIONS FROM THE  
INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM
Von Neumann never tried to write philosophy systematically2, Gödel did. In 
fact, from about 1943, “[…] Gödel devoted himself almost entirely to the philos-
ophy of mathematics and then to general philosophy and metaphysics” (Fefer-
man 1986. 13). By that time Gödel was at the Institute of Advanced Study (IAS) 
in Princeton – just like von Neumann. Von Neumann got appointed in 1933, 
soon after the IAS had been established. Gödel visited IAS three times before 
settling there permanently in 1940. It was during those visits that Gödel found 
the proofs of relative independence in ZF of the axiom of choice (1935) and 
continuum hypothesis (1937) – Gödel’s other two major contributions to math-
ematics. Von Neumann was fully aware of these achievements and he played a 
crucial role in arranging Gödel’s permanent appointment to IAS, when Gödel 
desperately tried to leave Asutria in 1939: he urged IAS to try to secure a special 
visa for Gödel. In a letter to Veblen von Neumann writes:
The claim may be made with perfect justification that Gödel is unreplaceable for our 
educational program. Indeed Gödel is absolutely irreplaceable; he is the only mathe-
matician alive about whom I would dare to make this statement. He represents a very 
important branch of mathematics, formal logics, in which he outranks everybody else 
to a much higher degree than usually happens in any other branch of mathematics. In-
deed, the entire modern development of formal logics concerning “undecidable ques-
tions”, the solution of the famous “continuum hypothesis”, and quite unexpected 
connections between this field and other parts of mathematics, are his entirely indi-
vidual contribution. Besides, the ouvre of his scientific achievements is obviously still 
in steep ascent, and more is to be expected from him in the future. I am convinced 
that salvaging him from the wreck of Europe is one of the great single contributions 
anyone could make to science at this moment. (Von Neumann to Veblen September 
27, 1939. Rédei 2005.)
The expectation expressed in von Neumann’s letter about further major con-
tributions to mathematics by Gödel were not really met. It has been found puz-
zling why from the early 1940s Gödel’s interest changed to philosophy from 
mathematics, where he proved so brilliant (Köhler 2006b). It sure is part of the 
answer that Gödel, by nature being an introverted person, needed congenial 
stimulus, discussions with colleagues, and it was unfortunate that the most suit-
able colleague to exchange ideas with, namely von Neumann, was mainly away 
2  His reservation to write philosophical papers came to the surface when he declined an 
invitation to a philosophy conference when the invitation was coupled with the expectation 
of writing up his contribution in form of a paper. (See von Neumann’s letter to Ernest Nagel 
December 9, 1953. Rédei 2005.)
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from IAS doing war-work (Köhler 2006b). But this divergence between Gödel 
and von Neumann was not simply a contingent, unfortunate circumstance 
caused by war. It was already a consequence of a difference in attitudes towards 
mathematics – a difference in philosophy of mathematics.
Gödel embraced a realist-platonist concept of mathematics. Perhaps the most 
important (Köhler 2006a) articulation of his platonistic philosophy is his paper 
prepared for the Gibbs Lecture in 1951. Gödel intended to publish this paper; 
however, the paper remained a hand-written manuscript that only got published 
in 1995 (Gödel 1951). One of the main claims of this paper is that mathematics 
is incompletable, inexhaustible. The main argument in favor of this claim uses the 
second incompleteness theorem:
It is this theorem which makes the incompletability of mathematics particularly ev-
ident. For it makes it impossible that someone should set up a certain well-defined system of 
axioms and rules and consistently make the following assertion about it: All of these axioms and 
rules I perceive (with mathematical certitude) to be correct, and moreover I believe that they con-
tain all of mathematics. If someone makes such a statement he contradicts himself. For 
if he perceives the axioms under consideration to be correct, he also perceives (with 
the same certainty) that they are consistent. Hence he has a mathematical insight not 
derivable from his axioms. (Gödel 1951. 309; emphasis in original.)
From this incompletability argument Gödel draws the following “disjunctive 
conclusion” (Gödel 1951. 310):
Either mathematics is incompletable in this sense, that its evident axioms can never be comprised 
in a finite rule, that is to say, the human mind (even within the realm of pure mathematics) 
infinitely surpasses the power of any finite machine, or else there exist absolutely unsolvable 
diophantine problems… (Gödel 1951. 310; emphasis in original.)
The further consequence of this (non-exclusive) disjunction is a non-mechanis-
tic, non-materialistic concept of the human mind (if one takes the first compo-
nent of the disjunction). The second component of the disjunction “…seems to 
disprove the view that mathematics is only our own creation…” (Gödel 1951. 
311) because
So this alternative seems to imply that mathematical objects and facts (or at least some-
thing in them) exist objectively and independently of our mental acts and decisions, 
that is to say […] some form or other of Platonism or “realism” as to the mathematical 
objects. (Gödel 1951. 211–312.)
On the basis of the position that mathematics is not a human creation Gödel also 
criticizes the logical positivists concept of mathematics (“logicism”, Gödel calls 
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it “conventionalism”), but his criticism is not an outright rejection. He acknowl-
edges that the logicist position is right about claiming that mathematics does not 
state anything about the physical world because mathematical statements are 
true “…already owing to the meaning of the terms occurring in it, irrespectively 
of the world of real things” (Gödel 1951. 320).
What is wrong, however, is that the meaning of these terms (that is, the concepts they 
denote) is asserted to be something man-made and consisting merely in semantical 
conventions. The truth, I believe, is that these concepts form an objective reality of 
their own, which we cannot create of change, but only perceive and describe. (Gödel 
1951. 320.)
Since von Neumann did not write papers on philosophy of mathematics prop-
er, one has to interpret the nature of his mathematical research and rely on his 
semi-popular writings to get a picture of how he saw the features of mathemat-
ics. The major source in this connection is his 1947 paper (von Neumann 1961), 
in which he addresses philosophical questions about mathematics, in particular 
the consequences of the second incompleteness theorem.
Von Neumann’s first main conclusion from the second incompleteness the-
orem is that the concept of mathematical rigor is not something that one can 
establish once and for all. Rather, he regards it as historically changeable. There 
is no absolute, fixed notion of precision, clarity and exactness:
Whatever philosophical or epistemological preferences anyone may have in this re-
spect, the mathematical fraternities’ actual experiences with its subject give little sup-
port to the assumption of the existence of an a priori concept of mathematical rigor 
(von Neumann 1961. 6).
From the changeability of the concept of mathematical rigor von Neumann draws 
another conclusion, which is very characteristic for his concept of mathematics: 
he thinks that “the variability of the concept of rigor shows that something else 
besides mathematical abstraction must enter into the makeup of mathematics” 
(von Neumann 1961. 4). What is this “something else”? von Neumann is very 
careful in his answer. He says that the case “in favor of the empirical nature of 
this extra content” is strong – without claiming that such a position is defensible 
without reasonable doubt. But the whole spirit and trust of his paper von Neu-
mann 1961 – and his activity as a mathematician – clearly indicate that this is the 
position he thinks is the right one: 
The most vitally characteristic fact about mathematics is, in my opinion, its quite pe-
culiar relationship to the natural sciences, or, more generally, to any science which in-
terprets experience on a higher than purely descriptive level (von Neumann 1961. 4).
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A specific aspect of this relationship is that
It is undeniable that some of the best inspirations in mathematics – in those parts of it 
which are as pure mathematics as one can imagine – have come from the natural sciences 
(von Neumann 1961. 2; my emphasis).
Von Neumann gives geometry and calculus as “monumental” examples for 
mathematical theories that have empirical origins – but he could have men-
tioned many more. In fact, von Neumann’s own mathematical activity enfolded 
in a way that it is itself evidence for the truth of his claim: his early work on 
functional analysis mentioned earlier grew out of the problem of mathemat-
ical modeling of quantum phenomena; his work on ergodic theory originates 
in Boltzmann’s work on classical statistical mechanics; the theory of von Neu-
mann algebras (“rings of operators”) emerged in the context of general quantum 
theory partly out of the need to decompose (factorise) quantum systems into 
subsystems; the theory of continuous geometry has its origins in quantum logic. 
These areas are part of pure mathematics; yet, they clearly originate in problem 
situations in physics. But von Neumann’s position is even broader in the sense 
that he regards fields other than physics as a potential source of mathematical 
concepts and knowledge. Economics is the prime example: for von Neumann it 
was the source and motivation to develop game theory. Paying close attention 
to sciences, formulating mathematical concepts, isolating structures, grasping 
the content of the scientific situation in terms of axioms and investigating their 
consequences, is very characteristic of von Neumann’s mathematical research, 
and it is in full harmony with his picture of what is essential about mathematics. 
In this he diverges from Gödel significantly. Gödel typically did not work on 
mathematical problems arising from the sciences, physics in particular. When he 
worked on problems related to physics, the motivation came not from physics 
proper but rather from philosophy: for instance in Gödel’s work on relativity 
theory, when he proved that the Einstein equations admit a solution in which 
closed time-like curves appear (Gödel 1949a), the motivation, according to his 
own account, was his desire to clarify the relation between relativity theory and 
Kant’s philosophy of time (Gödel 1949b. 274) (see also Stöltzner 2006. 289).
This is not to say that Gödel regarded mathematics and physics as completely 
separate. In his criticism of Carnap’s logicist position about meaninglessness of 
mathematical statements he writes:
If it is argued that mathematical propositions have no content because, by them-
selves, they imply nothing about experiences, the answer is that the same is true of 
laws of nature. For laws of nature without mathematics or logic imply as little about 
experiences as mathematics without laws of nature. (Gödel 1953. 360.)
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In an example following the above quotation Gödel describes how mathematics 
actually does add genuine content to natural laws (see Stöltzner 2006. 293) for 
further, current examples elaborating this idea). Yet, it is fair to say that Gödel, 
unlike von Neumann, did not consider physics (empirical sciences more gener-
ally) as a crucial source of mathematics, without which the nature of mathemat-
ics cannot be understood.
In one respect the von Neumann and Gödel concepts of mathematics are 
parallel though. Both think that mathematics is not an arbitrary creation: von 
Neumann’s position entails that mathematical content is coming to us from the 
natural and social world mediated through natural and social sciences, physics 
and economics in particular. Gödel would not say this, but to the extent mathe-
matics is not (fully) our creation, he regards it as allowing a somewhat empiricist 
position much like in connection with physics:
This whole consideration incidentally shows that the philosophical implications of 
the mathematical facts explained do not lie entirely on the side of rationalistic or ide-
alistic philosophy, but that in one respect they favor an empiricist viewpoint.3 (Gödel 
1951. 313.)
Gödel even goes as far as drawing the conclusion that, as a result 
If mathematics describes an objective world just like physics, there is no reason why 
inductive methods should not be applied in mathematics just the same as in physics 
(Gödel 1951. 313).
It is perhaps too strong to characterize this parallel between von Neumann and 
Gödel’s pictures of mathematics by saying that “Through the rejection of con-
ventionalism (by Gödel) the strict limit between empirical and mathematical 
truths disappears” (Stöltzner 2006. 292) but it is clear that neither Gödel nor von 
Neumann regarded mathematics as subjective or arbitrary.
Another idea formulated by von Neumann underscores the importance of 
empirical origin of mathematics. Von Neumann acknowledges that once the 
mathematical concepts needed to form a mathematical model of an extra-math-
ematical phenomenon has been obtained, they take on their own life, they de-
velop internally and after a while the resulted mathematics gets so far from its 
origin that those origins are hard to trace or recognize. Von Neumann mentions 
specifically the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis, precisely the 
two major problems to which Gödel made substantial contributions in the 1930s, 
as examples of issues to which mathematics has been led following its internal 
3  Gödel’s footnote: “To be more precise, it suggests that the situation in mathematics is 
not so very different from that in the natural sciences” (Gödel 1951. 313).
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development (von Neumann 1961). This von Neumann regards as a perfectly 
normal process that is part of the ordinary workings of mathematics. There is 
however, in von Neumann’s view, also a danger lurking in this internal devel-
opment: 
As a mathematical discipline travels far from its empirical source, or still more, if it is 
a second and third generation only indirectly inspired by ideas coming from “reality” 
it is beset with very grave dangers. It becomes more and more purely aestheticizing, 
more and more purely I’art pour I’art. This need not be bad, if the field is surrounded 
by correlated subjects, which still have closer empirical connections […] But there is 
a grave danger that the subject will develop along the line of least resistance, that the 
stream, so far from its source, will separate into a multitude of insignificant branches, 
and that the discipline will become a disorganized mass of details and complexities. 
In other words, at a great distance from its empirical source, or after much “abstract” in-
breeding, a mathematical subject is in danger of degeneration. […] whenever this stage 
is reached, the only remedy seems to me to be the rejuvenating return to the source: the 
re-injection of more or less directly empirical ideas. (Von Neumann 1961. 9.)
V. CLOSING COMMENTS
The just described divergence in their views about the nature of mathemat-
ics would probably have had the consequence that Gödel and von Neumann 
would not have interacted too much at IAS even if von Neumann had not been 
increasingly involved in war work during the 1940s as the war was raging on. In 
this connection one could mention that von Neumann did not interact too much 
with the another prominent member of IAS, Einstein, either – in spite the fact 
that one would expect this, given their major roles and interest in foundations 
and philosophy of quantum mechanics. (See Rédei 2011 for mentioning an ep-
isode of interaction between them on foundations of quantum mechanics.) It 
seems that a more substantial cooperation between Einstein and von Neumann 
was hindered by Einstein being less mathematically minded than ideal for a 
fruitful exchange of ideas with von Neumann, whereas Gödel was more inspired 
by pure mathematics than ideal for a useful and more intensive intellectual con-
tact between Gödel and von Neumann at that time.
After the war the careers of Gödel’s and von Neumann diverged wildly: von 
Neumann got involved more and more in applied research (computer devel-
opment) and government advising, which culminated in his appointment as 
Atomic Energy Commissioner (1954). In this change of von Neumann’s career 
other philosophical considerations, unrelated to philosophy of mathematics, 
played a role: von Neumann thought that scientists should get involved in gov-
ernment-military advising for moral reasons (Rédei 2005. Introduction). Gödel 
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remained fully within the protected walls of academia and continued his work, 
mainly pursuing philosophy. What started in the Austro-Hungarian Empire as 
very similar academic careers and which developed subsequently through over-
lapping scientific interests thus ended in the U.S.A. as radically different. In the 
divergence philosophical differences about the abstract epistemological nature 
of mathematics and its relation to sciences played a role, and conversely: these 
views were shaped by the scientific research they carried out.
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péter anDrás VarGa
A Snapshot of Austrian Philosophy on the 
Eve of Franz Brentano’s Arrival: The Young 
Bernhard Alexander in Vienna in 1868–1871
 I. INTRODUCTION
When Bernhard (Bernát) Alexander arrived in Vienna in autumn 1868, he was 
still far from being the widely respected university professor, public writer, and 
art critic who would later influence entire generations of Hungarian philoso-
phers and the intellectual climate of his native country.1 What separated him 
from this status was not merely his young age (he had just turned 18) and the 
corresponding lack of academic career milestones he reached in the coming dec-
ades (in the face of the rising tide of antisemitism in Hungary), but, first and 
foremost, the lack of his strong philosophical commitment to Neo-Kantianism 
he acquired throughout the later stages of his academic peregrination which he 
spent in Berlin (WS 1871–1872), Göttingen (SS 1872), and Leipzig (WS 1872–
1  Alexander was appointed to the University of Budapest as a lecturer (Privatdozent) in 
1878, i.e., shortly after his return to Hungary. Yet, he was passed over when the successor of 
Cyrill Horváth, Alexander’s own teacher (see Section II. 2 below) was elected in 1886 and 
had to wait until 1895 to become an extraordinary professor. Even then, this appointment 
proposal received only a minimal majority in the faculty, and Alexander’s promotion to the 
rank of ordinary professor, which, according to normal academic procedure, would have taken 
place after three years, was repeatedly rejected between 1898 and 1902 (as presented on the 
basis of archival documents: Gergely 1976. 15 ff). As we are going to see below, Alexander, 
in retrospect, attributed these obstacles to latent antisemitism. In 1904, Alexander, however, 
managed to secure his professorial appointment by virtue of governmental intervention. As 
a full professor, he gained considerable fame (e.g., his public lecture course was attended 
by more than thousand people from all over Budapest, cf. Gergely 1976. 19), became dean 
of the faculty (1914–1915), and, inter alia, president of the Hungarian Philosophical Society 
(1914–1919). His career suffered a second blow due to his alleged support for the Hungarian 
Soviet Republic of 1919 (cf. Turbucz 2017). In 1923, he returned from emigration and was 
partially compensated, but his career never fully recovered. (There is still no detailed intel-
lectual biography of Alexander, pioneering preliminary work was done by Gábor 1986; for 
reliable biographical data directly based on primary sources, see: Kovács et al. 2012. 25–27.) 
Even though a complete bibliography of Alexander also remains a scholarly desideratum, it is 
indicative of the extent of his journalistic activity, that a collection of newspaper commenta-
ries published by Alexander in German language in the Pester Lloyd during the lasts years of 
his life (i.e., in 1924–1927, including, literary, the last month of his life), which was preserved 
in his literary estate (Ms. MTAK 4110), consists of 24 newspapers cutouts alone (in addition 
to further 7 undated and one posthumously published items).
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1873-SS 1873).2 Given that it took decades for the mature Alexander’s young 
students educated in Neo-Kantianism of their professor to discover phenome-
nology for themselves and introduce it to Hungary, it might be compelling to 
speculate as to which kind of different course the history of philosophy would 
have taken in Hungary, had the young Alexander arrived in Vienna just a few 
years later or had stayed just a few years longer in order for him to encounter 
the philosophical debut of Franz Brentano in Spring 1874 (see Brentano 1874b) 
who broke new grounds in Austrian philosophy. Yet, the present paper is not an 
exercise in counterfactual history-writing in philosophy. Rather, it is dedicated 
to reconstructing and exploring the historical perspective offered by Alexander’s 
account of Austrian philosophy as it was actually practiced in Vienna on the eve 
of Franz Brentano’s arrival who inaugurated Austrian Philosophy (with a capi-
tal ‘P’), both according to the hagiographical narrative construed by the Vienna 
Circle and the more scientific, though still extrinsically motivated conception 
of Rudolf Haller.3 Thus, the present paper is intended to augment the author’s 
2  This historiographical judgement was already pronounced by Gyula Kornis (1885–1958), 
Alexander’s colleague who became an ordinary professor shortly after Alexander’s expulsion, 
see Kornis 1930. 196–197. (Technically speaking, Kornis inherited the chair of Alexander’s 
teacher Horváth through Horváth’s successor Pauer, while Alexander’s chair, which was ded-
icated to the history of philosophy, had remained vacant for decades after Alexander’s forced 
retirement in 1922, see Gergely 1976. 29.)
3  Classical exposition: Haller 1979. 7 ff. (Haller notably employed an idiomatic capitaliza-
tion: “Österreichische Philosophie”, which I render by idiomatically capitalizing the English word 
“philosophy”). Already by that time, Haller was fighting against his critics who claimed that 
the historiographical idea of Austrian Philosophy is a “Procrustean bed” (Haller 1986), plainly 
“false” (40), or simply too “unclear and blurred” (42) to be useful as a historiographical cate-
gory. His defense boiled down to asserting the exceptional nature of the “lineage of tradition 
[Traditionslinie]” that is constituted by Austrian Philosophy (41). Even as late as in the last 
year before his retirement (i.e., becoming a professor emeritus), Haller insisted on the idea of 
an Austrian Sonderweg in the history of modern philosophy (cf. Haller 1996. 153), supposedly 
characterized (see 14–155) by the shared rejection of Kantianism and subsequent German 
Idealism, aversion to existentialism, adoption of the methodology of the critique of language, 
and commitment to making philosophy scientific (even though Haller admitted that Bren-
tano’s philosophy exhibited “an impressive residual potential for metaphysics [metaphysis-
chen Restpotenzial]”; 155). In a telling passage of his late intellectual autobiography, however, 
Haller clearly stated that his introduction of the historiographical category was motivated 
by extrinsic consideration, namely “to pursue the tradition of Austrian philosophy from the 
vantage point of Russell, G. E. Moore and their followers”, who, Haller confesses, embody 
the “Weltgeist” (Haller 2001. 583). The alleged exceptionalism of Austrian Philosophy, thus, 
seems to be rooted in Haller’s admitted metaphilosophical preference for analytic philosophy. 
On the other hand, it is possible to make sense of Austrian philosophy not as an extrinsically 
motivated prescriptive notion, but rather as a descriptive notion pertaining to the local peculi-
arities of philosophy as it was practiced in the Habsburg Empire – which, however, obviously 
antedated the symbolical datum of 1874. Furthermore, as Katalin Neumer recently point-
ed out (notwithstanding her professional indebtedness to the research program initiated by 
Haller), Haller’s thesis is not merely descriptively untrue (e.g., as she argued, Wittgenstein, 
who was probably the most prevalent Austrian philosopher, stood in the striking proximity 
of German Lebensphilosophie during the late stage of his thinking), but also disregards the 
historical fact that Austria (i.e., the Habsburg Empire) was far from being a homogenous 
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earlier research on overcoming the received view of the (pre)history of phe-
nomenology, e.g. his attempts at reconstructing the biographical and conceptu-
al links between Edmund Husserl and Herbartian psychology transmitted via 
Robert Zimmermann (see Varga 2015) or between the School of Brentano and 
the philosophical logic that was prevalent in German academic philosophy (Uni-
verstitätsphilosophie) prior to the slow reception of Boole-Jevons-style old English 
logic and the triumphant rise of Bertrand Russell’s new English logic (see Varga 
2016b). In any case, the story of Alexander’s stay in Vienna in 1868–1871, no 
matter how brief it had been, represents one of the few authentic pieces of the 
history of Hungarian philosophy which are, at the same time, equally part of the 
history of Austrian philosophy proper.4
II. THE HISTORICAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF ALEXANDER’S  
STAY IN VIENNA
1. Courses attended
In the unpublished curriculum vitae that Alexander attached to his doctoral 
application at the University of Leipzig in July 1873, he wrote the following 
about his studies in Vienna and the brief prelude he spent at the university of 
his native city:
When I entered university, I have already chosen philosophy as the special field of 
studies. I have visited classes relating to this and philology for a year in Budapest 
and went then to Vienna where I had the pleasure of winning Professor [Robert] 
Zimmermann as a dear friend and supporter of my studies. On his advice, I enthusias-
tically studied natural sciences, […] have attended – with the exception of Prof Zim-
mermann’s lectures – only classes in theoretical branches of medicine, like anatomy 
and physiology. Of course, I continued my philosophical studies in a private way and 
prepared for the final university examination, mainly in order to obtain a supporting 
grant from the Hungarian government, so that my time, which, until then, was divid-
and exclusively German-speaking Nationalstaat (Neumer 2004. 126). In the end, as Neumer 
insightfully remarked (see esp. 129), the idea of an ‘Austrian Philosophy’ is rooted in the gen-
eral methodological dilemmas of writing the history of philosophy, insofar as Haller’s thesis 
represents a markedly universalistic conception of philosophy (hence Haller’s emphasis on 
the supposedly universal values embodied by analytic philosophy), while philosophy, Neum-
er believed, simultaneously purport the claim of universal validity and is embedded in locally 
determined networks.
4  Despite autobiographical documents made available already in the 1920s (see Section II. 
2 below), in the research literature there are only cursory discussions of Alexander’s academic 
peregrination (cf. note 1 above and, e.g., Kornis 1930. 196 ff.).
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ed between jobs for earning my living and my studies, could be dedicated to the latter 
alone. I passed the final university examination in philosophy and German language 
and literature with excellent results and went then to Germany […].5
It is worth comparing Alexander’s autobiographical narrative with archival data 
pertaining to his university studies. The individual student records at the Uni-
versity of Budapest have, unfortunately, been destroyed during in the turmoil 
surrounding the uprising of 1956, but the University Archives of Vienna pre-
serves detailed information on the classes Alexander registered for during the 
Austrian section of his academic peregrination (first partial publication in Varga 
2016c. 262–263). According to this data, the young Alexander, aged 18 and spec-
ifying “Hungarian” as his native language and “Jewish” as his religion, enrolled 
on the basis of the record of his previous studies at the University of Budapest 
(until 1873: of Pest) in WS 1868–1869 and opted to attend the following classes:6
– Practical philosophy (Praktische Philosophie) by Robert Zimmermann;
– Aesthetics (Aesthetik) by Robert Zimmermann;
– Advanced seminar (Philosophisches Conversatorium) by Robert Zimmer-
mann;
– Sophocles (Sophocles) [full title: Philological Seminar: Ancient Greek (Interpreta-
tion of Sophocles’ Ajax); Griechische Übungen im philologischen Seminar (Interpre-
tation von Sophokles Aias)] by Emanuel Hoffmann;7
5  Ms. UA Leipzig, Phil. Fak. Prom. 03403 (1876). 10 (all translations and transcriptions are 
by the present author, unless indicated otherwise). Original (supplied only in case of quota-
tion from unpublished sources): “Als ich die Universität bezug, hatte ich Philosophie schon 
als Fachstudium erwählt. Ich hörte ein Jahr lang diesbezügliche und philologische Vorlesun-
gen an der Universität zu Pest und gieng dann nach Wien, wo ich so glücklich war, im H. 
Professor Zimmermann einen warmen Freund und Förderer meiner Studien zu gewinnen. 
Auf sein Anrathen studierte ich eifrig Naturwissenschaften, zu <?> hörte zwei Jahre lang, 
mit Ausnahme der Vorlesungen von H. Prof. Zimmermann<,> nur theoretische Zweige der 
Medicin, wie Anatomie und Physiologie. Ich setzte natürlich privatim meine philosophische 
Studien fort, und bereitete mich auf das Staatsexamen vor, hauptsächlich, um eine Unter-
stützung von Seiten der ungarischen Regierung zu erhalten und meine Zeit, die bis dahin 
zwischen den Beschäftigungen, mir meinen Lebensunterhalt zu sichern und meinen Studien 
getheilt war, nun ganz diesen letzteren widmen zu können. Ich bestand das Staatsexamen aus 
Philosophie, deutscher Sprache und Literatur mit ausgezeichnetem Erfolg, gieng dann nach 
Deutschland <…>.” 
6  I provide a full transcript of Alexander’s entries Ms. UA Wien, Nationalen Phil. Fak. 
WS 1868/69 ff. (Med. Fak. since Alexander’s second academic year), collated against the 
corresponding course catalogues (Öffentliche Vorlesungen an der k. k. Universität zu Wien im Win-
ter-Semester 1868/9 [...]. Wien, Kaiserlich-königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei. 1868 ff.). I 
have previously published the list of the philosophical courses (see: Varga 2016c. 262–263). 
The dates of Alexander’s registration and de-registration from the faculties of the University 
of Vienna, as well as the personal data from his registration form, was already published in 
Patyi et al. 2015. 69. 
7  Emanuel Hoffmann (1825–1900), professor of classical philology at the universities of 
Graz (1850) and Vienna (1856), editor, amongst others, of Augustine’s De civitate dei.
186 THE INFLUENCE OF AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY IN HUNGARY 
– Euripides[, Cyclops]  (Euripides[, Cyclops]) by Johannes Vahlen;8
– Theory of organic and inorganic chemistry ([Theorie der organischen und unorga-
nischen] Chemie) by E[duard] Lippmann;9
– Mathematics (Mathematik) by Joseph Petzval.10
In the subsequent SS 1869, Alexander registered for the following classes:
– History of philosophy, Third Part; From Kant down to the modern age (Geschichte 
der Philosophie [III. Cursus; V]on Kant bis auf die Neuzeit [official title: bis auf 
die Gegenwart]) by Robert Zimmermann;
– [On] The life and works of Fr. Schleiermacher ([Über] Fr. Schleiermachers Leben 
und Werke) by Robert Zimmermann;
– [Presentation of the] Sankhya philosophy ([Darstellung der] Sánkhya[‑]Philoso-
phie) by Ludwig Poley;11
– Philosophy of law (Rechtsphilosophie) by Lorenz von Stein.12
In the following semester (WS 1869–1870) Alexander transferred to the Faculty 
of Medicine; yet, he remained faithful to Zimmermann:
– Descriptive anatomy (Descriptive Anatomie) by Joseph Hyrtl (1810–1894);
– Anatomy training course (Secierübungen) by Joseph Hyrtl (1810–1894);
– [General and medical-pharmaceutical] chemistry ([Allgemeine und medici-
nisch-pharmaceutische] Chemie) by Joseph Redtenbacher (1810–1870);
– Advanced seminar (Philosophisches Conversatorium) by Robert Zimmermann;
8  Johann Vahlen (1830–1911), professor of classical philology at the universities of Breslau 
(1856), Freiburg (1858), Vienna (in the same year), and Berlin (1874), commentator, inter alia, 
of Aristotle’s rhetorical writings.
9  Eduard Lippmann (1838–1919) obtained his habilitation in 1869 at the University of Vi-
enna, where he would become an extraordinary professor of chemistry in 1875. He specialized 
in the chemistry of aromatic organic compounds.
10  The class attended by Alexander was probably one or two of the sub-classes of the In-
troduction to Advanced Mathematics (Einleitung in die höhere Mathematik): Algebraic Analysis (Alge-
braische Analysis) or Theory of Higher-Order Equations (Theorie der Höheren Gleichungen). Joseph 
Petzval (1807–1891) started his professorial career at the University of Budapest (1835) but 
soon moved to Vienna (1835), where he had been ordinary professor of mathematics (1837–
1877). Today, Petzval is mostly remembered for his pioneering work in the 1840s and 1850s 
on designing photographic lens. Contrary to what is indicated in Alexander’s registration 
form, in WS 1868–1869, Petzval only taught the advanced theoretical classes. The introduc-
tory classes were held, instead, by the astronomer Edmund Weiss (Weiß, 1837–1917) who 
would become an extraordinary professor only in 1869 (ordinary professor: 1875).
11  The less-known Ludwig Poley (1812 [?] – 1885) obtained his venia legendi for indology 
at the University of Vienna in 1867 and started lecturing in the same year. His application 
in 1871 for the status of an extraordinary professor was, however, rejected. Poley continued 
lecturing until his death. For his biography, see Schroeder 1917 (which confirms Alexander’s 
report, see below, of Poley’s personal acquaintance of Hegel).
12  After being forced to leave his native University of Kiel due to his involvement in the 
German Revolution of 1848–1849, Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890) became an ordinary polit-
ical science at the University of Vienna in 1855 and launched a career an influential, philo-
sophically-inclined, and highly decorated professor.
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– [crossed out: History and critique of the] concept of God [in the modern world-
views] ([Geschichte und Kritik des] Gottesbegriff[es in den modernen Weltanscha-
uungen]) by Carl Sigmund Barach-Rappaport;13
At the new faculty in the next semester (SS 1870), Alexander continued to take 
a combination of medical and philosophical courses:
– Anatomy of the sense organ[, the brain and the nervous system]  (Anatomie der 
Sinnesorgane[, des Gehirns und des Nervensystems]) by Joseph Hyrtl;
– Anatomy of the vessel system (Anatomie des Gefässsystems) by Anton Fried-
lowsky (?–?);
– Organic chemistry [Part II: Carbon-rich compounds] (Organische Chemie[, Theil 
(Kohlenstoffreichere Verbindungen)]) by Ernst Ludwig (1842–1915; different 
name provided by Alexander);
– Psychology (Psychologie) by Robert Zimmermann.
Alexander remained at the medical faculty in WS 1870–1871 as well:
– Advanced seminar (Phil[osophisches] Conservatorium) by Robert Zimmer-
mann;
– Topographical anatomy [of the neck and the trunk] (Topographische Anatomie 
[des Halses und Rumpfes]) by Joseph Hyrtl;
– Comparative osteology [after the completion of human osteology] (Vergleichende 
Osteologie [nach Abschluss der menschlichen Knochenlehre]) by Joseph Hyrtl;
– Anatomy Training Course (Secierübungen) by Joseph Hyrtl;
– Pharmacology[, general therapy and the theory of prescriptions]  (Pharmakologie[, 
allgemeine Therapie und Receptirkunde]) by Carl Ritter von Schroff (1844–
1892);
– Pharmacognosy (Pharmakognosie) by Carl Ritter von Schroff;
– unidentifiable;
– Physiology und advanced anatomy (Physiologie und höhere Anatomie]) by Ernst 
Brücke (1819–1892);
– [History of the Old] German literature ([Geschichte der älteren d]eutsche[n] Lite-
ra tur) by Wilhelm Scherer.14
13  The less-known Carl Sigmund Barach-Rappaport (1834–1885) was appointed as a lec-
turer (Privatdozent) at the University of Vienna after years-long faculty infighting in 1861. In 
1870, he transferred to Lamberg and, in the subsequent year, to Innsbruck where he became 
an ordinary professor (see also: Wieser 1950. 13 ff., 85). He was regarded by his contemporar-
ies as a representative of “ethical idealism” (Eisler 1912. 46).
14  See note 21 below.
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The present author was unable to locate Alexander’s file for SS 1871, though 
Ale xander reported to have attended classes in a pattern similar to that of SS 
1870 (cf. Alexander 1928. 21–22). Let us now turn to other primary sources 
which permit a glance beyond the surface of archival data!
2. Intellectual relationships
There are a series of synchronous and diachronous autobiographical accounts 
pertaining to Alexander’s stay in Vienna.15 Shortly after Alexander’s death, the 
incomplete set of the letters Alexander wrote to his professor Cyrill (József) 
Horváth Sch. P. (1804–1884), has been published (see Alexander 1928), together 
with the separate publication of the letters sent to Horváth by József Bánóczi 
(Weisz; 1849–1926), Alexander’s fellow traveler (see: Bánóczi 1928). Horváth, 
who had been ordinary professor of philosophy at the University of Budapest 
since 1863, gained considerably fame in the historiography of Hungarian phi-
losophy as the creator of an eclectic-Hegelian philosophical synthesis, termed 
the system of “concretism [concretismus]”,16 which, however, is supposed to have 
never been devised, let alone presented by Horváth in its entirety.17 In his con-
tribution to Bánóczi’s Festschrift, Alexander described Horváth, the classes of 
whom they attended during their preparatory university years in Budapest, as 
somebody who “became aware of us, supplied us with books, but we have not 
learnt any philosophy from him, except from his books he supplied to us” (Alex-
15  Separately published recollection of the Göttingen phase of his academic peregrination: 
Alexander 1919b. 164 ff.
16  Horváth 1868. 15 ff. 
17  This historiographical scheme is already present in the obituary of Horváth delivered 
by his colleague Imre Pauer (1845–1930), successor to Horváth’s chair in Budapest, at the 
general session of the Academy on November 23, 1885: Horváth’s promised opus magnum 
“was never finished”, the system the book intended to present “is far from being completed, 
the basement of it might not yet be stable, and its details not formulated even in the mind 
of its master” (Pauer 1885. 17, 18). Pauer reported to have gone through Horváth’s literary 
estate but “failed to find the finished system anywhere” (loc. cit.). Pauer’s evaluation is shared 
by the modern research literature (see, e.g., Mészáros 2000. 181), though Béla Mester has 
recently argued that the “topos” of Horváth’s work on a system of philosophy is “construc-
tion” resulting from “external, non-philosophical requirements” (Mester 2011. 83), namely 
the requirement of reproducing the perceived role of Western system-making philosopher 
within his local Hungarian cultural context (cf. 82). At the same time, Mester believes, this 
requirement was “deeply interiorized” by Horváth himself as well (83). Without wishing to 
discount Mester’s legitimate concern for external conditions of philosophical production, I 
believe that, from a purely philosophical point of view (i.e., without committing oneself to 
deliberately psychological or sociological approaches), it is very hard to distinguish between 
supposedly genuine intention of philosophical system-making and the one supposedly re-
sulting merely from interiorized external requirements. In the end, all what the historian 
of philosophy could do is to point towards Horváth’s manifest own intention of producing a 
philosophical system (cf., e.g., note 16 above).
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ander 1919a. 8). At one occasion, the sexagenarian professor reportedly accused 
his young students “of trying to steal my philosophical system from me”.18 As if 
that were not enough, one might conjecture whether there have been a latent con-
fessional tension between the Piarist priest Horváth and his young Jewish students 
(or whether one of the parties have ever imputed such intentions to the another), 
even though there is no clear sign indicating that such thing has ever actualized. 
In any case, Alexander’s retrospective account recalls the latent and manifest an-
tisemitism they faced during other stages of their early intellectual biography.19 
Last but not least, the content of their letters is obviously determined by the 
conscious or subliminal genre constraints of letters written by young students 
believing themselves to be at the mercy of their academic benefactors. From this 
point of view, it is hard to overestimate that we are now in the possession of a syn-
chronous and relatively direct autobiographical source pertaining to the Viennese 
section of Alexander’s academic peregrination, namely the publication of his diary 
entries written in Vienna (see below in this special issue, 209 ff.).
Taken together, these sources permit a glance beyond the surface of archival 
data. Alexander, e.g., was attracted by Poley’s originality and first-hand experi-
ence of Hegel, though simultaneously alienated by Poley’s lack of systematic 
rigorousness.20 On the other hand, Alexander had fond memories of Lorenz von 
Stern’s lecture course on the philosophy of law (cf. Alexander 1928. 12). With 
regard to classes attended by Alexander, it is intriguing to ask why he dedicated 
such amount of his precarious time to studies of natural sciences. éva Gábor, 
whose merits in Alexander scholarship cannot be overestimated, believed that 
this was motivated by Alexander’s own “recognition that the profound study of 
philosophy indispensably presupposes the scientific, anatomical-physiological 
knowledge of the human body” (Gábor 1986. 12); though, few sentences earlier 
Gábor hinted at medicine being a typical career path for offspring of (lower) 
middle-class families like Alexander (see 10). In a similar vein, the Jewish schol-
ar Lajos Blau (1861–1936) who published the letters sent by Bánóczi to Horváth 
conjectured that the equally conspicuous amount of interest Bánóczi dedicated 
to studies of natural sciences and medicines are indicative of his intention of 
“becoming a physician” (Bánóczi 1928. 109), pointing at Bánóczi’s passing re-
mark according to which the study of anatomy “paints the uncertain future in a 
more comforting color” (120; quoted by 109). In stark contrast to these mundane 
18  Alexander 1919a. 8; Alexander’s anecdote logically implies that there was something to 
be stolen in the first place; though it could be colored by the retrospective historiographical 
assumptions of Alexander’s age and hence cannot be taken as a direct evidence that Horváth 
actually believed himself to be in possession of an elaborated system worth misappropriating.
19  See Alexander 1919a. 6 ff. This assessment was shared by Alexander’s contemporaries, 
see, e.g., Sebestyén 1934. 37–38.
20  Alexander 1928. 12–13; hitherto not identified due to the fact that Alexander did not 
explicitly use the name of Poley.
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existential reasons, Alexander’s doctoral curriculum vitae from Leipzig, quoted 
at the beginning of the current section, makes the intriguing claim that it was 
Robert Zimmermann, ordinary professor of philosophy at the University of Vi-
enna between 1861 and 1896, who directed the attention of his young student 
towards natural sciences, more specifically towards theoretical medicine. In fact, 
Zimmermann’s role is supported by a closer reading of Bánóczi’s letter’s to Hor-
váth in which the need to study natural sciences first surfaces upon the explic-
it recommendation of Zimmermann (“he recommended”, 113). Who was this 
strange professor of philosophy who dared to direct the attention of his students 
away from philosophy? Before attempting to address this question, let us take a 
closer look at the aforementioned existential aspect of Alexander’s stay in Vienna.
Already in his heavily stylized letters to his former university professor, Alex-
ander made a passing remark on the seclusion he suffered in the university city 
of Göttingen: “one lacks social circle [literally: szociális köre]” that would “coun-
terbalance” the “tedious studies” (Alexander 1928. 39). His private diary en-
tries, however, reveal the true nature of Alexander’s longing for »social circle«. 
As a young man away from home, he was far from leading an ascetic life: e.g., 
he co-organized a “carousal [Trinkgelage]” to celebrate the publication of his first 
feature (Feuilleton) in the Viennese daily Die Presse.21 Yet, Alexander’s “social 
circle” went beyond the confines of usual pass-time social activities by young 
adults. Alexander’s diary entries witness a curious kind of informal “fraternity 
[Bruderschaft]”,22 which exhibits traits both of the more formal student fraterni-
ties (Corps, Burschenschaften etc.) which were prevalent in nineteenth-century 
universities in the German-speaking cultural area, as well as of the less specific, 
though recurring behavioral patterns and intellectual inclinations that character-
ize young students of philosophy. When Franz Brentano’s students, who would 
later establish the official Philosophical Society at the University of Vienna (Philoso-
21  See orig. p. 6. As mentioned in the corresponding footnotes by the editors, the Die Presse, 
once the flagship of Vienna’s journalistic landscape (and predecessor of today’s eponymous 
daily), had already been on the decline when its actual owner, Carl Dreger issued a journal-
istic carte blanche for the newcomer Alexander. By the way, it is indicative of the Die Presse’s 
situation – and it, to a certain extent, also deducts from the value of Dreger’s offer – that in 
1870 the bulk of the cultural sections (Feuilleton) of the daily issues was filled with endless in-
stalments of the same novels (in case of the three-volume novel La Pucelle by the schoolteach-
er-turned-writer Karl Fren(t)zel [1827–1914], more than hundred instalments were published; 
biographical data based on Deutsches Literatur-Lexikon). On the other hand, even though the 
non-fiction content in the cultural section was unsurprisingly tilted towards literature, history, 
and music, Alexander was not alone in reporting on novelties of the philosophical literature. 
E.g., the Germanist Wilhelm Scherer (1841–1886), professor at the university between 1868 
and 1872, who was incidentally Dilthey’s friend and, precisely in 1870, lobbied heavily for 
Dilthey’s appointment to Vienna (cf. Dilthey 2011. 544 ff., esp. 545, n. 1), published a review 
of the first (and only) volume of Dilthey’s biography of Schleiermacher (Scherer 1870).
22  Orig. p. 5. Cf. also: „das wir zu Ehren eines neuen Bruders veranstaltet hatten” (orig. p. 
4), „der neue Bruder” (orig. p. 5).
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phische Gesellschaft an der Universität zu Wien) convened in the Café Kaiserhof23 in 
WS 1887/87, they were, as they recalled two decades later, „arguing over the ex-
istence of the external world and, for this purposes, questioning the existence of 
the stone tables, causing astonishment on the faces of uninvited listeners”.24 In 
a similar vein, it is fascinating to read Alexander’s description of their debating 
about the “big secrets of mankind” (orig. p. 4) and the futility of “increasing the 
number of the many question marks already possessed by human race” (ibid.). 
In contrast to the more formally-epistemologically oriented problems discussed 
by Brentano’s disciples in the late 1880s (probably not devoid of the vague in-
fluence of Neo-Kantianism), the burning issue for Alexander and his »brothers« 
were unapologetically metaphysical: “attaining truth” (orig. p. 4) and the “luring 
idea” of “immortality (orig. p. 3). They were also not afraid of dedicating their 
fraternity to overcoming individualism towards the advancement of humanity. 
As if that were not enough, Alexander’s description seems to attest an emotion-
al, almost mystical facet of their experience, even though this facet is articulated 
in pantheistic terms (see esp. the description at the bottom of orig. p. 5). It is 
probably not without reason, that the young Alexander was reportedly enter-
taining the idea of becoming a rabbi (cf. Gábor 1986. 11) and he retained his 
distinctly Jewish identity throughout his entire life.25
The “fraternity” of Alexander and his fellow students might constitute a 
promising subject matter for comparative studies of cultural forms among nine-
teenth-century students of humanities in German-speaking area; but what could 
turn it into a piece of genuine history of philosophy is, of course, the ability of 
its professional articulation in terms of the historical tradition of philosophy, i.e., 
Alexander’s ability to connect his vague ideas to what he was taught at the uni-
versity. In this regard, the diary preserved an explicit declaration of Alexander’s 
philosophical preferences that is worth being quoted in its entirety:
23  This is probably not identical with the bar of today’s hotel, but rather located in the 
Josefstädterstrasse.
24  Anonymous 1913. 3. According to the historiography of the Society, the crystallization 
process that transformed the debating circle into an officially organized structure was initiated 
by the external example of the Philosophical Society at the University of Berlin, see: Meister 
1938. 4. 
25  In one of his juvenilia published during his last Viennese winter term, Alexander re-
vealed strong sympathy for regarding religion as a merely cultural phenomenon: “In religions, 
all old is new and all new is old, and all progress consists in a combination of basic elements. 
Everywhere, the chords of the soul are struck in a way that the resulting tone is religion, be-
cause the chords – the human soul – are of the same composition, because the sublime phe-
nomena of nature, which elicit that tones from these chords, are essentially of the same nature 
everywhere.” (A[lexande]r 1871a. 9.) The reviewed author was Max Müller (1823–1900), an 
Indologist who, besides making a stellar career in Oxford academia, was a successful popular-
izer of his science not shy of drawing wide-ranging, and often far-fetched, conclusions on the 
basis of comparative linguistics and history of religions.
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Therefore, I am not a Hegelian in metaphysics, since I feel that it is not the path on 
which the common sense should wander, if it is intent on providing viable results. I 
hope to arrive at a natural world view that is equally distant from a flat ethical and 
scientific naturalism, as well as from a blurred idealism. Being a child of my time, I am 
a realist and compelled towards the views of a Herbart and a Lotze. As to how I would 
diverge from them, I do not know yet; but I think I will do [so].26
The part of Alexander’s above declaration which is, nolens volens, the most au-
thentic is probably his confession of being under the influence of the philoso-
phical Zeitgeist. This, of course, leaves open the question as to which extent the 
latter, culminating in Alexander’s avowal of “being a realist” corresponds to his 
latent philosophical convictions and preferences expressed in other parts of his 
diary analyzed above. In order to resolve this tension, one has to take into ac-
count Alexander’s professional philosophical activities in Vienna – which would 
bring us back to Zimmermann.
3. Writing projects
During his period spent in the Imperial city, Alexander pursued a cluster of 
philosophical writing projects. Already the sources published in 1928 univocally 
testify that Alexander’s involvement in Austrian originated in Zimmermann’s 
advanced seminar (Philosophisches Conversatorium), which, as indicated by our 
data in Section 0, Alexander consistently visited in each semester of his stay in 
Vienna. Even in the earliest report, the first one the Alexander’s preserved let-
ters to Horváth which was written shortly after the start of Alexander’s second 
semester in Vienna, he characterized Zimmermann as “my teacher in philos-
ophy” (Alexander 1928. 9), and in the diary entry from January 16, 1870 (i.e., 
almost one year later), Zimmermann is referred to as “my professor” (orig. p. 
6), not to mention Zimmermann’s description in the doctoral curriculum vitae 
as “dear friend and supporter of my studies.” In contrast to Brentano, whose 
advanced seminars, regularly announced under the title Together with the students: 
Reading, commentary and critical review of selected philosophical writings (In Gemein-
schaft mit den Studierenden: Lesung, Erklärung und kritische Besprechung ausgewählter 
philosophischen Schriften),27 was dedicated to one book per semester (often opting 
for classical authors of the history of philosophy); Zimmermann let each student 
present separate papers during his seminar sessions on a philosophical novelty. 
Alexander, as well as his companion Bánóczi excelled in this genre: Already in 
26  Orig. p. 2.
27  For the most complete list of the classes announced by Brentano, see: Antonelli 2001, 
496 ff.
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the first semester, Zimmermann “approved” Alexander’s paper and invited him 
to a discussion in his flat (Alexander 1928. 11). Zimmermann “became very fond 
of us”, Alexander recalled, “and assigned us the most important papers” (Alex-
ander 1919a. 10). “He told me several flattering things, I returned from his flat 
beaming with delight, in elevated spirits”, Alexander recorded in his diary with 
regard to a publication that originated from his presentations on Zimmermann’s 
seminars (orig. p. 6).
It is precisely Alexander’s writing projects originating from these seminar 
assignments which render Alexander’s student relationship to Zimmermann 
especially worth our attention. A detailed look permits us to reconstruct two 
major distinct writing projects which are outlined below. In none of them did 
Alexander’s main unpublished manuscript survive, but some of them Alexander 
managed to publish short pieces of writings representing the tips of the icebergs 
of his researches. These icebergs are surrounded by the floating debris of Alex-
ander’s minor occasional articles in the Die Presse (often only in its local edition, 
the Local-Anzeiger der “Presse”), published pseudonymously under various mon-
ograms and hence hard to identify in unambiguously manner.28
(1) Alexander’s first distinct writing project originated in the first semester 
from his assignment to review a booklet written by Heinrich Adolf Rinne (1819–
1868), an inconspicuous German physicist who died a premature death in the 
summer of the very year of the publication of his pamphlet.29 Rinne’s work in-
deed lacked any reference to names of philosophers, let alone their works; and 
Alexander claimed to have demonstrated its dependence on Hermann Lotze’s 
early book, the Medical Psychology (Lotze 1852; see Alexander 1928. 10–11). Alex-
ander was not alone in raising such concerns: The anonymous editorial reviewer 
of Rinne’s booklet in the influential Literarisches Centralblatt für Deutschland clas-
28  The monogram „B. A–er.” could definitely be assigned to Alexander, as it is used for the 
article he explicitly mentioned in his diary (see note 21 above) and it seems specific enough. 
Probably the same applies to the monogram “B. A.”. On the other hand, the present author 
is reluctant as to whether articles signed simply as “B.” could unambiguously be ascribed 
to Alexander (especially articles which are not specifically philosophical), even though he 
demonstrably employed this monogram in case of an article he explicitly mentioned as his 
own in his letters ([Alexander] 1870; cf. Alexander 1928. 21; for a probably different author 
using the same monogram, see the issue of January 27, 1870, p. 13). Barring any supplemental 
information, anonymous reviews cannot be ascribed to Alexander, even if they content would 
suggest Alexander’s authorship. Furthermore, Alexander probably continued contributing to 
the Die Presse even after he left Vienna (cf. A[lexander?] 1871).
29  Rinne 1868. In his letters, Alexander misreported its title as On the Significance of Materi-
alism in Psychological and Ethical Regard (Über die Bedeutung des Materialismus in psychologischer 
und ethischer Beziehung; see Alexander 1928. 10), which was reproduced by Gábor 1986. 13–14 
and Zóka 2012. 54, without providing any bibliographical reference to it. Heinrich Adolf 
Rinne studied in Munich and Göttingen and obtained his doctoral at the latter university. 
Subsequently, he embarked on a professional medical career and died in 1868, shortly after 
being appointed at a mental hospital in Hildesheim (biographical data based on his entry in 
Biographisches Lexikon der hervorragenden Ärzte und aller Zeiten und Völker).
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sified the first three sections as being on the verge of “plagiarism” (Anonymous 
1869). This issue of the Literarisches Centralblatt was published on April 17, 1869; 
i.e., two days before Alexander’s letter to Horváth in which Alexander reported 
his discovery to his former teacher. It is, thus, far from being surprising that 
Alexander’s acrimonious running commentary, which was allegedly 40 pages 
long (see Alexander 1928. 11), remained unpublished.30 It is worth mentioning, 
though, that this preoccupation made him aware of Friedrich Albert Lange’s 
book on materialism which is a seminal, yet still underestimated contribution 
to the genesis of Neo-Kantianism (besides being named by Brentano as the 
forerunner of his own idea of psychology, cf. Brentano 1874a. 13).31 The fruits 
of Alexander’s study of Lange’s opus magnum are already manifested in a short 
newspaper review article (A[lexande]r 1871c) he published in March 1871 about 
Ludwig Büchner (1824–1899) who had been one of the protagonists during the 
controversy on materialism that raged in the 1850s and, precisely through the 
voluminous pamphlet reviewed by Alexander (Büchner 1869), had just ignited 
another controversy centered around the philosophical implications of Darwin-
ism that would preoccupy philosophers and philosophically-inclined scientists 
in the 1860s and 1870s. Alexander adopted from Lange the main thrust of the 
argumentation by virtue of which early Neo-Kantian professional philosophers 
attempted the recapture the ground they had been forced to cede to natural 
scientists after the demise of Hegelianism and other absolute systems of phi-
losophy. Alexander instantiated this argumentative strategy claiming that, 
“[t]he materialism, which, at the beginning, had been a reaction against phi-
losophy, wanted to become a philosophy” (A[lexande]r 1871c. 14). In trying to 
do so, however, scientific materialism “regularly becomes shipwrecked” (ibid.), 
he claimed. In other words, the new wave of philosophers not only attempted 
to legitimate their endeavor by pointing out that their scientific critics are also 
engaged in doing philosophy, but their true strategy was to lure their enemy into 
the foreign terrain of philosophy where professional philosophers would prevail. 
Alexander, too, claimed by relying on Lange that Büchner is “entangled in the 
bonds of the old Naturphilosophie that is so much ridiculed by him”.32 
30  It must be said in Alexander’s favor that the long benevolent review of Rinne’s booklet 
by Heinrich Ritter (1791-1869), the aging historian of philosophy, in the renowned Göttingis-
che Gelehrte Anzeigen on August 5 of the previous year did not mention Rinne’s indebtedness 
to Lotze (besides suggesting the presence of a broadly-speaking Herbartian framework; cf. 
Ritter 1868. 1242). 
31  At that time, only the first, single-volume and less-discussed edition was available: 
Lange 1866. On the significance of Lange for the genesis of Neo-Kantianism, see Klaus 
Christian Köhnke’s seminal investigations (1986. 233 ff.).
32  A[lexande]r 1871c. 14. The passages Alexander had in mind were probably Lange’s 
claim that Büchner is under the spell of the “after-effect [Nachwirkung] of the Schellingi-
an-Hegelian philosophy” and occasionally even falls into “vague pantheism” (Lange 1866. 
304). In accordance with the general line of his argumentation, Lange also attempted to prove 
that Büchner “propounds a completely new concept of philosophy without, however, exactly 
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Hence, the philosophical standpoint manifested by the young Alexander in 
Vienna might, from a level general enough, be described as being committed to 
scientific ideals and, thus, subsumed under the historiographical concept of Aus-
trian Philosophy. What such historiographical classification overlooks, however, 
is specifically the early Neo-Kantian approach to sciences, as exemplified by the 
young Alexander’s critique of Büchner. What else does the case study of Alexan-
der’s juvenilia teach us about Austrian Philosophy as it was actually practiced on 
the eve of Brentano’s arrival that inaugurated it in the historiographical sense?
(2) It is only the present critical edition of the Viennese entries from Alex-
ander’s diary which reveals Alexander’s second distinct writing project (hith-
erto apparently conflated with the previous one),33 namely the presentation 
and critique of a philosophical-cultural sensation du jour, receded into obliv-
ion since then (even the author’s name was overshadowed by an eponymous 
twentieth-century philosopher): Eduard von Hartmann’s (1842–1906) Philoso-
phy of the Unconscious, which was first published in November 1868 (Hartmann 
1869) and went through eight editions within a decade. Already in February 
1869, the Leipzig-based cultural weekly celebrated Hartmann’s book as one 
of the „outstanding publications of recent philosophical literature” (Gottschall 
1869. 113), and the book was reviewed at great length in the leading profession-
al philosophical journal already during the second half of the same year (see: 
Reichlin-Meldegg 1869). Alexander himself prepared a paper that consisted of 
53 densely written pages and presented it spanning three sessions of Zimmer-
mann’s advanced seminar in November 1869 (see: Alexander 1928. 13). Alex-
ander also reported that Zimmermann recommended him to submit his paper 
to the Zeitschrift für exacte Philosophie (ibid.; full title of the journal: Zeitschrift für 
exacte Philosophie im Sinne des neuern philosophischen Realismus). This passage in 
Alexander’s letter has hitherto been taken at its face value, without looking into 
the issue as to whether Hartmann’s bestseller was actually reviewed in that jour-
nal or not. This question can be answered in affirmative mode; however, the 
author of the review was, unfortunately, not Alexander but rather Friedrich Bar-
tolomäi,34 a lesser-known German Herbartian pedagogue who belonged to the 
defining it” (298), because Büchner insisted on philosophy being generally intelligible and 
accessible to lay audience; though this argumentation of Lange verges on being a sophism.
33  Cf. Gábor 1986. 14–15; Zóka 2012. 55; I was unable to locate any writing of Alexander 
published in the Neue Freie Presse, as claimed by Zóka. Szemere, the editor of Alexander’s 
letters to Horváth, was careful enough not to try to guess what Alexander’s writing project, 
described at lengths by Alexander in the letters without exactly telling its subject matter, was 
about (cf. Alexander 1928. 5).
34  Friedrich Bartolomäi (1817–1878) studied mathematics and philosophy in Jena (since 
1840), where he joined the Herbartian pedagogical circles and worked as a teacher at the flag-
ship teacher training school. From 1866 he was employed as a statistician in Berlin (mental 
health problems since 1877). Biographical data from Lebensskizzen ausgewählter Herbartianer 
of the Arbeitsstelle für Internationale Herbartianismusforschung at the University of Düsseldorf, 
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inner circle of the self-avowedly Herbartian journal (Bartholomäi 1871). The 
review was published in issue no. 3 of vol. 9, which spanned 1869–1871, so its 
submission probably coincided with the incubation of Alexander’s own plans. In 
March 1870, Alexander reported to have submitted his paper “to the journal of 
the Herbartians”, even though the “journal appears to be discontinued, as only 
one issue was published in the previous year and no issue so far in the current 
year” (Alexander 1928. 17). It must have been a bitter disappointment for Alex-
ander to find out that his juvenilia collided with a review originating from the 
inner circle of the journal.
In this case, however, Alexander managed to publish a condensed version 
of his paper as a feature article spanning the bottom parts of four pages in the 
cultural section (Feuilleton) of the declining Viennese daily Die Presse.35 His diary 
provides the useful information that this article was definitely the first one he 
published in the cultural section of German-language newspapers (cf. orig p. 6). 
Collated with his letters to Horváth, it also becomes clear that he sent the print-
ed text to his Hungarian mentor who benevolently compared it to the aforemen-
tioned review36 that was published in the mainstream professional Zeitschrift für 
Philosophie und philosophische Kritik (cf. Alexander 1928. 17), and  that Alexander 
was entertaining the idea of publishing a Hungarian version of the article.37
Unlike the lost longer manuscript which reportedly “sharply criticize[d] the 
inconsistencies and falsehoods” in Hartmann’s book (Alexander 1928. 13) and at-
tempted to demonstrate that Hartmann’s “inductive method fails to attain the 
results on which he based his system” (17); Alexander’s published feature article 
is self-avowedly descriptive (e.g., he does not want to “impose a judgement on 
the reader”; A[lexande]r 1870. 2). At the same, time there is, to a certain extent, 
a harmonia praestabilita between Alexander’s more general remarks in the article 
and the views expounded by Brentano when he ascended to the lectern two years 
later (see: Brentano 1874b). Both were situated in what Frederick C. Beiser has 
recently so aptly termed as the post-Hegelian “obsolescence crisis”38 of philoso-
phy – even though the young Alexander was more sympathetic to the idea that 
Germany (https://www.uni-due.de/herbartianismus-forschungsstelle/Skizze.shtml; last visit-
ed: 10-12-2018).
35  A[lexande]r 1870. First identified by: Varga 2016c. 261.
36  Reichlin-Meldegg 1869; hitherto not identified.
37  See: Alexander 1928. 17. I was unable to locate a possible realization of this plan by 
Alexander.
38  Beiser 2014. 49 and passim. As I have argued elsewhere (see esp.: Varga 2016a), Early 
Phenomenology (i.e., the School of Brentano, Edmund Husserl and his Munich, Göttingen, 
and, to a certain extent, early Freiburg students and collaborators) constitute the blind spot 
of Beiser’s investigations, even though his framework, namely the rehabilitation of German 
theoretical academic philosophy (Universitätsphilosophie) of the post-Hegelian decades during 
the second half of the so-called long nineteenth-century as a legitimate object of scholarly 
history of philosophy (which, under a different label, was actually pioneered by Köhnke, see 
Köhnke 1986), is apparently promising for contextualized understanding of Early Phenome-
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Hegel had been “dead long enough” to be regarded as “classical writer of philo-
sophy” (A[lexander] 1870. 13) who is no more able to “engender new enthusiasm” 
(A[lexande]r 1871b. 14); while Brentano acrimoniously recalled Jakob Friedrich 
Fries’ (1773–1843) remark that Hegel’s philosophy would “belong to the history 
of policing the schools [Schulpolizei], rather than the history of philosophy” (Bren-
tano 1987. 67; cf., e.g., Fries 1840. 671). Disregarding the differences in their mag-
nanimity towards their historical predecessors, both regarded the current crisis of 
philosophy as a chance, rather than a malady. In the concluding part of his inau-
gural address, Brentano called the “rich burgeoning” of “natural science and its 
subspecies” the precondition for the arrival of “springtime for philosophy” (Bren-
tano 1874b. 20). Alexander, too, declared that “[w]ithout accurate knowledge of 
natural sciences one could hardly dare to engage in speculations” (A[lexande]r 
1870. 1), and he praised Hartmann for attempting to ground his “system” on an 
“empirically […] unshakeable basis” (2). Vice versa, he chastised Hegel for failing 
to account for the source of “the creative efficacy of his ideas” which are “nothing 
else than pure concepts” (1). In sum, one is really compelled to construct a coun-
terfactual narrative (as mentioned in Section 0 above): Had Alexander remained 
at the University of Vienna, he might have found his new philosophical hero in 
Brentano who ascended to the lectern in Spring 1874. Instead, Alexander wrote 
to Horváth at the end of SS 1871 that, despite his strong personal and professional 
ties to Zimmermann, he is bored by the Viennese menu in philosophy and his 
ship is bound to sail to Berlin (see: Alexander 1928. 21–22). There is, however, a 
factual (rather than a counterfactual) hero of Alexander’s Vienna period, namely 
his actual teacher Zimmermann. Even the plethora of Alexander’s occasional mi-
nor writings testify to Zimmermann’s influence – and to the influence of the ideas 
transmitted by him, most notably the philosophy of Herbart. E.g., Alexander’s rel-
atively mature review of Zimmermann’s treatise on Samuel Clarke concludes in 
highlighting Clarke’s significance for the development of the ideas of Herbart (cf. 
A[lexande]r 1871d. 15), even though the original text of Zimmermann’s academy 
lecture – delivered on January 19, 1870, i.e., during the heydays of Alexander’s 
admiration for Zimmermann – barely announced  Herbart’s name (cf. Zimmer-
mann 1870b. 360) and even its expanded version published subsequently only 
mentions Herbart within the general context of overcoming the one-sidedly emo-
tive grounding of ethics and aesthetics.39 Hence, in the last section of the present 
paper I am going to look into the intellectual fruits of Alexander’s stay in Vienna, 
respectively what it could tell us about Austrian philosophy itself (regardless of 
the capitalization of ‘p’).
nology. The present paper, together with other works by the present author, intends to serve 
as a small contribution towards realizing this approach.
39  Zimmermann 1870a; the existence of this separate, expanded version of Zimmermann’s 
talk, published in the Denkschriften of the Academy, is often overlooked.
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III. ALEXANDER AND THE “ZIMMERMANN RIDDLE”
1. The contested relevance of Alexander’s philosophical master in Vienna
The relevance of the young Alexander’s Viennese period for the historiography 
of philosophy is, to a certain extent, rooted in nothing else than his relation-
ship to Robert Zimmermann. Zimmermann, not unlike Alexander, was a pro-
ductive author but an elusive thinker. Since the vast body of Zimmermann’s 
writings is mostly dedicated to aesthetics (respectively, consists of occasional 
pieces of writing), the true extent of his philosophical views, which he must 
have expounded to his students in his lecturing activity that spanned almost 
all major historical periods and disciples of philosophy (cf. Wieser 1950. 78–83), 
remains in the shadow, especially during the later decades of his professorship. 
Alexander recalled that he and his travel companion Bánóczi “had been the 
only ones amongst [Zimmermann’s] students who made philosophy the main 
course of study of their lives” (Alexander 1919a. 10). This claim is historically 
untrue, as Zimmermann, who had been an ordinary professor of philosophy at 
the University of Vienna (the only one after Brentano’s demotion to the rank of 
Privatdozent in 1880),40 oversaw entire generations of Brentano’s Viennese stu-
dents, including, most notably, Edmund Husserl, who studied in Vienna in SS 
1881 – WS 1881–1882 and WS 1884 – SS 1886 (see Schuhmann 1977. 9–17; full 
course list: Varga 2015. 99–101), not to mention the fact that one of the exam-
iners during the philosophical part of Husserl’s mathematical doctoral examina-
tion was Zimmermann himself (see already: Schuhmann 1977. 11). Alexander’s 
claim is, however, historically true in the sense that he (and Bánóczi) had been 
the only famous philosophy students of Zimmermann whose loyalty to their mas-
ter was undivided. It is, namely, not by chance that, decades later, Alexander and 
his audience were unaware of the fact that Husserl, who, by then, had already 
reached the zenith of his philosophical influence, was a counterexample to Al-
exander’s claim of being the only student of Zimmermann who made a career in 
philosophy. Quite the contrary, as I have argued elsewhere (see Varga 2018. 108 
ff.), it was Husserl’s own deliberate decision to reduce his philosophical lineage 
to Brentano alone (which was cemented precisely around this time by Husserl’s 
hagiographical account of his study at Brentano in Vienna, completely ignoring 
the classes he took under Zimmermann; see Husserl 1919, 1989. 304–315). Dur-
ing his Halle period in 1896, in contrast, Husserl still mentioned in a letter both 
Brentano and Zimmermann as his most influential teachers in philosophy (see 
Purkert and Ilgauds 1987. 206).
40  Concerning the historical circumstances of Brentano’s demotion from the point of view 
of the development of early phenomenology (based on a combination of printed and unpub-
lished sources), see Varga 2014. 86 ff. 
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What is at stake philosophically is whether Zimmermann had been in the 
position to transmit ideas from the outside to Husserl and other fellow disci-
ples of Brentano in Vienna. Furthermore, what renders this question especial-
ly pertinent is Zimmermann’s exposure to the philosophy of Bernard Bolzano 
(1781–1848), the polymath thinker from Prague whom Husserl believed to have 
rediscovered (see, e.g., Husserl 1900. 224–227; 1975. 226–229) and who indeed 
anticipated many fundamental tenets of early phenomenology (as well as of con-
temporary analytical philosophy and logic). After all, both Robert Zimmermann 
and his father Johann August Zimmerman (1793–1869) had been member of the 
inner circle of the disciples of Bolzano, who explicitly called Zimmermann jun-
ior his “beloved son [Herzensjunge]” (Bolzano 2006. 229) and put “great trust” in 
him (Bolzano 2005. 521), namely in Robert Zimmermann’s capacity as “an effec-
tive tool for the propagation of our ideas” (47). Indeed, the young Zimmermann 
verifiably advertised Bolzano’s ideas when historical circumstances permitted 
(see, e.g., Zimmermann 1849). Especially Eduard Winter (1896–1982), the pi-
oneering Bolzano scholar who had personal ties to the late phase of the Prague 
wing of the School of Brentano, was an ardent supporter of Zimmermann’s role 
as a transmitter of Bolzano’s ideas (already: Winter 1933. 252). In the face of the 
mounting evidence of the mature Zimmermann’s public silence on Bolzano, 
Winter later developed the irrefutable hypothesis that Zimmermann conspira-
torially denied Bolzano even if he remained attached to Bolzano’s ideas at the 
bottom of his heart.41
In the specific context of the historiography of early phenomenology, it has 
been alleged that Zimmermann as a professor of philosophy in Vienna “was in 
a position to promote Bolzanian doctrines at least to some extent” (Rollinger 
1999. 69); while Zimmermann’s role as a transmitter has recently come under 
heavy criticism from the point of view of the general historiography of Austrian 
philosophy (see, e.g., Morscher 1997). The present author has argued (Varga 
2016c) that Husserl had indeed been significantly exposed to Zimmermann, 
whose classes he regularly attended in Vienna in 1884–1886 (though not through 
the philosophy textbook he used in the secondary school). At the same time, the 
doctrines Zimmermann verifiably transmitted to Husserl were not of Bolzano, 
but rather general Herbartian ideas (which are relevant on their own right to the 
development of Husserl’s specifically phenomenological idea of intentionality). 
From a philosophical standpoint, the crux of the issue is whether the concept 
(Begriff) is defined in a logical way that clearly anticipates the phenomenological 
idea of intentional content (as exemplified by the original, Bolzanoian edition 
of Zimmermann’s logic textbook, see esp. Winter 1975. 41–42, 45) or rather by 
virtue of a pictorial theory of representation, e.g., as a “certain picture of a tree 
41  See Winter 1993. 34; it must be said in Winter’s favor that Bolzano and his disciples 
indeed employed conspiratorial method to counter censorship and other repressive measures.
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[gewisses Bild eines Baumes]” that is distilled from the series of the corresponding 
experiences, as Zimmermann wrote in the more widespread, Herbartian version 
of his logic textbook (already: Zimmermann 1860. 17; emphasis in original). Is 
Alexander’s acquaintance of Zimmermann, reconstructed in the above section 
of the present paper, is of any avail when reconstructing the influence Alexan-
der’s philosophical master might have exerted a decade later on his students 
who would originate phenomenology?
2. Alexander’s juvenilia as a baseline of Austrian philosophy  
prior to Austrian Philosophy?
The possibility of using Alexander’s Viennese period as a baseline for recon-
structing philosophy, more specifically philosophical logic, as it was practiced in 
Austria prior to the birth of Austrian Philosophy – in other words, the possibility 
of obtaining an unfiltered picture of Zimmermann’s thinking that, in case of the 
1880s, was mixed with that of Brentano – hinges on reconstructing the entirety 
of the corpus that is presented by Alexander’s juvenilia. His longer manuscripts 
reconstructed above, if we were in their possession, might provide detailed in-
formation on the logical doctrines Alexander acquired during his philosophi-
cal apprenticeship in Vienna, but his feature articles are apparently not specific 
enough. Is it possible to look beyond the surface of these occasional writings? 
It is less known that there exists a partial print (Alexander 1876) of Alexan-
der’s original dissertation by virtue of which he obtained his doctoral degree 
at the University of Leipzig in August 1873, and it is even lesser known that 
the original dissertation itself has been preserved in the Hungarian Jewish Ar-
chives.42 Unlike the dissertation, which discusses the contemporary critique and 
defense of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, the original manuscript is simultaneously more broadly conceived 
and closer to Kant’s letter: it presents Kant’s general intellectual biography with 
a special focus on pre-critical works (furthermore, the partial print does not ex-
actly correspond to any of the seven chapters of the original dissertation, which, 
in turns, differs from Alexander’s mature work on Kant [Alexander 1881]). The 
original dissertation manuscript unmistakably attests Alexander’s adherence to 
the Herbartian philosophy, as the opening sentence of its introduction is a direct 
quotation from Herbart on the long-lasting significance of Kant for the contem-
porary condition of German philosophy (Herbart 1850. 513, lines 5–10). Yet, this 
42  Ms. HJA, XIX-113. I am grateful to Péter Turbucz for directing my attention to this item. 
It contains both the handwritten fair copy of Alexander’s dissertation (with a few marginalia, 
presumably from the reviewers of the dissertation) and Alexander’s so-called half-way (halb-
brüchig) manuscript of the former. I am not aware of any extensive discussion in the scholarly 
literature of the partial print of Alexander’s dissertation, let alone of its original manuscript.
PéTER ANDRÁS VARGA: A SNAPSHOT OF AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY 201
source is, again, not suitable for providing a glimpse into Zimmermann’s ideas. 
Alexander’s dissertation exemplifies interesting early strata of Neo-Kantianism 
precisely before its institutional crystallization (see, e.g., Pollok 2010); yet, by 
the same token, Alexander’s loyalty is here divided between what he might 
have learnt from Zimmermann and what he acquired during the later stages of 
his academic peregrination.
There is, however, another source pertaining to Alexander’s Vienna period. 
“I must write anthropology as a prize essay for the Hungarian academy”, he 
recorded in his diary on January 16, 1870 (orig. p. 6). The prize competition was 
announced during the General Assembly of the Hungarian Academy of Scienc-
es in April 1869 (see the corresponding editorial footnote); but it was declared 
unsuccessful during the General Assembly in May 1871.43 According to the 
rules, the applicants must have submitted code-named fair copies handwritten 
by somebody else and, in case the prize competition was deemed unsuccessful, 
the accompanying envelopes containing the authors’ data must be destroyed 
without opening them. This is what happened in 1871, so it seems impossible 
to tell whether Alexander realized the plan he recorded in his diary entry and, if 
so, which one of the two submitted prize essay manuscripts was written by him. 
Fortunately, in a letter written to Horváth in October 1871, Alexander confessed 
that he indeed submitted a prize essay during the last year and, furthermore, his 
essay was the second one (see Alexander 1928. 24). The manuscript itself – as 
far as I know, hitherto unidentified – is preserved in the archives of the Hun-
garian Academy of Sciences (Ms. MTAK). Alexander’s voluminous prize essay, 
arrived on September 30, 1870 and inventoried under the number 913/870 (vol-
ume XXXIX), provides a comprehensive survey of many fields of philosophy 
relevant to anthropology, including, fortunately, a specific discussion of philoso-
phical logic and psychology. Already Alexander point of departure is unmistak-
ably Herbartian (see 162 ff): our presentations (képzetek) of human are different 
(e.g., the presentation of an infant); how is it then possible to attain a concept 
(fogalom) which “encompasses [át fog]” several presentations (163)? According 
to the renowned tradition of philosophical logic, Alexander clearly distinguishes 
between content (tartalom) and extension (kör) of a concept (see 164), but there 
are at least three specific and compelling aspect of his theory: (1) He also takes 
account of the name (név); (2) he provides a Herbartian account of the fusion of 
the particular presentations like “the rays of a fan” (162); and, what especially 
anticipates the so-called genetic phenomenology that would be devised by an-
other student of Zimmermann a few decades later, he raises the issue of how the 
genetically fused perceptual elements constitute a “network [háló]” (166) that 
make subsequent generalizing object recognition possible in the first place (this 
43  See: A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia 1871. május 20‑án tartott ünnepélyes közgyűlésének tár-
gyai (A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Évkönyvei XIII/VII). 1871. 73.
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is why, Alexander says, a small child recognizes a dog even on a picture and, if 
confronted with a wolf, she would recognize it as a dog).
According to the evaluation report, Alexander’s prize essay was “richer” than 
his competitor, but lacking an “independent, coherent, organized unity.” It was 
deemed rather like a “collection of material [anyaggyüjtemény],” on the basis of 
which somebody could “write an essay worthy of the prize.”44 Indeed the text 
looks like a collection of dense summaries, lacking specific bibliographical refer-
ences. At the beginning of his work, Alexander listed a series of authors he relied 
upon (including, e.g., Lotze, Lange, Hartmann, Voigt, I. H. Fichte; but nota-
bly missing Zimmermann himself). Given that Alexander’s prize essay indeed 
represents an unfiltered, synchronous, and detailed imprint of the philosophi-
cal ideas he acquired in Vienna under the guidance of Zimmermann, I think it 
warrants a closer and more extensive study in the form of a critical edition that 
would identify the sources of the individual elements which coagulated in the 
prize essay (maybe even a partial translation of the text). The young Viennese 
student Alexander, after all, did not leave us with empty hands.
Rudolf Haller explicitly claimed that “the beginning of Austrian Philosophy 
could be identified with” Brentano’ Vienna period, thus, “in a slightly exagger-
ated form”, the year 1874 was “the year of birth of Austrian Philosophy” (Haller 
1986. 36). There is a considerable discrepancy – both in terms of the dramatis 
personae, their writings, and the involved philosophical doctrines – between the 
content of Haller’s Austrian Philosophy (with capital ‘P’) and what was recon-
structed above based on the snapshot provided by the Viennese section of Alex-
ander’s academic peregrination. At the same time, the latter not only temporally 
preceded the former, but it must also be regarded as its precondition, though 
obviously not the single one, both historically and philosophically. Furthermore, 
I think it is possible to draw a more general lesson from these investigations that 
transcends the narrow confines of the history of late nineteenth-century philo so-
phy in Vienna: The discrepancy between Austrian Philosophy (with capital ‘P’) 
and what seems to have been depicted on Alexander’s snapshot could be said to 
epitomize the methodologically relevant difference between a historiographical 
construct and the actual richness and materiality of the history of philosophy 
(notwithstanding the necessity of devising such constructs). If Austrian Philoso-
phy was born in 1874, then Alexander, his teachers, and his fellow philosophers 
might represent the philosophical equivalent of a premature birth – but they 
have equal right to live and capture our scholarly attention.
44  A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia 1871. május 20‑án tartott ünnepélyes közgyűlésének tárgyai. 73.
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EINLEITUNG DER HERAUSGEBER
Die nachfolgende Erstveröffentlichung gibt die 1869–1870 in Wien entstan-
denen Tagebucheinträge des jungen Bernhard (Bernát) Alexander (geb. 1850 
in Budapest, gest. ebenda 1927) wieder. Zusammen mit seinem Reisekom-
pagnon József Bánóczi (geb. Weisz, 1849–1926) studierte Alexander zwischen 
WS 1868–1869 und WS 1870–1871 in Wien, wo er Philosophie (u.a. bei Robert 
Zimmermann) und Medizin hörte. Während der weiteren Strecken seiner aka-
demischen Peregrination, die ihn nach Berlin, Göttingen und Leipzig führten 
(er promovierte in Leipzig im August 1873),1 hat sich Alexander dem Neukan-
tianismus angeschlossen, den er als Mitübersetzer von Kants Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft und als einflussreicher Dozent in Budapest (ordentlicher Professor seit 
1904) Generationen von ungarischen Philosophen vermittelte. Die frühen Ein-
träge seines erst in Wien angefangenen und im Laufe seiner Peregrination un-
systematisch weitergeführten Tagebuches bieten jedoch eine synchrone und 
relativ unvermittelte Aktorperspektive auf die noch vor-kantische Frühphase 
seiner geistigen Entwicklung, sowie auf das Studentenleben des späten 19ten 
Jahrhunderts. Darüber hinaus erhebt der Text offenbar auch literarische und 
philosophische Ansprüche.
Obwohl schon Alexander selbst autobiographische Beiträge zu seiner Pere-
grination verfasste2 und kurz nach seinem Tod die Jugendbriefe von Alexan-
der an seinen Budapester Philosophielehrer, den spätidealistischen Eklektiker 
1  Die Dissertation wurde in seiner Heimatstadt gedruckt und gelang wohl deshalb nicht 
in den Kreislauf der internationalen Kant-Forschung: Alexander, Bernhard 1876. Kant’s Lehre 
vom Erkennen. Budapest, Ph. Wodianer.
2  Siehe z. B. Alexander Bernát 1919. Bánóczi József. In Emlékkönyv Bánóczi József születése 
hetvenedik évfordulójára. Budapest, Franklin-Társulat. 1–38, 9 ff.
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Cyrill Horváth SP (1804–1884), herausgegeben wurden,3 blieb das Tagebuch 
unveröffentlicht und sein Inhalt ist nur aus sporadischen Referaten in der Al-
exander-Kurzmonographie von éva Gábor bekannt.4 
Auf dem inneren Titelblatt des Heftes befindet sich ein Vermerk von Al-
exander, der der Schriftart nach den Pariser Einträgen zuzuordnen ist: “Im Falle 
mir ein Unglücksfall zutritt, so sollen diese Blätter ungelesen verbrannt werden. 
Diese Bitte müssen meine Freunde erfüllen, und sie werden es auch thun.” 
Eine ähnlich lautende Aufforderung wurde in dem längeren und auf Ungarisch 
verfassten Vermächtnis ausgesprochen, das sich auf der vorherigen Titelseite 
befindet und explizit auf 18. VI. 1875 datiert ist. Keine dieser beiden Wünschen 
wurden von Alexanders Freunden und Familienmitgliedern erfüllt.
Zu dieser Edition wurden die Seiten 1–9 (nachträgliche Nummerierung) von 
den Herausgebern aus dem Original transkribiert, kollationiert und mit Anmer-
kungen versehen. Die Wiener Tagebucheinträge und die Einträge bis S. 56 ver-
fasste Alexander in Kurrentschrift auf Deutsch. Die Wiener und die darauffol-
genden Berliner Einträge unterscheiden sich erheblich in ihren Schriftbildern. 
Die Wiener Schriftweise stellt wegen des verwendeten Schreibmaterials beson-
dere Herausforderungen dar. Der Rest des Heftes ist auf Ungarisch in moderner 
Schrift geschrieben. Der Gesamtumfang des Heftes beträgt 257 Seiten (aus-
schließlich der geschriebenen Titelblätter), von dem es nur 69 Textseiten gibt. 
Auf dem Titelblatt befindet sich neben den oben erwähnten Testamenten die 
Titelangabe “Tagebuch”, sowie Angaben zu seinem Namen und der Adresse 
unter welchem Alexander spätestens seit dem Anfang seines zweiten Wiener 
Semesters wohnte: “Bernhard Alexander. Gr<osse> Schiffgasse 10. 1. St<ock 
Nr.> 8.”. (Diese Angaben sind auch auf Grund ihrer Tinte und Schreibweise 
den Wiener Einträgen zuzuordnen.)
In der nachfolgenden Edition wurden die vereinzelten gestrichenen oder ein-
gefügten Textteile individuell vermerkt, sowie die von Alexander relativ selten 
verwendeten Abkürzungen (z. B. “u.”). Die Herausgeber haben es versucht, 
so wenig wie möglich in die originellen Satzstrukturen einzugreifen. Auch die 
Orthographie wurde nicht modernisiert, um dieses Textstück, die zu den weni-
gen ursprünglich auf Deutsch über die Österreichische Philosophie verfassten 
zeitgenössischen ungarischen Augenzeugenberichten gehört, authentisch ver-
mitteln zu können.
Die Herausgeber möchten sich Herrn Dr. Antal Babus, Leiter der Hand-
schriftenabteilung der Zentralbibliothek der Ungarischen Akademie der Wis-
senschaften, für die freundliche Genehmigung bedanken, Teile des Tagebu-
ches (Signatur: Ms 4110/26) veröffentlichen zu dürfen. 
3  Alexander Bernát – Szemere Ssmu (Hrsg.) 1928. Alexander Bernát ifjúkori levelei Horváth 
Cyrillhez. Budapest.
4  Gábor éva 1986. Alexander Bernát. (A múlt magyar tudósai.) Budapest, Akadémiai.
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Wien 9 Dezember 1869.5 Es ist schon sehr lange<,> daß ich keine Zeile in mein 
Tagebuch schrieb.6 Mittlerweile sind böse Tage gegangen u<nd> gekommen, 
die Zeiten, in denen ich Noth litt<,> sind verschwunden, aber auch jetzt ist 
meine äußere Lage nicht günstig genug, um mir Zufriedenheit zu gewähren. 
Ich habe noch heute keinen Winterrock,7 und bin in geplagtem Zustande, in 
welchem mir tausend kleinere und größere Nadelstiche das Leben sauer ma-
chen. Doch davon ein andermal.
Ich habe sonderbare Metamorphosen im Geiste durchlebt. Mehr als ein Jahr 
ist<’>s nun, daß ich in Wien lebe, aber ich fühle mich gehoben, wenn ich auf 
diese Zeit zurückblicke, denn nicht vergebens habe ich sie durchlebt. Was Er-
fahrung und Wissenschaft nur bieten konnte<,> habe ich reichlich genossen. 
Ich8 kann sagen, ich bin immer vorwärts geschritten, nie rückwärts. Bei alledem 
war ich kein Bücherwurm, ich habe mehr Tage im9 Nichtsthun vollbracht, mehr 
Tage herumgeschweift, als gerade neben den Büchern zugebracht, aber nicht 
einmal diese Zeit achte ich für verloren. Ich fühle, ich bin nicht hinter meinen 
Kräften zurückgeblieben, ich erreichte, was mir die Möglichkeit geboten <hat>. 
Vielleicht täusche ich mich auch, aber kein Gefühl ragender Reue beunruhigt 
mich, ich lebe in Frieden mit mir und der Welt, wenn mir diese auch nicht gera-
de die beste Seite gezeigt hat. Was ich studierte, habe ich meinem Wesen assi-
milirt, meine Ken<n>tnisse stehen nicht zerstückt und zusammenhanglos, wie 
fremde Gäste, die die Zeit10 auseinanderstäubt,11 in meinem Kopfe, ich suchte 
sie meinem Wesen einzuverleiben, sie als innerstes Eigenthum mir zu erwerben. 
Ich strebte mehr nach Tiefe als nach Breite, da mir für letztere noch immer Zeit 
genug bleibt, wenn mir ein bleibender Grundstock lebt, an dem sich aller Stoff, 
alle Elemente ankrystallisiren. Durch ruhiges liegen lassen meiner Ansichten, 
5  Im Original unterstrichen.
6  <Da der Eintrag auf der ersten Seite steht und das Heft selbst kein erkennbares Zeichen 
physischer Diskontinuität aufweist, bezieht sich diese Bemerkung wohl auf ein anderes, 
verschollenen Tagebuches von Alexander oder aber deutet auf eine bewusste Stilisierung 
durch Alexander hin.>
7  <Laut Grimm-Wörterbuch (Bd. 30, Sp. 471): “rock für den winter; wärmender, dicker 
rock”.>
8  Nach “Ich” gestrichen: “bin”.
9  Im Original: “in”.
10  Im Original Komma nach dem Wort.
11  Im Original Semikolon nach dem Wort. <Vgl. wohl Immanuel Hermann Fichtes Kritik 
der Herbart’schen atomistischen Psychologie: “so sehen wir nicht ein, was ihr [der Seele] 
auch nur für einen Augenblick ihre Dauer sichern könne, und warum nicht der ganze Mensch 
gleich den Wolken, die am Himmel erscheinen, und die sich auch nur aus mancherlei Dunst-
theilchen ohne innere Einheit gebildet haben, wesenlos auseinanderstäubt und verfliegt 
nach allen Seiten!” (Fichte, I. H. 1832. Über Gegensatz, Wendepunkt und Ziel heutiger 
Philosophie. Erster kritischer Theil. Heidelberg, J. C. B. Mohr. 286–287). Um diese Zeit 
beschäftigte sich Alexander nachweislich mit den Werken I. H. Fichtes.>
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verschwemmen12 diese nicht, oder lösen sich auf, sie runden<?> und vervoll-
kommenen sich, und wenn ich einen Gedanken recht innig durchlebt habe, so 
ist mir das mehr werth, als die Lecture von13 einer ganzen Reihe wissenschaftli-
cher Compendien. Vor dem Unverstandenen habe ich nicht die heilige Scheu, 
wie vor einem Heil<i>gthum, ich lasse es, wenn ich keinen Weg zu demselben 
finde, ich bahne mir einen solchen, wenn ich mir seine Spuren finde. Und darin 
fühle ich, daß ich Recht habe, denn das rein Menschliche kehrt sich in mir her-
vor, das fähig ist<,> alles Große u<nd>14 Wahre und Schöne aufzufassen und zu 
begreifen. In der Metaphysik bin ich deshalb auch15 kein Hegelianer<,> weil ich 
fühle, daß das nicht der Weg sei, auf welchem der gesunde Menschenverstand 
wandern soll, wenn er lebensfähige Resultate zu erzeigen16 Willens ist. Ich hoffe 
zu einer natürlichen Weltanschauung zu gelangen, die ebenso weit entfernt sein 
soll von der eines platten ethischen und wissenschaftlichen Materialismus, als 
von einem verschwommenen Idealismus. Als Sohn meiner Zeit bin ich Realist, 
und neige mich den Ansichten eines Herbart<s> u<nd> Lotzes zu. Wie ich von 
ihnen abweichen werde<,> weiß ich noch nicht, aber ich glaube<,> ich werde es 
<thun>, denn mein Denken scheint mir nicht steril zu sein, und ist auf selbstän-
digem Wege zu Vielem17 gekommen, was jene Männer im Zusammenhange ge-
dacht und geschrieben haben. Aber eines ist es, was ich für das Wichtigste halte, 
der große Welträthsel ist mir aufgegangen, nicht die Lösung des Problems, aber 
es selbst in seiner ganzen großartigen Herrlichkeit, und unergründlichen Tiefe. 
Wenn ich so die zahllosen Wasseratome sehe, oder den gestirnten Himmel, oder 
die Erde, in der finsteren Pracht der Nacht, so weiß ich nicht<,> wie mir ist. Ich 
fühle mich fremd, mir schwindelt<’>s, ich weiß
nicht<,> wer ich bin, was das alles ist, ich staune über den leisesten18 Luft-
zug, über das gewöhnlichste Menschenangesicht. O was wiegt mir, das eine 
Gefühl, das in mir oft in solcher Lebendigkeit ist, auf, was habe ich von all dem, 
was in hundert Büchern geschrieben steht, wenn ich mich so träumend in alle 
Geheimnisse des Seins versenke. Wenn19 es mich bei meinen Büchern ergreift, 
dann lasse ich alles fahren, ich denke nicht mehr, worüber sie sich alle die Den-
ken geplagt <haben>, ich sinne nur für mich hin, und lasse das Gefühl in mir 
walten. Das mir die größte Seligkeit20 gewährt, ein Mensch zu sein, in vollem 
12  <Laut Grimm-Wörterbuch (Bd. 25, Sp. 1205): “in eigentticher bedeutung, von wasser-
fluten, die etwas fortreiszen, dann etwas bedecken mit angeschwemmtem (sand, schlamm) 
[...]. die übertragene anwendung schlieszt sich oft eng an die bildliche an”.>
13  Nach “von” gestrichen: “hundert”.
14  Nach “u<nd>” Unlesbares gestrichen.
15  Einfügung.
16  Im Sinne von “erweisen” (vgl. Grimm-Wörterbuch, Bd. 3, Sp. 1081).
17  Verbesserung für “vielem”.
18  Nach “leisesten” Unlesbares gestrichen.
19  Vor “Wenn” gestrichen: “Ich”.
20  Nach “Seligkeit” gestrichen: “u<nd> die gr”.
DIE WIENER EINTRäGE 1869–1870  213
Sinne des Wortes mit fühlender Brust dem All gegenüber. Ich könnte oft wahn-
sinnig werden von all den dunkeln21 unaussprechlichen Ahnungen, die dann 
in mir auftauchen, ich weiß nicht<,> wohin ich mich vor mir selben flüchten 
soll, und das Gewöhnlichste ist mir willkommen, das mich meinen Gedanken 
entreißt. Denn wenn es lang anhielte, ich könnte es nicht ertragen, ich müßte 
den Verstand verlieren. O Unsterblichkeit, welch lockender Gedanke bist du 
für den Menschen -- sage ich dann vor mich hin, was würden sie opfern, wenn 
sie deiner gewiß wären.
Erst gestern Abend war es, als wir<,> ein trauter22 Zirkel, eben von einem 
Trinkgelage zurückkehrten, das wir zu Ehren eines neuen Bruders veranstaltet 
hatten. Ich hatte viel des Bieres genossen, und doch war meine Seele klar. Ich 
tobte und lärmte, und suchte die innere Stimme zu übertäuben, und brachte 
nichts heraus, als was sie mir eingab. Ich rief, das große Geheimniß der Mensch-
heit hat mich angepackt, und sie fühlten sich verwandt, denn auch in ihnen 
lebt<’>s. Was thue ich auf der Welt, rief ich, die Zahl der vielen Fragezeichen 
vermehren, die unser Geschlecht schon besitzt? Und doch ist<’>s eine Selig-
keit<,> versetzte mein Freund W<eiss>,23 wenigstens die Fragen alle zu wissen.
“Herum wandern unter den vielen Problemen, die noch anstarren, ohne ein 
einzigeslösen zu können?<”>
Sp. meinte:24 Was25 plagt Ihr sich, wollt Ihr Euer Geschlecht weiter bringen, 
damit es schneller die Wahrheit erlange, und früher aufhöre zu leben?
Ja, rief ich, ich will nicht in der Menschheit Waagen sitzen, ich will das Roß 
sein, das es zieht, das Roß<,> rief ich, wie berauscht von diesen Gedanken.
Die andere lachten und wir giengen ruhig26 weiter.
Zu Hause angelangt setzten wir uns um den Tisch, und durchlebten die wei-
hevollste Stunde, die man sich denken kann. Jeder schrie, den Egoismus zu 
zerbrechen, und jeder in seiner Weise, für die Menschheit zu leben und zu 
wirken. Wie Feuer loderte die Begeisterung in uns, mit ihren heiligen Strah-
len, erwärmte und erhob sie unsere Herzen. W<eiss> betonte, daß er Alles für 
die Freunde hingebe, daß wir zusammenhalten, und uns gegenseitig fördern 
wollen, daß das Eigenthum des Einzelnen nicht ihm, sondern der Bruderschaft 
angehören, sein Wirken nicht ihm, sondern der Menschheit zu Gute kommen 
sollte. K. schwur, er gebe sein Leben für Freunde und Verwandte hin, die er 
21  Historische Schreibweise.
22  <Laut Grimm-Wörterbuch (Bd. 21, Sp. 1550): “vom freunde: alt besonders in der ver-
bindung tr. geselle”.>
23  <József Bánóczi (bis 1874: Weiss/Weisz; 1849–1926), der Alexander während seiner 
ganzen Peregrination begleitete. Damals wohnten sie noch getrennt, in der geographischen 
Nähe voneinander: Kleine Schiffgasse 12 und Grosse Schiffgasse 10.>
24  Im Original Komma.
25  Verbesserung für Unlesbares.
26  Im Original: “ruhige”.
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mit ganzer Seele liebe, und dieser Mann des Gefühls, versicherte uns27<,> uns 
zu folgen und sich uns anzuschließen, wohin wir immer giengen. Sp. saß da, mit 
dem melancholischen, pessimistischen Gesichte, und wir bekämpften
lebhaft, seine Schwäche, sich in nichts zu vertrauen. Nach und nach löste 
sich die Spannung auf dem Gesichte und wir hatten ihn ganz überwunden. 
E<...><,> der neue Bruder, der schlasse28 Kaufmann zitterte am ganzen Körper, 
als die edelsten Gefühle, als die reine Menschheit sich in uns allen zeigte, und 
tausend gute Entschlüsse keimten in seiner Seele. Wir sprachen von Liebe, in 
der wir schon alle einige Erfahrungen gesammelt <haben>, und ich gab meine 
innerste Sehnsucht kund, einem Wesen ganz anzugehören, in29 ihm gänzlich 
“aufzugehen”. Dann saß ich still leidend <?> vor mir hin, und dachte an die 
Naturnothwendigkeit<,> mit der die Menschen die<jenige> sind, die sie sein 
müssen, an die mannigfaltigen Naturen, die hier versammelt sitzen, jeder an-
dere, jeder aber gut und edel in seinem innersten Wesen mit Gefühlen, die 
die Welt einschauen.30 Bis vier Uhr morgens, hielt mich die Aufregung, die ich 
körperlich und geistig empfand, wach, und schon um ½ 7 wachte ich auf, um in 
meine Wohnung31 heimzukehren.
16/1 1870. Eben bin ich von einem Trinkgelage zurückgekehrt, daß ich zu gro-
ßem Theile veranstaltet habe. Am 13. d<ieses Monats> ist mein erstes Feuille-
ton in der Presse32 erscheinen, und ich habe dafür 20 Fl<orenos>33 erhalten. Es 
ist ein kleiner Anfang, das ist wahr, aber es ist
doch einer. Mein Professor34 gratulirte mir dazu, und sagte, ich habe Anla-
gen<,> einen guten Stil zu bekommen. Er forderte mich auf<,> das Referat35 
über das neue Werk I<mmanuel> H<ermann von> Fichtes zu übernehmen,36 
ich solle wenigstens darüber arbeiten, wenn ich nicht mit der Richtung überein-
stimme. Er sagte mir noch manches Schmeichelhafte, ich kam mit freudestrah-
lendem Gesichte aus seiner Wohnung, ich fühlte mich gehoben. Auch der 
27  Aus Versehen gestrichen.
28  <Laut Grimm-Wörterbuch (Bd. 15, Sp. 500): “schlaff, weich, […] sonst auch nachlässig, 
unthätig”.>
29  Im Original: “im”.
30  <Im Sinne von “anschauen”, “durchschauen”, vgl. Grimm-Wörterbuch (Bd. 3, Sp. 
267).>
31  <Grosse Schiffgasse 10. 1. St. Nr. 8. >
32  <Vgl.: Philosophie des Unbewußten. Die Presse. Bd. 23, Nr. 12 (13. Jan. 1870). 1–4, ge-
kennzeichnet mit “B. A-r.”.>
33  <Lateinische Abkürzung für Gulden, die offizielle Währung der Doppelmonarchie ab 
1867.>
34  <Robert Zimmermann (1824–1898), ordentlicher Professor für Philosophie an der Wie-
ner Universität 1861–1896.>
35  Nach “Referat” gestrichen: “s”.
36  <Fichte, I. H. 1869. Vermischte Schriften zur Philosophie, Theologie und Ethik. Bd. 1–2. Leip-
zig, F. A. Brockhaus.>
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Eigenthümer der Presse Dr Dreger37 sagte mir, ich solle ihm nur wieder verschi-
cken was ich habe, kurz mein Feuilleton38 scheint für mich vielversprechend zu 
werden. Aber mein Ziel muß ich erreichen, als Preisschrift für die ung<arische> 
Akademie muß ich eine Anthropologie anfertigen,39 das soll für mich die große 
Leiter sein, auf der ich enger klimmen will zu äußerem Ansehen und Ruhm, zu 
innerer Befriedigung und Harmonie. Wird mir aber das je möglich sein? Jetzt 
halte ich in mir den ganzen Zwiespalt, den das große Räthsel der Welt mir auf-
drängt. Ich habe den Muth verloren, je über diesselbe hinaus zu können, u<nd> 
glaube<,> kein Mensch, kein Wesen, selbst Gott ist dieß nicht im Stande. Es ist 
ein so ungeheurer Gedanke<,> innerhalb einer Natur zu stehen, sich als etwas 
zu fühlen<,> und doch nie über sich hinauszukönnen. Ich glaube<,> der Kopf 
zerspringt mir bei diesen Gedanken. Ich fühle mich40 so unheimlich, mein Stuhl 
zittert unter mir, ich meine <?> es wenigstens zu fühlen, dann fällt mir ein:41 
mein Stuhl? Was ist mein Stuhl? Materie, was ist Materie? Was ist Gott? Woher 
Gott?
Woher Materie, woher die ganze Welt? Woher Alles was man denken kann? 
Woher meine Fragen u<nd> Zweifeln? Ich habe in einer Abhandlung gesagt, 
die Frage <“>woher<”> hat keine42 Ende, immer und immer kann man danach 
fragen. Das scheint <…> und kalt. Die Menschen beruhigen sich dabei, und 
essen und trinken weiter. Warum? Weil43 sie diesen Gedanken nicht gefühlt ha-
ben. Hat ihn aber jemand gefühlt, dann ist es nicht mehr zum Aushalten, dann 
glaubt man wahnsinnig zu werden. Es ist etwas anderes, diesen Satz sich ein-
fach herzusagen und dabei zu staunen, als ob man eine Marionette anstaunte, 
oder ein perpetuum mobile, daß ein erfinderische<r> oder wahnsinniger Kopf 
endlich gefunden zu haben glaubt.
Ich kann nicht weiter, ich fürchte mich vor diesen Gedanken, er ist mein Ver-
derben. Ich weiß nicht<,> ob ihn schon je ein Mensch gefaßt <hat>; so tief und 
so <?> streckend, so sinnberäubend, wie ich ihn fasse. Er soll mein geheimer 
Leitstern sein, in allen was ich unternehme. Er soll meine Seligkeit und meine 
Qual werden. Man sagt, daß das Wissen dem Menschen Macht verleiht, wenigs-
37  <Carl (Karl) Dreger (1825–1896), Verleger der Presse aus ihrer Periode nach der Ab-
spaltung der Neuen Freien Presse im Jahr 1864, die schließlich 1896 zum Abstellen des Blattes 
führte (die bis heute erscheinende namensgleiche Tageszeitung wurde erst 1945-1946 ge-
gründet).>
38  Nach “Feuilleton” gestrichen: “ist”.
39  <An der Allgemeinen Sitzung am 17. April 1869 erließ die Ungarische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften u.a. ein Preisausschreiben zur Abfassung eines »Handbuches der Anthropo-
logie« im Umfang von min. 12-14 Oktavbogen, das sein Gegenstand »mit dem gegenwärti-
gen Stand der jeweiligen Wissenschaft übereinstimmend« und zugleich »auf einer populä-
ren, hübschen und geregelten Sprache« darstellt.>
40  Im Original: “mith”.
41  Im Original Komma.
42  Nach “keine” Unlesbares gestrichen.
43  Im Original ohne Fragezeichen: “Warum weil”.
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tens innere, daß er so geistiger Besitzer all dessen werde, was er begreift. Dieser 
Gedanke aber, der höchste<,> den ein Mensch fühlen kann, hebt auch weit-
hinaus über alles Gewöhnliche. Obwohl ich überzeugt bin, daß alle<,> die um 
mich leben<,> von diesen Gedanken keine Spur haben -- fühle ich doch keinen 
Stolz, nur ein Drängen meines Gehirns<,> als wollte es mir den Kopf zerspren-
gen. Ich glaube<,> das ist die wahre Gedankengröße, daß sie so hoch hebt über 
alles Gewöhnliche, daß man keines der gewöhnlichen menschlichen Gefühle 
mehr empfiehlt, weder Mut, noch Stolz, nur eines bleibt, der ragende Zweifel, 
die schreckliche Verzweiflung. Vielleicht wird auch diese abgestumpft. Kann 
man innerlich durchdrungen von diesem Gedanken noch unter Menschen le-
ben. Nein, ich glaube<,> man muß ihn verbannen aus dem gewöhnlichen Um-
kreis des Denkens, man muß ihn mit einer Decke verhüllen, man muß ihn tief 
versenken als Grundstein aller seines Denkens und Fühlens, er darf nur tragen 
das ganze geistige Menschenleben, er darf es aber nicht durchdringen, denn 
diesen Durchbruch hält kein Erdgeborener, kein sin<n>endes Wesen aus.
Dieser Gedanke44<,> daß man nicht weiß woher, innig durchgefühlt, voll-
ständig begriffen<,> ist das schrecklichste Räthsel, zu welchem der Menschen-
geist gelangen kann.
Ich will für jetzt abbrechen, denn ich kann nicht weiter. 
44  Am Ende des Wortes gestrichen: “n”.
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Summaries 
GerGely ambrus
Austrian Identity Theory and Russelian Monism: Schlick, Russell and Chalmers
This papes discusses Moritz Schlick’s “Austrian” psychophysical identity theory, for-
mulated in the Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, and compares it to the similar views of Rus-
sell and to contemporary Russellian monism. A close similarity between Russell’s and 
Schlick’s views was already stated by Herbert Feigl long ago; beyond investigating this 
relation, my aim is also to identify features contemporary Russellian monists may have 
in common with their historical ancestors. I argue that they share some fundamental as-
sumptions: linguistic physicalism, an ontology which may be characterized as physicalist 
dualist property pluralism, and a dual-language account of the psychophysical identity 
thesis which is an alternative to reductionist materialism. Further, Schlick, Russell and 
Chalmers ground these tenets on a structuralist account of the meaning of physical terms 
which, however, they lay out in importantly different ways.
christian Damböck
Carnap’s Aufbau: A Case of Plagiarism?
In a recent article, Verena Mayer formulates a very radical claim, specifically that in 
the Aufbau, Carnap somewhat plagiarized Husserl, stealing ideas from the then-unpub-
lished manuscript of Ideen II. The aim of this article is to refute this claim. Though Car-
nap might have been acquainted with Husserl’s manuscript, there is no indication that 
he took a significant amount of ideas from the latter.
Denis Fisette
The Reception of Ernst Mach in the School of Brentano
This paper is about the reception of Ernst Mach by Brentano and his students in Austria. 
I shall outline the main elements of this reception, starting with Brentano’s evaluation, 
in his lectures on positivism, of Mach’s theory of sensations. Secondly, I shall comment 
the early reception of Mach by Brentano’s pupils in Prague. The third part bears on the 
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close relationship that Husserl established between his phenomenology and Mach’s de-
scriptivism. I will then briefly examine Mach’s contribution to the controversy on gestalt 
qualities. The fifth part bears on Stumpf’s debate with Mach on psychophysical relations 
and I shall conclude on Husserl’s criticism of Mach’s alleged logical psychologism.
Guillaume Fréchette
Brentano on Perception
Brentano’s philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of 
his theory of intentionality. If all and only mental phenomena are constitutively inten-
tional, and if perceptual experience is mental by definition, then all perceptual experi-
ences are intentional experiences. I refer to this conception as the “standard view” of 
Brentano’s account of perception. Different options are available to support the standard 
view: a sense-data theory of perception; an adverbialist account; representationalism. I 
argue that none of them are real options for the standard view. I suggest that Brentano’s 
conception of optical illusions introduces a presupposition that not only challenges the 
standard view – the distinction between the subjectively and objectively given – but 
that also makes his account more palatable for a naïve understanding of perception as 
openness to and awareness of the world. 
christoph limbeck-lilienau
The First Vienna Circle: Myth or Reality?
In the genealogy of logical empiricism, the so-called “First Vienna Circle” (Neurath, 
Frank, Hahn) has been considered an essential episode, connecting the philosophy of 
Mach and the French conventionalists with the later logical empiricism of the Vienna 
Circle around Schlick. The present paper makes three claims: (1) We make the histori-
cal claim that the lack of archival sources on the “First Vienna Circle” does not allow a 
reliable reconstruction of such a discussion group, and even allows some doubts about its 
existence, at least as a regular discussion group. (2) We emphasize the interaction of the 
young Neurath, Hahn and Frank, in Vienna around 1910, with a group of philosophers 
strongly influenced by Meinong and claim that this interaction was very advantageous 
for a reception of the new symbolic logic and especially of Russell´s philosophy of logic 
and mathematics. New archival sources permit us to reconstruct such an interaction. (3) 
We claim that this Meinongian context in Vienna shaped some philosophical positions 
of Neurath and Hahn, especially their view of the nature of logic and mathematics. We 
claim that at least Neurath, but probably also Hahn, endorsed a logical realism similar to 
that of Russell and Meinong. It was only after the reception of the Tractatus in the Vien-
na Circle that such a logical realism was unanimously rejected by the logical empiricists. 
Besides the obvious influence of Mach and the French conventionalists on the young 
Neurath, Hahn and Frank, this heritage from the Meinong school should be taken into 
account in an evaluation of the early philosophies of our mentioned trio. 
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csaba pléh 
The Impact of Karl Bühler on Hungarian Psychology and Linguistics 
This review paper analyses the influence of the theories of Karl Bühler on Hungarian 
twentieth century psychology. The Würzburg Denkpsychologie works of Bühler showed 
up in early theoretical works of Valéria Dienes in the 1910s, and later in the reviews 
and experimental studies of Ferenc Lehnert/Lénárd from the 1930s to the 1970s. Two 
Würzburg based PhD dissertations under the direction of Karl Marbe done by Anton 
Schütz on associative sets, and by Imre Molnár on the objective foundations of aesthetic 
experience show an important inspiration going back to Bühler: a commitment to the 
existence of supraindividual organizations. 
The mature Bühler of the Vienna years had a central impact on two Hungarian ex-
perimental psychologists. Paul Schiller von Harkai who spent some postdoctoral months 
in Vienna developed a functionalist theoretical psychology combining it with ideas from 
the Gestalt theories of Lewin and Bühler. He extended the ideas of Bühler about the 
universality of meaningful holistic organization of behavior into a task-centered motiva-
tional psychology. The other follower was Ludwig Kardos, a PhD student of Bühler in 
Vienna. Kardos extended the sign-based perceptual theory of Bühler into a successful 
mathematical theory of light constancy that interpreted contextual influences in a gene-
ral model. In his later work on animal memory and the origin of mental life in the 1950-
1980s period Kardos has taken up the evolutionary interests of Bühler. He proposed a 
theory of the origin of mind where the information aspect plays a leading role. In a way 
this is a continuation of the sign-based semiotic theory of mind entertained by Bühler.
miklós réDei
Parallels and Divergencies: Gödel and von Neumann
John von Neumann and Kurt Gödel are two towering figures of 20th century science. 
Their life and scientific careers had many parallels and their research interests over-
lapped. But their philosophical views about sciences, especially about the nature and 
foundations of mathematics were different. The paper highlights some parallels and cor-
relations between divergences of their philosophical positions and differences in their 
scientific research and career.
FrieDrich staDler
Austrian Philosophy: Outlines of a Discipline  
at the University of Vienna in the 20th Century
The article provides an overview of “Austrian philosophy” during the “long 20th cen-
tury” through an institutional history of the Department of Philosophy with the main 
figures teaching philosophy at the University of Vienna. After a short review of philoso-
phy as a key discipline within the Faculty of Philosophy, the development is described 
mainly from 1848 onwards with a focus on the last century. The personal and institution-
al breaks and continuities are characterized by a thematic analysis of the philosophical 
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research and teaching in historical context. This is done with a focus on the typical Aus-
trian “scientific philosophy” in its relation to alternative dominant currents is provided. 
This specific dynamics becomes manifest on the one hand with the significance of phi-
losophy within the Faculty of Philosophy and, on the other, with its role and function vis 
à vis the other classical faculties. The process of a gradual dissolution and diversification 
of the Faculty of Philosophy up to the present indicates this changing role of a long-term, 
dominant “royal discipline”. Nevertheless, the restructuring and renewal of philosophy 
as a discipline and research field since the University reform after 2000 appears as a 
successful and promising turn with an increasing international visibility and appreciation 
covering also the typical Austrian tradition in philosophy.
thomas uebel
Overcoming Carnap’s Methodological Solipsism: Not As Easy As It Seems
Methodological solipsism is the position adopted by Rudolf Carnap in his Der logische 
Aufbau der Welt (The Logical Structure of the World, 1928) according to which it is possible 
to develop, by logical construction, a conceptual system encompassing all of empirical 
science on the basis of concepts pertaining only to an individual’s phenomenal experi-
ence. In this paper I investigate whether, and if so, how, methodological solipsism can 
be effectively opposed when it is assumed – as it was until Quine’s criticism published 
only in 1951 – that the Aufbau succeeds in its reconstructive aim. I argue that Carnap had 
considerable resources to block several ways of pressing the criticism that it overlooks 
the social dimension of knowledge – but not all of them.
péter anDrás VarGa
A Snapshot of Austrian Philosophy on the Eve of Franz Brentano’s Arrival: 
The Young Bernhard Alexander in Vienna in 1868–1871
When the young Bernhard Alexander arrived in Vienna in 1868 he was not yet the towering 
figure of late nineteenth – early twentieth century Hungarian philosophy. The philosophy 
he encountered in Vienna was, too, not yet the Austrian Philosophy (with a capital ‘P’) which 
Rudolf Haller believed to have been born few years later in 1874. Based on the combination 
of unpublished sources from four archives (including Alexander’s Viennese diary entries, 
co-published in this journal issue by B. Szekér and B. Szabados) and Alexander’s early occa-
sional writings, I reconstruct the historical circumstances of Alexander’s academic peregrina-
tion in Vienna (e.g., courses attended, intellectual relationships, and writing projects). There 
is a considerable discrepancy – both in terms of the dramatis personae, their writings, and 
the involved philosophical doctrines – between the content of Austrian Philosophy and the 
snapshot of Austrian philosophy that becomes visible to us through the lens of Alexander’s 
peregrination. Yet, the latter not only temporally preceded the former, but it also constitutes 
the conceptual and historical precondition of Haller’s Austrian Philosophy. In particular, the 
young Alexander could provide us with an unfiltered picture of what Robert Zimmermann, 
his Viennese philosophical master, could have transmitted to another generation of young 
Viennese students, including Edmund Husserl, who convened around Franz Brentano one 
decade later and inaugurated Austrian Philosophy with a capital ‘P’.
